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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines competition among asymmetric firms in three different 
theoretical frameworks. The first study investigates mobile telecommunications, with 
a strong focus on access charge on off-net calls. Compared to the symmetric cost-based 
access charge regulation, whilst the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation 
facilitates entry, it dampens social welfare if, relative to the incumbent, the new firm 
is significantly inefficient in cost, distinctly inferior in reputation, and incapable of 
clearly differentiating its service from the one provided by the established firm.  
 The second study sheds light on a broader framework of infrastructure sharing 
among telecommunications firms with asymmetric cost structures. Compared to 
stand-alone investment, co-investment is deemed to be collusive in quality upgrade, 
and consequently decreases industry output and consumer surplus when infrastructure 
sharing does not yield a sufficient amount of cost saving. Even though the fully-
distributed-cost regulation can stimulate investment in quality upgrade, it undermines 
incentives to expand consumer bases, leads to price increases, and eventually dampens 
consumer welfare.  
The last study captures the competition beyond only one product market 
where a multi-product firm competes with its single-product rivals by using a variety 
of bundling strategies that impact on firms’ incentives for quality enhancement in 
different ways. The pure-bundling strategy can encourage the multi-product firm to 
invest in quality enhancement when the associated costs are comparatively low and 
the additional utility from quality enhancement is relatively high, but it certainly 
discourages the single-product firms from improving quality. In the mixed-bundling 
case, this outcome inevitably occurs in the more competitive market, and it is likely to 
be found in the less competitive market when the markets are not too different in 
competition intensity. Therefore, both bundling strategies threaten consumer welfare 
when the two markets are significantly different in competition intensity due to the 
negative influence of the market distortions after tying the two markets.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 Telecommunications services were first provided by government agencies 
because of the requirement of high investment in infrastructure and the obligation to 
the public, like other public services. After the privatisation of telecommunications 
services and telecommunications reforms, the industry has still been in need of being 
monitored and regulated by national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to ensure an 
acceptable degree of competition and social benefit. In form of commissions or  
quasi-judicial boards, the regulators have been entitled to make judgments on 
telecommunications affairs and disputes between telecommunications service 
providers. There was a rapidly growing trend in the foundation of NRAs in many 
countries around the world.  
 In competition with the incumbents, some entrants are granted licenses to 
operate as telecommunications service providers in anticipation of a boost in the 
degree of competition and consumer welfare. When telecommunications service 
providers are symmetric in terms of cost efficiency, financial constraints and market 
power, the regulators can easily achieve their goals of finance, efficiency and equity. 
However, in the real business world, firms are normally asymmetric. According to the 
main characteristics of incumbents with market dominance, the dominant firms are 
likely to seize this opportunity to corner the markets by employing predatory 
strategies and creating barriers to entry, which can hinder the improvement of market 
efficiency and social welfare. Similar to other industries, firm asymmetry between 
incumbents and entrants can lead to several crucial issues about market inefficiency 
such as predatory pricing, vertical integration, margin squeezing, collusion, tying and 
bundling. These problems seem much more complicated for the telecommunications 
regulators because the nature of the industry is oligopolistic. Consequently, in a period 
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of transition between infant markets and mature markets, the regulators continue to 
closely monitor the market efficiency in this oligopolistic situation. The regulators 
may impose behavioural interventions and/or structural interventions in order to 
promote social welfare in the long run. An example of behavioural interventions is 
price regulation, while structural interventions involve service providers’ business 
modules and organisational structures. This thesis aims to discuss some crucially 
important issues of competition and regulations in telecommunications, including 
interconnection, infrastructure sharing and service bundling in the context of firm 
asymmetry. 
1.1 Firm asymmetry in telecommunications 
Telecommunications markets are distinct from other product markets in that 
both competition and cooperation between competitive firms are likely to occur 
simultaneously. In general, firms compete for consumers to maximise their own 
profit. However, telecommunications service providers compete in the retail market 
while they also cooperate with one another to complete their services that run on not 
only their own networks, but also their rivals’ networks. Theoretically, the relationship 
among these firms is based on the concept of one-way access or two-way access. 
Competitive firms compete for end users, whereas they have an agreement in the 
wholesaler-retailer relationship. This can be seen in several telecommunications sectors 
such as mobile telephony, fixed line and the Internet. They have to agree on 
interconnection in order to allow transmission from one network to another network. 
In the mobile telephony market, they impose access charges (interconnection charges/ 
mobile termination rates) for providing call termination. This is the reason why they 
are highly interdependent.  
Moreover, after subscribing to a network, a consumer may have difficulty in 
switching to another network and accordingly become locked in the network. 
Consumers may experience high technical switching costs and a complicated 
procedure for switching networks. Similar to other experience goods, if consumers are 
satisfied with their current networks, they tend to believe that their current networks 
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are more reliable than other networks which they have never used before. This type of 
brand loyalty can influence consumers’ decisions, especially when an entrant 
struggles to introduce its service in the market where an incumbent has long been 
operating. In the mobile telephony market, the regulators in several counties try to 
lower switching cost by implementing Mobile Number Portability (MNP). This policy 
allows consumers to change their mobile networks more easily while they can also 
keep their current mobile numbers. However, there is some evidence to support that 
firms tend to set high access charges in order to soften competition. High access 
charge is also considered to be a predatory strategy in some situations. Most 
regulators recognise these problems and adopt cost-based access charge regulation to 
mitigate the distortion in retail prices.  
When the market is mature, all firms are capable of competing in strong 
competition. As a result, social welfare is enhanced and consumers enjoy the benefits 
of the competitive market. However, in the infant market, entrants are likely to be at a 
disadvantage. Incumbents are more likely to foreclose the market. The competitive 
market is impeded by the predatory behaviour of the incumbents. In addition, it is 
admitted that technology in the telecommunications industry rapidly changes. 
Therefore, the issues of asymmetry become inevitably involved in regulatory regimes. 
For instance, in the mobile market, cost asymmetry occurs when mobile network 
operators (MNOs) have different experiences and/or technologies. Advanced technology 
is mostly designed to reduce cost and bring service providers an advantage to compete 
in the market. Nevertheless, investment in more advanced technology may be 
suppressed by its prohibitively high fixed cost. Big companies that hold significant 
market power have a strong tendency to dominate with more advanced services. This 
situation may be beneficial to consumers when the big firms develop their expertise in 
telecommunications. Conversely, it may be too risky for an entrant to enter the 
market. Consequently, the regulators should facilitate entry in order to attain their 
long-run goal of fair and efficient facility-based competition.  
For example, Thai telecommunications regulator, NBTC, implements cost-
based access charge in the mobile telephony market. New network operators have 
been encouraged to compete with the incumbents in anticipation of an increase in 
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degree of competition and welfare. Mobile network operators in Thailand are legally 
required to report their termination costs to the regulator. These reports are used to 
support their proposals to collect cost-based access charges. The dominant established 
networks, which earn comparatively large market shares, have proposed significantly 
lower access charge than small networks. In 2011, AIS with the largest market share 
(43.66 %) has proposed access charge at 1.07 baht per minute. Likewise, DTAC and 
TrueMove with 30.04 % and 23.73 % of market shares have proposed access charge 
at 1 and 1.07 baht per minute respectively. On the other hand, a new mobile network 
operator, TOT, with a negligible market share of 0.15 %, has proposed significantly 
higher access charge at 1.25 baht per minute (NBTC, 2012). It is implied that the new 
network may incur higher termination cost. The new network is less likely to 
penetrate the market. The regulators should consider an effective policy to intensify 
the competition among asymmetric networks and promote social welfare.  
In addition to facility-based competition, telecommunications firms may use 
other modes of entry. Co-investment is an approach telecommunications firms adopt to 
facilitate the launch of advanced services with a lighter burden of investment in 
infrastructure. According to a business model, capital expense (CAPEX) and 
operation expense (OPEX) are claimed to significantly decrease after the costs are 
shared under co-investment. The models of infrastructure sharing vary according to 
degrees of sharing. Some firms may agree on partial sharing of some common 
facilities. Others may agree on full sharing of network and frequency pooling/trading. 
For instance, in the wireless telephony sector, both passive RAN sharing
1
 and active 
RAN sharing
2
 have been admissible in Austria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and 
UK. Meanwhile, frequency pooling/trading has not yet been admissible in Austria, 
Germany, UK and Switzerland (Frisanco, Tafertshofer, Lurin, and Ang, 2008). This 
concept of infrastructure sharing is also applied to the broadband internet market in an 
effort to hasten the next generation network deployment. However, there is some 
concern about incentive to quality enhancement under co-investment. In addition, 
                                                          
1
 passive radio access network sharing 
2
 active radio access network sharing 
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service-based entry is another approach of the infrastructure-sharing concept. Entrants 
use the incumbent’s facilities by virtue of local loop unbundling. The entrants benefit 
from the service-based entry, especially when they are concerned about the uncertainty 
of technological change and demand. The competition between a facility-based operator 
and a service-based operator may affect competition intensity and the market outcomes 
under this asymmetry situation.  
Furthermore, a telecommunications firm may provide a wide variety of services 
and also strategically offer service bundles in order to become dominant in the industry. 
As seen in the fixed broadband market, consumers have a tendency to subscribe to 
broadband internet providers that supply other telecommunications services such as 
landline, multichannel TV and mobile telephony. As seen in Figure 1.1, in the UK, 
the consumption of bundles of services served by the same service providers has been 
increasing since 2005. According to Figure 1.2, as broadband internet subscribers, the 
majority of respondents choose other telecommunications services which are included 
in a bundle offered by the same provider as broadband service. This pattern of 
consumption can be seen in many countries. 
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Figure 1.1 Take-up of bundled services over time 
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Figure 1.2 Proportion of consumers buying their fixed broadband service  
in conjunction with other communications services 
The firms that offer a wider range of telecommunications services benefit 
from their favourable position to extract rents by tying their services in the related 
markets. There is some concern about the survival of the single-product firms that are 
incapable of offering attractive bundles. The competition intensity, quality and prices 
in the context of bundling are highly debatable. For example, in Canada, bundling in 
telecommunications has been closely monitored by the regulator, CRTC. The firms 
which offer bundles have been obliged to set reasonable bundle prices on the grounds 
of a cost-oriented basis in order to prevent predatory pricing behaviour. Additionally, 
the integrated firms or the upstream firms with the bundling strategy have also been 
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monitored. The regulator aims to ensure that the downstream rivals are not threatened 
by the bundling strategy when they compete for end users in the retail markets.  
Fair and efficient regulation is a challenge for the telecommunications 
regulators. It is ambiguous to point out clear-cut policies and regulations in the 
context of firm asymmetry. However, interventions by the regulators are still necessary 
to facilitate the market outcome to approach the ideal state of efficiency in terms of 
social welfare. Suggestions for optimal regulations vary according to circumstances as 
seen in the existing literature reviewed in the next section. 
1.2 Literature review 
 This thesis focuses on the competition in the environment of firm asymmetry 
in order to investigate the competitive behaviours of asymmetric firms, especially in 
telecommunications markets. This thesis reviews the existing related literature on  
firm asymmetry issues, which have recently been brought into focus, including  
(1) interconnection in telecommunications, (2) infrastructure sharing, and (3) bundling. 
1.2.1 Interconnection in telecommunications  
Telecommunications regulators’ goal is to promote market competition among 
telecommunications service providers. Mobile telephony is one of the examples of 
these complicated market structures. Due to a small number of mobile network 
operators, they may tacitly collude and not fiercely compete with each other. 
Basically, an on-net call is delivered within the same network and an off-net call is 
originated and terminated by different networks. As a wholesaler, a network supplies 
its rivals with terminating service for off-net calls despite the fact that they still 
compete in the downstream (retail) market. Each network’s revenue is divided into 
two main components based on the Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. The first one 
is revenue from call origination. This revenue is collected from its own subscribers. 
The second one is access revenue/deficit from call termination. When a network 
originates off-net calls, it has to pay access charges to other networks which terminate 
these off-net calls. Conversely, the network generates revenue from terminating the 
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incoming off-net calls from other networks. This two-way access shapes the 
telephony markets in a complicated way. In other words, an access charge is deemed 
to be a wholesale price that an originating network has to pay for terminating service 
provided by a terminating network. Consequently, firms can influence their rivals’ 
retail prices by charging high access charge in the upstream (wholesale) market. The 
recent literature related to mobile and fixed networks reveals that network operators 
can soften competition or even foreclose the markets by means of access charge and 
retail price setting.  
Theoretical and empirical studies in this topic proposed various models 
underlain by different assumptions about the market structures. They concluded 
different findings and made alternative suggestions. Most policy implications from 
the literature give a strong focus on enhancing competition and social welfare.  
Uniform Pricing 
Under the uniform pricing scheme, on-net calls and off-net calls are charged at 
the same price. Under this pricing scheme with linear tariffs, access charge is claimed 
to be an instrument of tacit collusion (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 
1998a). Symmetric networks set high reciprocal access charge in order to prevent 
price-cutting. Under the condition that access charge is not too high and networks’ 
services are not closely substitutable, networks finally agree to choose above-cost 
reciprocal access charge and their retail prices increase with the access charge mark-
up. An equilibrium retail price is greater than perceived cost because of the effect of 
double marginalization. It is set to cover a mark-up on associated access charge 
(Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). However, in accordance with double marginalization, 
socially optimal access charge should be set below cost in order to pull the 
corresponding retail price down to the welfare-maximising level (Armstrong, 1998; 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). 
Furthermore, under uniform pricing with two-part tariffs, networks can 
generate profit from fixed fees. The profit-maximising retail price is set at the 
weighted-average associated cost of on-net marginal cost and off-net perceived cost 
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(Carter and Wright, 2003; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a; Lopez and Rey, 2009; 
Peitz, 2005). Most of the related literature assumes the balanced calling pattern. 
According to this assumption, all subscribers have an equal probability to be called 
and they are not classified as heavy or light users. Thus, the numbers of on-net calls 
and off-net calls made by a subscriber correspond to his network’s market share. Due 
to the balanced calling pattern assumption, when the reciprocal access charge is set 
above the marginal cost, a larger network can charge a lower retail price than a 
smaller network. This is because the large firm originates a greater number of on-net 
calls than off-net calls and then its weighted-average associated cost is lower than that 
of the small firm (Carter and Wright, 2003; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). 
However, the profits of both networks are independent of access charge when the 
networks reach an agreement on reciprocal access charge. At any possible level of 
access charge, the networks’ profits are not affected because they will set their retail 
prices to cover their perceived costs and reap profits from fixed fees. As a result, cost-
based reciprocal access charge tends to occur if the negotiation on reciprocal access 
charge is successful. Nevertheless, a network may reap more profit if it can set higher 
access charge than its competitor. Therefore, the networks have an incentive to 
unilaterally increase access charge and cost-based reciprocal access charge may not 
occur in equilibrium (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). 
Network-based price discrimination 
As seen in the mobile market, a network may set different tariffs for its on-net 
and off-net calls. An access mark-up directly affects a corresponding off-net price. In 
other words, off-net prices increase with associated access charges, which are set by 
rival networks. This price discrimination may ameliorate the effect of double 
marginalization because the mark-up on access charge no longer has a direct effect on 
the corresponding on-net price. In addition, the price discrimination may intensify 
competition because the average price of on-net and off-net calls is lower than the 
retail price under uniform pricing (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b).  
Under two-part tariffs, networks collect fixed fees in addition to usage fees. 
Networks choose on-net and off-net prices equal to perceived costs, and they 
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consequently gain no profit from usage fees. However, the networks still make profits 
from fixed fees. In other words, networks set retail prices as low as perceived costs 
and extract profits from consumer surplus by charging fixed fees (Gans and King, 
2001; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b; Lopez and Rey, 2009; Peitz, 2005). Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole (1998b) concluded that networks may agree to set cost-based access 
charge in order to earn the maximum profits. If networks set any mark-up on access 
charge, their profits will decrease from the maximum levels. On the contrary, Gans 
and King (2001) argued that if below-cost access charge is allowed, networks may 
agree on below-cost reciprocal access charge in order to maximise their own profits. 
As a result, each network charges its on-net price higher than its off-net price instead. 
According to the balanced calling pattern assumption, the small network is more 
attractive. This is because if a consumer chooses to join the small network, he has a 
higher probability to make off-net calls than on-net calls and accordingly benefits 
from relatively low payment. Subsequently, the networks do not have an incentive to 
expand their market shares because the big firm will experience access deficit and its 
profit will dwindle in this setting. The networks will not attract a marginal consumer 
by reducing their fixed fees. Therefore, under price discrimination and non-linear 
tariffs, setting below-cost access charge may soften price competition in this manner. 
However, below-cost access charge is unlikely to be practical in the business world. It 
is difficult to draw up a contract for below-cost access charge.  
As seen in the previous section, it is claimed that an access mark-up can be 
used as tacit collusion to avoid price war under uniform pricing with linear tariffs 
(Armstrong, 1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). Likewise, Gans and King (2001) 
concluded that bill-and-keep, which can be interpreted as no access charge (access 
charge at a rate of zero), may also increase networks’ profits and decrease social 
welfare. In addition to above-cost access charge, networks may adopt bill-and-keep 
and use this scheme as tacit collusion under price discrimination with non-linear 
tariffs. Similar to Gans and King (2001), Calzada and Valletti (2008) showed that 
even in the model of several identical firms, networks agree to choose below-cost 
reciprocal access charge and dampen competition.  
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Asymmetric networks 
The aforementioned literature concerns symmetric networks which can be 
seen only in the mature market. Networks can compete with each other without any 
entry barrier. This situation occurs at the mature stage of the industry. However, at the 
early stage of the market, an entrant enters later than an incumbent. As a result, the 
incumbent is likely to be more attractive to consumers than the entrant. Consumers do 
not carefully consider only competitive retail prices but also networks’ reputations. 
The incumbent may occupy a dominant position and take advantage of its good 
reputation and brand loyalty. Carter and Wright (2003) set up a model of asymmetric 
networks having the same cost structure but different levels of brand loyalty. In their 
model, networks compete under uniform pricing with two-part tariffs. From consumers’ 
perspectives, the incumbent is more reliable than the entrant. Thus, the entrant has to 
give extra benefit to consumers by offering a lower retail price in order to persuade 
them to choose its service instead of joining the incumbent. This asymmetry can be 
interpreted as one type of switching cost, which can cause consumers to hesitate to 
join the new network. Carter and Wright (2003) introduced a parameter representing 
brand loyalty which equally affects all consumers on the preference line in the 
standard Hotelling model. They found that if the large network and the small network 
can negotiate reciprocal access charge, the profit-maximising access charge is equal to 
termination cost which is a benchmark for the socially optimal access charge. On the 
other hand, if the networks can unilaterally set their access charges, both firms will 
choose above-cost access charges and the large firm’s access charge is higher than 
that of the small firm.  
Peitz (2005) assumed different levels of fixed utilities which consumers receive 
from different networks under two-part tariffs with network-based discriminatory 
pricing. These fixed utilities vary from network to network. If a consumer subscribes 
to the incumbent, he will gain higher fixed utility than that from joining the entrant 
because of reliability, goodwill and/or special service obtained only from the 
incumbent. The study suggests that the regulator should regulate the incumbent to set 
cost-based access charge. Accordingly, the entrant will impose an access mark-up. 
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This asymmetric access charge regulation is more felicitous than the symmetric cost-
based access charge because it can increase consumer surplus and the entrant’s profit. 
Despite a reduction in the incumbent’s profit, the asymmetric regulation is designed to 
achieve the regulator’s goals of improving consumer welfare, encouraging entry and 
promoting market competition.  
Baranes and Vuong (2012) further examined the asymmetric mobile market 
where the incumbent deploys a new technology with full market coverage but the 
entrant offers the new technology with partial market coverage and competes for the 
rest of the market with the old technology. They omitted an issue of differences in 
marginal cost of call origination and termination but emphasised the degree of 
asymmetry between networks according to the discrepancy in technology deployment. 
They asserted that the asymmetric regulation on termination charges can increase the 
entrant’s market share and intensify market competition, which benefits consumers. 
However, the asymmetric regulation reduces the incumbent’s profit. Therefore, this 
regulation may increase social welfare under certain circumstances when the positive 
impact on market competition prevails.    
Without regulatory intervention, Hoernig (2007) pointed out that the on-net/ 
off-net differential set by the large network can act as predatory pricing. Due to the 
assumption of the utility from receiving calls, the large network can reduce the utility 
of its rival’s subscribers by raising access price and accordingly pushing up its rival’s 
off-net price. In addition, the volume of outgoing calls from the large network to its 
rival network decreases. Therefore, the large network may set high access charge to 
discourage entry.  
To assess the predatory behaviour of the incumbent, Lopez and Rey (2009) 
examined the asymmetric networks regarding switching cost under network-based 
price discrimination and non-linear tariffs. Consumers will confront switching cost 
when they decide to switch from the incumbent to the entrant. The incumbent has an 
advantage from consumer inertia when switching cost is large. The incumbent tends 
to set high reciprocal access charge and a prohibitive off-net price to drive the entrant 
or the small network out of the market. They also pointed out that in the absence of 
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switching cost, the incumbent still have control over the market under the reciprocal 
access charge agreement. When network-based price discrimination is allowed, the 
incumbent or the large network probably corners the market. 
The incumbent has larger market share as a result of consumers’ perception of 
extra benefits from joining the incumbent, even though both the incumbent and the 
entrant are symmetric in cost structure and quality. The incumbent may take this 
opportunity to harm the entrant by setting high access charge. This predatory 
behaviour is reported by recent studies in the setting of two-part tariffs under not only 
network-based price discrimination, but also uniform pricing. Under uniform pricing, 
the incumbent may set such high access charge that the entrant cannot make profit 
when the networks are allowed to unilaterally set access charges (Carter and Wright, 
2003). Likewise, under network-based price discrimination, the incumbent uses high 
access charge and the price differential between on-net and off-net calls to deter entry. 
When the incumbent set high access charge to limit entry, the entrant’s off-net price 
soars and finally the entrant is not attractive (Calzada and Valletti, 2008; Hoernig, 
2007; Lopez and Rey, 2009). Thus, access charge should be rigorously monitored by 
regulators.  
There has been empirical evidence confirming that access charge plays an 
important role in retail price setting by mobile network operators. In the early 2000s, 
the volume of mobile calls was significantly lower than that of fixed-line, which has 
served the market with full coverage long before the emergence of mobile service. In 
this situation, it was asserted that an increase in mobile termination rate (MTR)
3
 could 
lead to a significant reduction in mobile retail price (the waterbed effect) in both 
theoretical and empirical studies. An allowance of mark-up on MTR could encourage 
mobile market expansion through subsidising cost of providing mobile service to 
mobile subscribers (Armstrong and Wright, 2009; Genakos and Valletti, 2011; Harbord 
and Pagnozzi, 2010). Genakos and Valletti (2015) added more recent data in their 
                                                          
3
 Similar to access charge in the present study and some theoretical work, the term mobile 
termination rate (MTR) refers to a fee for the provision of call termination by a mobile 
network operator. 
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empirical work to revisit the issue of the waterbed effect that had been found in 
Genakos and Valletti (2011). They found that the effect becomes less significant than 
the competition effect between mobile network operators because mobile has been 
growing in importance with greater outgoing-call volume than fixed-line according to 
a report by Ofcom (2014). They supported that mobile retail price decreases after a 
reduction in MTR (Genakos and Valletti, 2015) in line with the aforementioned 
findings in the relevant theoretical work (Armstrong and Wright, 2009; Calzada and 
Valletti, 2008; Hoernig, 2007; Lopez and Rey, 2009). From a theoretical perspective, 
in the situation where an entrant enters the mobile market in which an incumbent has 
already established dominance, the unregulated small network unilaterally increases 
its MTR under the asymmetric regulation (Baranes and Vuong, 2012; Lee, Lee and 
Jung, 2010; Peitz, 2005). Empirical evidence from European countries also shows that 
a smaller mobile network sets higher access charge because its access charge has a 
less significant effect on the average price and demand with regard to consumer 
ignorance (Dewenter and Haucap, 2005). However, when small firms can penetrate 
into the market and the firm asymmetry is less substantial in the mature phase of 
mobile market, the regulators in many countries, for example, Sweden, Denmark, 
Poland and Portugal, have adopted the symmetric regulation instead of the asymmetric 
regulation in expectation of welfare enhancement (Lee, Lee and Jung, 2010)  
In addition to the issue of access charge in the firm-asymmetry environment, 
Mobile Number Portability can reduce switching cost associated with the difficulty  
of changing telephone numbers. Under this scheme, consumers can change their 
networks without changing their current mobile numbers (Maicas, Polo and Sese, 
2009). This policy supports the entrant to be viable in the market by alleviating the 
asymmetry between the incumbent and the entrant. Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2008) 
also studied the effect of calling club, which locks consumers into the same network 
as their friends and families. When networks are allowed to discriminate price 
between on-net and off-net calls, the presence of calling club can be interpreted as 
switching cost, which discourages subscribers from changing their networks. 
Some studies further investigated asymmetric networks in different ways. 
Cambini and Valletti (2003) argued that networks with asymmetry in quality, but 
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identical cost, set above-cost access charge, while socially optimal access charge 
should be set below cost. They also supported that bill-and-keep should be implemented 
instead of LRIC,
4
 because the bill-and-keep agreement would stimulate investment in 
quality.  
The aforementioned studies investigated asymmetric networks in the context 
of reputation and incumbency of established firms. In order to emphasise the effects 
of this aspect of firm asymmetry, those studies generally assume that networks have 
the same cost structure, i.e. both origination and termination costs are identical among 
competing firms.  
Call externality  
Several studies assume that a caller enjoys utility from making a call but a 
receiver has no utility from answering the call (Gans and King, 2001; Laffont, Rey 
and Tirole, 1998a). Under the assumption of call externality, both callers and 
receivers have utility from making and answering calls respectively. Under network-
based price discrimination, call externality plays an important role in firms’ competitive 
behaviours and consumers’ decisions. In the absence of call externality, under network-
based price discrimination and two-part tariffs, it is claimed that networks can make 
profit from fixed fees and offer both on-net and off-net prices at perceived costs 
(Cambini and Valletti, 2003; Gans and King, 2001; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b; 
Lopez and Rey; 2009; Peitz, 2005). When call externality is taken into account, 
networks set retail prices below associated costs (Berger, 2005; Hoernig, 2007).  
Hoernig (2007) set up a model incorporating call externality and additional 
utility, which consumers receive only from the incumbent. One example of additional 
utility is the benefit from the incumbent’s reputation. It is found that networks charge 
their equilibrium on-net prices below their associated costs. Additionally, the large 
network may offer a higher off-net price than the small firm. Even though the large 
                                                          
4
 LRIC is one of the methodologies which the regulators implement in order to oblige mobile 
network providers to set their access charges on the grounds of marginal termination costs. 
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network sets higher off-net price, most consumers still choose its service. This is 
because the utility from receiving on-net calls within the large network predominates 
when the volume of on-net calls within the large network is greater than that of off-
net. Moreover, the large network’s high off-net price can decrease the volume of 
corresponding off-net calls and then reduce the utility that its rival’s subscribers 
receive from answering these off-net calls. As a result, most consumers consider the 
rival network less attractive.  
A network has incentive to widen the gap between on-net and off-net prices in 
order to put its rival at a disadvantage. According to call externality, a network may 
set a low on-net price to attract consumers, whereas it may set a high off-net price to 
decrease the number of outgoing off-net calls. Subsequently, the subscribers of its 
rival receive less incoming off-net calls, and the rival network becomes less attractive 
because of offering lower utility (Hoernig, 2007; Jeon, Laffont and Tirole, 2004). The 
incumbent with a larger network has an advantage from call externality. It can impose 
a large on-net/off-net differential and a high off-net price as a barrier to entry 
(Hoernig, 2007).  
In addition to facility-based entry, an entrant may choose service-based entry 
and other approaches of infrastructure sharing, especially when facility-based entry is 
not financially feasible. There are other forms of relationships among competitive 
firms, which are usually asymmetric in some aspects. The next section reviews the 
literature on various approaches of infrastructure sharing in the telecommunications 
industry. 
1.2.2 Infrastructure sharing  
 In telecommunications markets, facility-based firms have a great financial 
burden of investment in their own network facilities, whereas they incur only 
comparatively negligible marginal cost. An entrant with financial constraints may 
seek for access network to enter the market as a service-based firm. Moreover,  
co-investment in infrastructure is also an alternative to conventional investment, 
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especially in new advanced technology in association with incredibly high investment 
cost.  
In the mobile telephony market, there are several approaches of infrastructure 
sharing from different perspectives of business and engineering. In a business model, 
firms may agree on infrastructure sharing with contractual obligations. In a geographic 
model, a firm may share other firms’ infrastructures in the regions that it does not 
directly invest in. Lastly, in a technology model, infrastructure sharing raises several 
issues of technical engineering (Frisanco, Tafertshofer, Lurin, and Ang, 2008). From a 
technical viewpoint, mobile network operators may share their facilities at different 
levels of infrastructure sharing. The intensity of sharing ranges from a small degree of 
infrastructure sharing (firms co-invest in some common facilities but separately invest 
in other equipment) to full sharing, roaming and service-based entry by a mobile 
virtual network operator (MVNO). A higher degree of infrastructure sharing leads to a 
bigger portion of cost saving that firms are more likely to achieve (Beckman and 
Smith, 2005; Song, Zo and Lee, 2012). From an economic viewpoint, the consideration 
of infrastructure sharing is associated with not only cost saving but also market 
competition, retail price and social welfare as a whole.  
Infrastructure sharing in a single-area framework 
 In the broadband internet market, the trade-off between static efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency of next generation access network has been a debatable issue for 
over a decade. An obvious example is an issue of access networks which a facility-
based incumbent provides for a service-based entrant. This can be seen as an extreme 
level of infrastructure sharing, e.g. local loop unbundling, where the entrant pays an 
access price as a wholesale price for using the incumbent’s access network. From a 
static perspective, high access price can increase the incumbent’s profit in the wholesale 
market. Moreover, high access price may dampen market competition because the 
service-based entrant incurs a high wholesale price and its retail price is pushed up 
accordingly (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2015). In contrast, low access price 
encourages the service-based entrant to enter the retail market, and it then intensifies 
competition in the short run because the incumbent is regulated to set reasonable 
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access price. Consequently, access regulation is necessary if the regulator pays more 
attention to retail market competition from a static viewpoint. Some studies support 
cost-related access price in an attempt to promote competition and protect consumer 
welfare.  
However, from a dynamic viewpoint, the regulator should consider the trade-
off between the positive effects of access regulation on competition in the short run 
and the negative effects on investment and innovation in the long run. According to a 
literature review by Cambini and Jiang (2009), most of the theoretical studies support 
that cost-oriented access price, which encourages service-based entrants for the purpose 
of increasing static efficiency, can undermine incentives to investment and innovation. 
With low access price or cost-based access price, the facility-based incumbent has 
less incentive to develop and invest in advanced-technology infrastructure. On the 
other hand, high access price can stimulate the facility-based incumbent to invest 
more heavily in new technology. Additionally, high access price may influence the 
entrant’s strategic decision on mode of entry. With high access price, the entrant may 
find it more profitable to invest in its own infrastructure instead of leasing access 
network from the incumbent. Then, network duplication benefits consumers with a 
wider variety of services (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2015). In summary, access 
regulation may have a negative effect on incentive to invest in advanced technology 
(Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2015; Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; Cambini and 
Valletti, 2003; Godinho de Matos and Ferreira, 2011; Kotakorpi, 2006; Nitsche and 
Wiethaus, 2011; Vareda, 2010). From a static view point, the competition in the 
existing market may be less intense because of high retail price corresponding directly 
to high access price in the wholesale market (Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan, 2012; 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2015).   
Vereda (2010) further investigated the competition between a facility-based 
incumbent and a service-based entrant in the broadband market. In the study, the 
incumbent decides on further investment in quality upgrade and cost reduction. It is 
commonly found that the incumbent increases a level of quality if it can charge high 
access price. Conversely, high access price undermines incentive to reduce cost if a 
process of cost reduction requires a substantial level of further investment. 
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Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) studied an incumbent’s decision on investment 
in next generation network (NGN). Their model assumed only one incumbent and one 
entrant competing à la Cournot. The entrant is only a service-based operator and it has 
to pay access price to get access to the incumbent’s technology. They concluded that 
LRIC (an approach of cost-based access price) yields the lowest investment and the 
poorest consumer welfare amongst other access price regimes. The study shows that 
risk-sharing by co-investment yields the highest consumer welfare amongst other 
access price regimes, including the fully-distributed-cost approach and the regulatory 
holiday. 
In contrast to the majority of the relevant literature, a few studies argue that 
high access price can have a negative impact on investment in innovation under 
certain circumstances. Gayle and Weisman (2007) examined an incumbent’s incentive 
to invest in cost-reducing innovation when an entrant makes a make-or-buy decision 
to use the incumbent’s network under mandatory unbundling. In line with the standard 
result, they supported that mandatory unbundling, which encourages service-based 
competition, can undermine the incumbent’s incentive to invest. Nevertheless, similar 
to Vareda (2010), they also pointed out that the incumbent decreases investment in 
innovation when access price is raised in the access price range that preserves the 
efficient make-or-buy decision. This is because raising access price leads to an increase 
in retail price and a corresponding decrease in output, which finally discourages 
investment in innovation.  
The recent empirical evidence also supports that the access price regulation 
and mandatory local loop unbundling do not stimulate the next generation access 
network deployment (Bacache, Bourreau, and Gaudin, 2014; Bouckaert, van Dijk and 
Verboven, 2010; Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler, 2013; Briglauer, Gugler and 
Haxhimusa, 2015; Crandall, Eisenach, and Ingraham, 2013; Grajek and Röller, 2012). 
Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler (2013), using data from the EU27 member states for the 
years from 2005 to 2011, revealed that service-based competition under mandatory 
local loop unbundling has an adverse impact on the deployment of fibre optic as high-
speed broadband internet service. This finding is also confirmed by evidence from 
OECD countries. Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven (2010), using data from 20 
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OECD countries in the period from December 2003 to March 2008, found that 
broadband penetration is promoted by inter-platform competition such as cable and 
wireless, but it is impeded by service-based intra-platform competition. Therefore, it 
is suggested that the promotion of inter-platform competition is the efficient way to 
expand broadband penetration. Briglauer, Gugler and Haxhimusa (2015) employed 
firm-level data of incumbents and entrants from European countries in the period 
from 2003 to 2012. They provided significant evidence that facility-based competition 
has a positive effect on investment by both incumbents and entrants. The empirical 
evidence does not link the NGN deployment to the concept of stepping stone or 
ladder of investment (Cave, 2006; Cave and Vogelsang, 2003) that supports service-
based entry in an early phase of liberalisation in expectation of the gradual development 
of the entrants’ infrastructure along the ladder of investment after they can build up 
their consumer bases and expertise.  
The regulators take on the challenge of new regulatory regimes for NGN in 
the broadband internet market when their consideration is beyond a static framework. 
Although cost-based access price may dampen investment in NGN from a dynamic 
perspective, other alternatives still require support from a substantial number of 
related studies. Deregulation on access price or the regulatory holiday may be suitable 
under some circumstances; however, it is necessary for the regulators to carefully 
monitor the competition in NGN (Kirsch and von Hirschhausen, 2008). In the US, 
deregulation has been implemented in the broadband market for the purpose of 
facilitating the NGN deployment (Cambini and Jiang, 2009). 
Infrastructure sharing with coverage concern 
 In addition to the competition in one single area, some studies extend their 
models to firms’ decisions on coverage of telecommunications services when firms 
enter in multiple areas. In the presence of local loop unbundling, access price still 
plays a crucial role not only in firms’ decisions on investment in a single area, but 
also in the strategic coverage decision. In a single area, there is evidence to support 
that high access charge stimulates the investment of the facility-based incumbent. In 
the setting of multi-area competition, an increase in access price also gives the 
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facility-based firms an incentive to invest in the coverage expansion (Bourreau, 
Cambini and Doğan, 2012; Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2015).  
Valletti, Hoernig and Barros (2002) examined the coverage of two facility-
based networks under different regulatory policies. They focused on only one 
technology and omitted the issue of investment in service enhancement. This static 
framework boils down to a two-stage game where the two firms decide on their own 
coverage and then choose their retail prices later. On the assumption that the 
incumbent invests in larger coverage, it operates in both monopoly areas and duopoly 
areas in competition with the entrant. Like Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and 
Armstrong (2001), the study reported a very low price in duopoly areas but a very 
high price in monopoly areas. However, when price discrimination across areas is not 
allowed, the uniform price is set between the high monopoly price and the low 
duopoly price. The uniform price decreases with the entrant’s coverage relative to the 
incumbent’s coverage, i.e. the number of duopoly areas relative to that of monopoly 
areas. Moreover, a price cap imposed by the regulator also plays a role in the firms’ 
decisions on coverage. If the price cap is strict, the incumbent with monopoly areas is 
the first to be affected. The incumbent will reduce its strategic coverage in response to 
the price cap. In addition to the incumbent’s reaction, the entrant will also shrink their 
strategic coverage if the price cap is very strict. Additionally, when the incumbent is 
regulated under the coverage constraint with uniform pricing, an increase in the 
incumbent’s coverage encourages the entrant to expand its coverage according to 
strategic complement in coverage. However, an increase in the incumbent’s coverage 
is larger than that of the entrant. Consequently, the incumbent with its extended 
monopoly areas can raise its uniform price and soften the price competition in 
duopoly areas. The entrant can increase profit, while the incumbent’s total profit 
decreases due to the coverage obligation. Even though the coverage constraint with 
uniform pricing causes an increase in price, it brings telecommunications service to 
greenfield areas. Therefore, consumer welfare varies with different areas. If expanding 
coverage does not involve a too substantial increase in fixed cost, it seems to be 
worthwhile to impose the coverage constraint under uniform pricing across multiple 
areas.  
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Godinho de Matos and Ferreira (2011) studied the competition among facility-
based providers and virtual providers in the NGN deployment. They pointed out that a 
high access price reduces the number of virtual providers and forces the entrants to 
choose to invest in their own facilities instead of leasing access networks. On the 
other hand, a low access price encourages virtual providers, but it undermines the 
facility-based providers by reducing incentive to invest and lowering their profits. As 
suggested by some of the aforementioned studies, access prices should not be too high 
because they bring about a reduction in social welfare. It is also claimed that 
deregulated access price (high access price) in a high potential market (a densely 
populated or low-cost area) makes virtual operators reluctant to enter the market. 
Accordingly, it may eventually lead to a monopoly in an adjacent market, which has 
less potential (a sparsely populated or high-cost area).  
Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan (2012) captured the competition where firms 
decide to switch to newer technology while the older technology network still exists. 
In this model, the incumbent already built the old generation network (OGN) with  
full coverage in all areas. The study focuses on the new generation network (NGN) 
roll-out. If the entrant chooses to serve OGN in a particular area, it seeks OGN access 
from the incumbent on payment of access price. Like the incumbent, if the entrant 
decides to deploy NGN in a specific area, the entrant has to invest on its own NGN 
infrastructure. Similar to Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2015), they concluded that 
the entrant has an incentive to expand its own NGN coverage if access charge on 
OGN infrastructure increases.  
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2015) extended their model to different 
geographic areas. In their model, two facility-based incumbents decide upon their 
investment coverage, whereas one service-based entrant enters the market by seeking 
access network. There exist two different types of competitive areas; (1) single-
infrastructure areas with only one incumbent rolling out a network, and (2) duplicate-
infrastructure areas with both incumbents racing for infrastructure investment.  Under 
the assumption of increasing marginal investment cost in remote areas, firms have a 
tendency to duplicate network and yield a wider range of service variety in the cheap-
investment areas, but they leave the costly-investment areas with either one network 
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provider or no network roll-out at all. In the wholesale market, firms can set different 
access prices according to different competition situations in the areas. It is found that 
coverage in both area types increases with access prices. Like Bourreau, Cambini and 
Doğan (2012) and Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2013), even though high access 
price gives firms an incentive to duplicate network and to expand its coverage, it may 
cause an increase in retail price, dampen competition and finally reduce per-area 
social welfare. Thus, the regulators should consider optimal access price in 
compliance with a trade-off between dynamic efficiency (benefit from coverage 
extension) and static efficiency (service variety and competition enhancement).  
They also mentioned that the access price should not be so high that the 
incumbent corners the market. In addition, high access price may lead to unnecessary 
duplication of facilities. Further, they suggested that uniform access price among 
these two types of areas is not the optimal solution. To maximise social welfare, 
access price in single-infrastructure areas should be lower than that in duplicate-
infrastructure areas. Therefore, regulatory intervention is still necessary. However, the 
regulator can impose these discriminatory access prices only under full commitment. 
The problem of commitment is one of the regulator’s concerns. The regulator may use 
duplication-based remedies, i.e. only access price in single-infrastructure areas is 
regulated, but that in duplicate-infrastructure areas is monitored in compliance with 
the dispute resolution access price. Nevertheless, this partial deregulation policy is 
claimed to be another possible solution only under the restricted circumstances such 
as the situation where services are sufficiently differentiated. It is not a universal 
solution in the presence of partial commitment.     
Infrastructure sharing by co-investment  
Due to high investment cost, facility-based firms probably encounter financial 
difficulties in the deployment of advanced technology infrastructure. Co-investment is 
one funding approach by which firms agree to share infrastructure and financial risks. 
When firms compete in a single area and they can vary their quality enhancement 
levels, the investment level under an infrastructure sharing agreement is higher than 
that with no cooperation. An infrastructure sharing agreement can stimulate 
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investment in quality-enhanced/value-added services (Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; 
Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011). Overall, social welfare increases after an infrastructure 
sharing agreement (Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; Foros, Hansen and Sand, 2002; 
Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011). In a setting of multiple areas, it is found that co-
investment enables the deployment in further greenfield areas and expands the total 
coverage under these circumstances (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2013).  
Cambini and Silvestri (2013) investigated the effect of investment sharing in 
the broadband market. They assumed two rival firms competing à la Cournot in a 
single area. In this model, the incumbent is deciding on rolling out NGN technology. 
It has three options of investment; (1) investment without any sharing agreement (the 
incumbent collects cost-based access price from the service-based entrant, who seeks 
for NGN access), (2) basic investment sharing with the entrant without side payment, 
and (3) the joint-venture agreement. At a given level of investment, the number of 
subscribers under the basic investment sharing is higher than those under no sharing 
agreement and the joint-venture agreement respectively. However, among these 
options, the joint-venture agreement is the most effective way to stimulate investment. 
In addition to maximising their joint profit, the joint-venture firms will set the above-
cost reciprocal side payment in order to soften competition. Thus, the joint-venture 
approach is likely to yield larger profit and a higher level of investment than other 
options. On the other hand, similar to the results reported by Bourreau, Cambini and 
Hoernig (2015), Cambini and Valletti (2003), Godinho de Matos and Ferreira (2011), 
Kotakorpi (2006), Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) and Vareda (2010), no sharing 
agreement with regulated access price creates the lowest incentive to invest because 
the incumbent cannot make wholesale profit from cost-based access price. Due to the 
tacit-collusion effect, the joint-venture agreement yields lower consumer surplus and 
social welfare than the basic sharing agreement. Moreover, less incentive to invest in 
the case of no sharing agreement causes consumer surplus and social welfare to be 
lower than those under the basic sharing agreement. This outcome still occurs when 
another service-based entrant enters the market late. 
The previous studies assume that co-investment has no effect on the total 
investment cost in a particular area. Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2013) further 
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extended this assumption and found the interesting linkage between co-investment 
and the coverage expansion in the situation where co-investment is another feasible 
approach of investment in multiple areas. In the study, co-investment can reduce the 
total investment cost in a particular area if the co-investment reduces financial risk by 
raising funds from co-investors instead of from outside loans. In contrast, co-
investment may require additional equipment or transaction to operate services for 
multiple network operators. Consequently, co-investment may increase the total 
investment cost. It is found that co-investment can increase the total coverage if rival 
services are differentiated and cost reduction from co-investment is sufficiently 
significant. Additionally, access price is also associated with the coverage in this 
environment. When the facility-based incumbent increases access price, the service-
based rivals incur higher opportunity cost of leasing access network. The rivals may 
find it more profitable to co-invest with the facility-based incumbent instead. For this 
reason, the total coverage can expand. High access price can encourage the incumbent 
and the co-investors to extend their network coverage. Retail prices are pushed up and 
the competition is less intense from the static viewpoint. As seen in the aforementioned 
studies, the regulators must consider this trade-off.   
The tension between the static and dynamic perspectives on co-investment is 
also confirmed by experimental evidence. In the experimental study by Krämer and 
Vogelsang (2014), it is asserted that co-investment generates cost-reduction in the 
deployment of network infrastructure and has a tendency to push down retail prices. 
Communication about co-investment induces coverage expansion. However, tacit 
price collusion, which jeopardises consumer welfare, may occur in the retail market 
when firms can negotiate on co-investment at the earlier stage. According to these 
opposing effects of co-investment on consumer welfare, it is suggested that regulators 
should carefully consider the implementation of co-investment. This experimental 
study underlines the concern that co-investment may soften competition, as highlighted 
in the related theoretical literature.  
In the model of Foros, Hansen and Sand (2002) without the coverage issues, 
two facility-based networks agree to share each other’s networks under a roaming 
agreement in à la Cournot competition. They choose a reciprocal degree of roaming 
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quality to spill over each other under the bilateral agreement. Then, they separately 
invest in quality enhancement on their own networks. The quality enhancement gives 
additional utility to representative consumers whose utility levels of basic service are 
uniformly distributed on a certain interval. These assumptions on the demand side 
have also been adopted and developed in the related studies such as Brito, Pereira and 
Vareda (2010), Cambini and Silvestri (2012), Cambini and Silvestri (2013), Foros 
(2004), Kotakorpi (2006) and Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011). It is supported that the 
firms should be allowed to collude in the stage of investment decision because the 
collusion leads to the socially optimum level of quality spillover under the roaming 
agreement. Conversely, if the collusion is not permitted, firms’ decisions will end 
with an exceptionally higher level of quality spillover than the social optimum. 
 In addition to a specific telecommunications market, the advent of digital 
convergence facilitates firms entering multiple telecommunications sectors by 
offering various types of telecommunications services. However, this multi-service 
firm requires an enormous amount of investment. A big company with adequate 
financial support may take advantage of its dominant position by means of offering 
service bundles. Meanwhile, a small firm that provides only one single service is 
likely to be threatened in this situation. Asymmetry in scope of products/services 
plays such a key role in the markets, especially when digital convergence is growing 
in accordance with consumers’ daily life. The existing literature on product bundling 
is discussed in the next section.  
1.2.3 Bundling  
 Recent literature points out that a multi-product firm may put its single-
product rivals at a disadvantage through a bundling strategy. However, the market 
outcomes vary according to different competitive environments.  
Bundling in a monopoly framework 
 When a monopolist invests in several product markets, it can implement 
bundling as an effective tool of price discrimination. Consumers may have different 
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valuations of goods. For example, a consumer’s reservation price of the first good is 
high but that of the second good is low. In contrast, another consumer may have a low 
valuation of the first good but a high valuation of the second good. This is evidence of 
a negative correlation of valuations. In this case, the monopolist may offer product 
bundles in order to increase profit (Adams and Yellen, 1976). The consumers’ 
valuations of the whole bundle become subtly different. Bundling can encourage 
consumers to be more homogeneous. This strategy acts as price discrimination 
because the monopolist can extract consumers’ rent through the sorting effect of 
bundling. Conversely, consumer welfare decreases due to distortion of the allocation 
of goods after bundling. 
Bundling in a symmetric duopoly framework  
 The effect of bundling in a duopoly framework differs from that in the 
monopoly setting. Reisinger (2006) set up a model of two firms that compete in two 
duopolistic markets based on the Salop model of circular spatial competition. Each 
consumer is assumed to buy only one unit of product from each market. The key 
variable is consumers’ valuations of the two products. Under the negative correlation 
of valuations, the firms find that bundling decreases profit. However, in the absence 
of collusion, both firms still choose to offer bundles despite a reduction in profit. This 
outcome is similar to a prisoner’s dilemma. In this environment, some consumers 
prefer the first product from one firm but prefer the second product from the other 
firm. Therefore, bundling can persuade these consumers to be more homogeneous, 
and the competition becomes more intense. The business-stealing effect outweighs the 
sorting effect, so the firms’ profits are lower than those in the case of no bundling. 
Despite a bundle discount, the prices of individual products increase after bundling. 
On the other hand, under the positive correlation of valuations, firms can increase 
profit by bundling. In this case, each consumer prefers to buy a pair of products from 
the same firm. Each firm has monopoly power over its customer base. As a result, the 
firms can set higher prices than those under the negative correlation. Bundling brings 
about the sorting effect which dominates the business-stealing effect. Thus, the firms 
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can increase their profits because they can extract consumers’ rent by employing the 
bundling strategy.  
Following Reisinger (2006), Granier and Podesta (2010) extended their model 
to capture an issue of mergers and bundling. Unlike Reisinger (2006), they allowed 
firms to decide whether or not to merge and which firm to be merged. They found that 
in the circular model, each firm finally choose to merge with a homogeneous firm at 
the same location if the correlation of reservation prices is positive. On the other hand, 
each firm merges with a heterogeneous firm at the opposite location if the correlation 
is negative. In other words, the decision about merging depends on the correlation of 
reservation prices. After the merger, the firms can offer bundles and increase profits 
without a prisoner’s dilemma because they can choose which type of firms to merge 
with. In this situation, the sorting effect dominates the business-stealing effect 
(competition effect). The merger occurs when the merging firms are allowed to offer 
bundles. If they cannot employ the bundling strategy, there is no incentive to merge.  
 Rennhoff and Serfes (2009) also set up their model based on the Salop model. 
They focused on the upstream-downstream competition in the cable TV industry. 
Upstream firms are content providers and downstream firms are system operators. 
Consumer preference for content variety is set as a parameter. This parameter acts as 
incremental utility from bundle consumption, which affects every consumer in the 
same way. It is concluded that all downstream firms will offer mixed bundles (pure 
bundles) if consumers have moderately (extremely) strong preference for content 
variety. This is because the bundling strategy can raise profit while a prisoner’s 
dilemma does not occur.  
In a framework of symmetric firms, merging firms have an incentive to offer a 
bundle discount (Granier and Podesta, 2010; Reisinger, 2006; Rennhoff and Serfes, 
2009; Thanassoulis, 2011). However, consumer surplus and social welfare may be 
threatened by the bundling strategy. After bundling, some consumers are persuaded to 
buy bundles containing some products they do not prefer. Moreover, individual prices 
are likely to be pushed up despite a substantial discount on bundles (Reisinger, 2006). 
It is found that this distributive inefficiency may finally decrease consumer surplus 
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(Gans and King, 2006; Granier and Podesta, 2010; Reisinger, 2006; Rennhoff and 
Serfes, 2009). For this reason, some studies support forbidding bundling (Granier and 
Podesta, 2010; Rennhoff and Serfes, 2009).  
Bundling in an asymmetric duopoly framework 
Bundling is considered to be an instrument of entry deterrence. Nalebuff 
(2004) investigated the competition between an incumbent and an entrant. The 
incumbent operates in two product markets, whereas the entrant decides to enter one 
of the two markets. Thus, the incumbent still has a monopoly in the other market. If 
the incumbent cannot deter entry in the market, it will go into duopolistic competition. 
Bundling is a credible strategy for the incumbent. This is because the incumbent earns 
higher profit from bundling, regardless of the entry decision of the entrant. In other 
words, bundling can transfer market power in the monopolistic market to the 
competitive market (the leverage theory). The bundling strategy significantly 
diminishes the entrant’s profit. In some situations, it can deter entry. By contrast with 
limit-pricing, the bundling strategy becomes more acceptable because it does not 
require the incumbent to sacrifice its profit for entry deterrence.  
  Gans and King (2006) examined product bundling in two duopolistic markets. 
Each consumer purchases one unit of each product. Based on the Hotelling model, the 
consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed in a unit square. To increase their 
own profits, the allied independent firms in different markets have an incentive to 
make an agreement on a bundle discount. By contrast, their rivals, which separately 
offer their products, lose profits. However, their rivals will copy the bundling strategy, 
and then all firms will finally offer bundle discounts in equilibrium. The firms’ profits 
will be pushed down to the same level as the outcome of no bundling. Nevertheless, 
social welfare is lower than that in the no-bundling case, because bundling distorts the 
allocation of consumers by persuading consumers not to buy their preferred products.  
Gans and King (2006) also extended their model to the case of horizontal 
integration. An integrated firm aims to maximise their joint profit, while its rivals in 
both markets still operate independently. After offering bundles, the integrated firm 
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can expand its market share and earn higher profit than its independent rivals. In 
response to the integrated firm’s bundling strategy, the independent firms will not 
offer bundles by means of alliance because this may intensify the competition and 
finally decrease their own profits. Even though the individual prices and bundle 
discount in this integration model are lower than those under unilateral bundling by 
the allied independent firms in the basic model, social welfare is still threatened by 
bundling. The market share of the integrated firm expands, and the allocation of 
consumers is more inefficient. If all firms are eligible to merge in this integration 
game, they all decide to merge but not to bundle their products. This is because 
bundling will trigger more aggressive competition between the two integrated firms 
and then all the prices and profits finally decrease. As a result, there is no incentive 
for the merging firms to bundle their products. Therefore, social welfare in the case of 
the allied independent firms is lower than that in the case of bilateral integration due 
to the distributive inefficiency of the bundling outcome. 
 Thanassoulis (2007) introduced single-product consumers in addition to multi-
product consumers. The number of consumers in each group is fixed. In this model of 
two duopolistic markets, the Hotelling model is applied to the uniformly distributed 
consumers in the single-product groups in the form of unit lines and in the multi-
product group in the form of a unit square. With firm-specific preferences, the multi-
product consumers enjoy the benefit of economies of scope, i.e. saving shopping cost 
from one-stop shopping. Thus, the multi-product consumers have more elastic demand 
than the single-product consumers. In equilibrium, both firms offer bundles in order to 
reap higher profit. The individual prices are pushed up but the bundle price is set 
lower than the sum of the individual prices in the no-bundling case. However, 
bundling decreases consumer surplus. The multi-product consumers may benefit from 
a bundle discount, but they cannot choose products from different firms. Conversely, 
with product-specific preferences, all combinations of products are available to the 
multi-product consumers. In this case, a prisoner’s dilemma occurs. The profits of the 
two firms decrease after bundling. The individual prices and the bundle price are 
lower than those in the no-bundling situation. Consequently, consumer surplus 
increases.  
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Thanassoulis (2011) further assumed that one market is more intense because 
the products in this market are less differentiated than the other market in a merger 
game with firm-specific preferences. Under partial convergence, the merging firm can 
reap higher profit without offering a bundle discount. The single-product consumers 
in the more competitive market are worse off because of an increase in price, while 
those in the less competitive market are better off due to a price reduction. Thus, the 
multi-product consumers experience an increase in price. The consumer surplus of the 
multi-product consumers is still ambiguous. It can either increase or decrease 
depending on the competitive natures of the two markets. However, under full 
convergence, both merging firms definitely offer bundle discounts to increase profits. 
A multi-product consumer can reduce taste cost due to economies of scope from 
whichever bundle he chooses. Therefore, the bundles are less differentiated because 
taste cost (transportation cost in the Hotelling model) decreases. As a result, the 
merging firms have to offer bundle discounts in this stronger market.  
It is also found that under full convergence, the two merging firms compete 
for the multi-product consumers and the single-product consumers separately. The 
individual prices are equal to the no-convergence benchmark. Compared to the no-
convergence situation, the single-product consumers gain nothing from the full 
convergence, whereas the multi-product consumers are better off. Thus, aggregate 
consumer surplus increases after the full convergence. Nevertheless, a merging firm’s 
profit in the partial convergence is higher than that in the full convergence. 
Consequently, in the two-stage merger game, partial convergence is the pure strategy 
outcome. A pair of firms that merge first will take a better position. If its rivals have 
already merged, the firms will remain independent in order to mitigate the negative 
effect on their own profits. This result contrasts with the merger-wave outcome shown 
by Granier and Podesta (2010) and Reisinger (2006), and it deviates from the no-
bundling outcome under bilateral integration supported by Gans and King (2006). 
In a framework of firm asymmetry, a firm which can unilaterally offer a 
bundle is more likely to achieve a dominant position. A firm can boost its profit by 
employing a bundling strategy. If its rivals cannot implement the bundling strategy in 
response, they may lose huge profit or become on the verge of exit (Gans and King, 
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2006; Nalebuff, 2004; Thanassoulis, 2011). To survive in the market, independent 
firms may decide to lower their individual prices (Gans and King, 2006; Thanassoulis, 
2011). However, there is some concern over distributive inefficiency as an adverse 
effect of bundling, which undermines consumer welfare (Gans and King, 2006; 
Thanassoulis, 2007; Thanassoulis, 2011).  
Bundling in various types of product markets 
A bundling strategy is a profit-enhancing tool for multi-product firms not only 
in the markets of independent and complementary products, but also in the markets of 
substitute products. After a consumer buys a substitute good, his incremental utility 
from consuming another substitute good inevitably decreases. However, firms may 
offer a discount on the second product (as a bundle) to extract consumers’ rent.  
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) examined bundling in a monopoly setting of 
independent, complementary and substitutable products. The study incorporates a 
consumer’s degree of contingency, which increases (decreases) the sum of stand-alone 
reservation prices for the two products when they are complements (substitutes). The 
degree of contingency is constant across all consumers. Under the assumption of 
relatively low cost, the monopolist chooses the mixed-bundling strategy when the 
products are independent, weak substitutes or weak complements. Conversely, if the 
products are strong substitutes, it chooses not to bundle its products.  
In addition, Armstrong (2011) also showed that the competitive firms with 
substitute goods cooperate in offering a bundle discount rather than compete in price 
in order to extract consumer surplus. Bundling can act as an instrument of collusion. 
The individual price under this cooperation is higher than that under the no-
cooperation benchmark, while bundle price is lower due to bundle discount.  
Bundling and R&D 
Choi (2004) introduced R&D in cost reduction in a bundling framework based 
on the Hotelling model. Firms compete in price and they also invest in cost reduction. 
It is found that a multi-product firm with the pure-bundling strategy invest more 
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heavily in R&D in cost reduction, whereas a single-product firm reduces investment 
in cost reduction. In this framework, social welfare decreases. Heeb (2003) also 
supported that the integrated firm, which can offer bundles, increases the level of 
innovation but the single-product firm reduces investment in innovation. 
Bundling and vertical differentiation 
 The aforementioned literature focuses on horizontal differentiation, where 
consumers have different taste costs associated with the difference between their most 
preferred products and the products available in the market. In the setting of vertical 
differentiation, consumers with varying degrees of quality concern have different 
willingness to pay. Basically, in a vertical differentiation model, firms try to maximise 
their differentiation in order to avoid intense competition. The firms will choose 
different levels of product quality. Generally speaking, the firms target different 
groups of consumers. The high-quality firm attracts consumers who prefer high 
quality. Meanwhile, the low-quality firm tempts consumers whose valuation of low 
quality is subtly different from that of high quality (Tirole, 1988; Wauthy, 1996).  
Krӓmer (2009) incorporated quality decision in a model of the competition 
between a multi-product firm and a single-product firm. The multi-product firm has 
market power in one monopolistic market. It has just entered in a duopolistic market 
in which the single-product firm is an incumbent. According to vertical differentiation, 
firms differentiate themselves by choosing different levels of quality to serve different 
groups of consumers. In the absence of bundling, as an incumbent, the single-product 
firm chooses to first offer high quality because the high-quality firm can reap higher 
profit than the low-quality firm. However, the multi-product firm can transfer its 
market power from the monopolistic market to the duopolistic market by means of 
pure bundling. After bundling, the multi-product firm chooses to offer the high-
quality product. Instead, the single-product rival is forced to offer the low-quality 
product in compliance with product differentiation, and as a consequence it earns 
lower profit than the multi-product firm.  
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Avenali, D’Annunzio and Reverberi (2013) investigated the effects of bundling 
by a multi-product firm, which offers a monopoly component to be consumed together 
with another component served in the duopolistic market. Similar to Krӓmer (2009), it 
is argued that bundling is the multi-product firm’s dominant strategy that reduces the 
single-product firm’s incentive to invest in quality. The bundling strategy forces the 
single-product firm to reconsider about the efficiency of its quality investment in 
terms of sunk cost of investment and consumers’ incremental willingness to pay for 
quality. As a result, bundling can prevent undesirable investment by the single-product 
firm, and it has a tendency to improve social welfare in spite of a relatively small 
decrease in consumer surplus and the single-product firm’s profit under certain 
circumstances. Therefore, a price test to monitor a distortion of monopoly component 
price after bundling should be implemented instead of a ban on bundling. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 In the business world, dominant firms have a tendency to take full advantage 
of their dominance through their predatory behaviour, whereas cooperation among 
competing firms may lead to negotiation and collusion. As mentioned in the previous 
sections, the majority of related literature captures the competition in the setting of 
symmetric firms. Despite firm asymmetry’s crucial influence on equilibrium market 
outcomes, a few existing studies emphasise this issue. Therefore, this thesis sheds 
light on asymmetry among firms in different vulnerable situations.  
Chapter 2, Access Charge Regulations with Asymmetric Mobile Network 
Operators, suggests the optimal access charge when facility-based firms with 
asymmetry in cost and reputation agree to interconnect each other in order to 
complete off-net calls. In the unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to 
be dominant with higher access charge when its reputation is not too worse than the 
high-cost firm. The symmetric cost-based access charge regulation can eliminate the 
firms’ abilities to forcibly increase their rivals’ retail prices through setting high 
access mark-ups. Meanwhile, the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation 
facilitates the entrant’s dominance. Thus, the asymmetric regulation may be more 
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appropriate than the symmetric regulation in order to encourage the underdog entrant 
to enter the market and promote competition and social welfare on condition that the 
cost differential and the discrepancy in reputation are not too substantial and the two 
networks are differentiated enough.  
Chapter 3, Infrastructure Sharing in Telecommunications, investigates the 
effects of various approaches of infrastructure sharing, especially co-investment, on 
incentives to upgrade quality and consumer welfare. Under stand-alone investment, 
the low-cost firm is dominant with a higher level of quality upgrade than the high-cost 
firm, due to its cost saving. Co-investment can be employed to enhance both firms’ 
profits, even though the high-cost firm with lower bargaining power agrees to invest 
in a larger proportion of total investment and has lower profit than the low-cost firm. 
Compared to stand-alone investment, co-investment undermines incentive for quality 
upgrade, decreases industry output and threatens consumer welfare when 
infrastructure sharing does not yield a sufficient amount of cost saving. From the 
high-cost firm’s static perspective, access to the low-cost incumbent’s infrastructure 
under the fully-distributed-cost regulation is the most profitable mode of entry 
because of an equal burden of total investment cost. The low-cost firm may also prefer 
the fully-distributed-cost regulation to co-investment if the difference in cost 
structures of both firms is negligible. Compared to co-investment, this approach can 
stimulate quality upgrade but lower output levels and consumer surplus. The regulator 
may support co-investment, especially when infrastructure sharing can yield the 
sufficiently great benefit of cost reduction. Otherwise, the welfare-dampening collusion 
in quality upgrade is likely to occur. 
From a broader perspective, Chapter 4, Bundling and Incentives for Quality 
Enhancement, examines the competition in multiple product markets where one 
multi-product firm can employ different types of bundling, which can adversely affect 
its single-product rivals. In contrast to the symmetric market outcomes in the no-
bundling case, both pure bundling and mixed bundling, which increase the multi-
product firm’s profit but decrease those of the single-product firms in most situations, 
lead to the asymmetric market outcomes. Investment in quality enhancement made by 
the multi-product firm can be stimulated by pure bundling when the associated costs 
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are comparatively low and the additional utility from quality enhancement is 
relatively high, and similarly by mixed bundling in the more competitive market. 
Meanwhile, the single-product firms react by decreasing their quality enhancement 
levels to focus mainly on saving costs instead. This outcome is likely to be found in 
the less competitive market with mixed bundling when the two markets are not too 
different in competition intensity. Therefore, both bundling strategies may diminish 
consumer welfare when the two markets are significantly different in competition 
intensity because of the adverse impacts of the market distortions after tying the two 
markets. However, in some situations, the regulators should take into account the 
positive impacts of bundling on boosting quality enhancement.  
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the significant results and policy implications in 
the presence of various types of firm asymmetry. Additionally, there is a discussion of 
limitations of this thesis and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2  
Access Charge Regulations with 
Asymmetric Mobile Network 
Operators 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 In the mobile market, incumbents and entrants may have different cost 
structures due to differences in experience, scope of services, frequency spectrum 
and/or technology deployment. An entrant is more likely to be dominated due to late 
entry. This is a major aspect of firm asymmetry, which becomes a debatable issue 
about antitrust and predatory practices by dominant firms. Accordingly, there has 
been intense debate about whether asymmetric networks should be treated in different 
way (NBTC, 2012) in order to remove the inequalities caused by exogenous factors 
(Goral and Karacaer, 2011). The new firm may incur higher cost, and it may require 
support from the regulator in order to achieve market penetration and become 
financially viable. To encourage entry and promote competition especially in the short 
run, the regulators may impose the asymmetric regulation on access charge.
5
 This 
                                                          
5
 The asymmetric regulation on access charge has been considered to be acceptable in an 
immature market in many countries such as some European countries, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. Under this regulation, an incumbent with significant market power is regulated to set 
cost-based access charge while an entrant with small market share should set reasonable 
access charge. This regulation may promote entry of small networks and subsequently 
intensify competition. 
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problem is less complicated when firm asymmetry becomes subtle after a transition 
period of asymmetry. Therefore, the US and most of the European countries have 
implemented a glide path toward the symmetric regulation on access charge (Goral 
and Karacaer, 2011; Lee, Lee and Jung, 2010; Ofcom, 2011). The asymmetric 
regulation has been abandoned and the symmetric regulation is imposed instead, for 
example, in Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Portugal (Lee, Lee, and Jung, 2010). 
However, in some countries, especially in developing countries, there is substantial 
evidence about network asymmetry, which still plays a significant role in market 
concentration.
6
  
Most of the existing literature, however, focuses only on symmetric networks 
or asymmetric networks from a conventional viewpoint on firm asymmetry. The 
present study compares the effects of the asymmetric regulation on social welfare in 
the competition between two mobile network operators with asymmetry in both cost 
structure and reputation. In addition to the incumbent’s superior reputation as 
assumed by Carter and Wright (2003), from consumers’ perspective, the incumbent 
may be as good as or inferior to the entrant in terms of reputation, especially when 
technology has changed rapidly and legacy networks give way to newcomers. In this 
model, both firms offer their services under network-based price discrimination and 
two-part tariffs. Social welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus are closely 
examined under three different regulatory policies; (1) no regulation, (2) the symmetric 
cost-based access charge regulation, and (3) the asymmetric cost-based access charge 
                                                          
6
 For example, in Thailand, a mobile entrant sent Thai telecommunications regulator (NBTC) 
a petition about the situation where the entrant has been charged unfair interconnection charge 
from an incumbent. The entrant provided some evidence supporting that the incumbent with 
larger network had lower marginal cost than the entrant. It is evident that when the incumbent 
provides a wider variety of services than the entrant, its joint and common cost allocated to 
the voice service sector is lower than that of the entrant, which has smaller market share 
(NBTC, 2012).  
   In South Korea, there has been the imposition of asymmetric regulations such as a retail 
price cap for the incumbent, asymmetric prices of access services and an implementation 
schedule for number portability in favour of entrants (Lee, Lee and Jung, 2010).  
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regulation. The asymmetry in cost leads to the asymmetric market outcomes. In 
contrast to on-net prices, off-net prices diverge from marginal cost pricing because 
firms charge access mark-ups. The regulations on access charge are still necessary to 
eliminate the distortion in order to promote consumer surplus in this firm-asymmetry 
setting. However, the regulator should consider these regulations very carefully when 
asymmetric networks are significantly different in efficiency. It may be reasonable to 
implement the asymmetric regulation instead of the symmetric regulation when the 
cost differential, the discrepancy in reputation and/or the degree of substitutability 
between the networks are not too large. Otherwise, the asymmetric regulation 
threatens consumer welfare and the symmetric regulation is more appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
Related literature 
The telecommunications regulators in many countries monitor networks’ 
behaviours and impose some regulations on access charge in order to discourage  
the large network’s predatory behaviour regarding access charge and enhance 
competition in the mobile market.
7
 A majority of the related literature supported 
access charge regulations on two-way access between facility-based firms. In the 
symmetric setting, mobile networks may abuse reciprocal access charge to soften the 
competition as an instrument of tacit collusion (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole, 1998a). When they agree on an access mark-up, the retail prices are kept high 
to cover the access charge and they will not trigger price war. Regarding a linear 
pricing scheme, it is shown that retail prices are high because of a mark-up on access 
charge (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a). Similarly, under two-part tariffs, networks 
have profits from fixed fees and set retail prices at weighted-average associated cost 
                                                          
7
 For example, the UK telecommunications regulator (Ofcom) has applied Long Run Incremental 
Cost (LRIC) to policy on access charge. LRIC is one of the approaches on the basis of cost-
based access charge. Ofcom (2011) has announced proposed mobile termination rates (MTRs) 
for the four large mobile networks, including EE, H3G, Telefonica and Vodafone, and it has 
allowed other designated mobile communications providers to set access charges on the basis of 
being fair and reasonable.  
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of on-net marginal cost and off-net perceived cost (Carter and Wright, 2003; Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole, 1998a; Lopez and Rey, 2009). In addition, off-net price is still higher 
than actual cost even under network-based price discrimination with a linear pricing 
scheme because networks still charge access mark-ups (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 
1998b). These results indicate that double marginalisation occurs and social welfare 
may be threatened. However, regardless of call externality, networks reap profits from 
fixed fees and set on-net and off-net prices equal to their perceived costs under two-
part tariffs and network-based price discrimination. Under certain circumstances, 
networks might set access charge at cost to maximise their profit (Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole, 1998b). Moreover, Calzada and Valletti (2008) and Gans and King (2001) 
argued that networks might agree to set below-cost access charge to soften competition 
and then social welfare might decrease.  
Most relevant literature also mentions that networks may choose above-cost 
access charge to soften the competition or undermine their rivals when the regulator 
does not intervene. This behaviour is a threat to social welfare. Even though some 
studies support below-cost access charge or Bill and Keep (Cambini and Valletti, 
2003) to enhance social welfare, most regulators still choose cost-based access charge 
regulations. However, in the presence of firm asymmetry, the asymmetric regulation 
on access charge, especially in the immature market, is very important for the 
regulators to consider. This is because there is some concern that a large network with 
dominant market power has a tendency to put its rivals at a disadvantage or foreclose 
the market by setting high access charge and widening the gap between on-net and 
off-net prices (Hoernig, 2007; Lopez and Rey, 2009) in line with the findings revealed 
in this study. 
 Carter and Wright (2003) introduced competition between asymmetric 
networks in terms of brand loyalty, but the networks still have the same cost structure 
under uniform pricing. Consumers receive extra benefit only from the incumbent 
because of brand loyalty. As a result, the incumbent and the entrant are asymmetric 
from consumers’ perspective. They pointed out that the larger network prefers cost-
based reciprocal access charge. Similar to Carter and Wright (2003), Peitz (2005) 
investigated asymmetric networks under network-based price discrimination with 
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two-part tariffs. He concluded that the asymmetric regulation on access charge is 
more appropriate than the symmetric regulation because it boosts consumer surplus 
and the entrant’s profit. Stühmeier (2013) also supported the standard result that the 
asymmetric regulation in favour of the entrant can promote the entrant’s profit in the 
setting of cost asymmetry. However, it is found that there is no effect on equilibrium 
market shares as a result of network-based discriminatory pricing. Baranes and Vuong 
(2012) pointed out that the asymmetric regulation can intensify market competition 
and may enhance social welfare in some situations. However, Lee, Lee and Jung 
(2010) argued that a decrease in the asymmetry of access charges can enhance 
consumer surplus when the entrant’s cost is low and the degree of substitutability 
between services is high.  
In the recent empirical literature, retail prices significantly decline after access 
charges decrease under the cost-based access charge regulation. Nevertheless, there  
is no evidence to support the adverse effect of the regulation on mobile network 
operators’ profits (Genakos and Valletti, 2015). Additionally, Dewenter and Haucap 
(2005) employed data from some European mobile network operators to confirm that 
the small networks have incentive to increase their access charges under the 
asymmetric regulation. This empirical evidence supports the result of the present 
study along with the relevant theoretical literature. However, the conclusions about 
the asymmetric regulation may vary according to different concerns and perspectives.  
In the next section, the model of asymmetric networks under two-part tariffs 
and network-based discriminatory pricing is illustrated. The different cost structures 
and the parameter of asymmetry in reputation are introduced. In Section 2.3, the 
market outcomes and the effects of three regulatory policies on the equilibrium 
outcomes are discussed. Policy implications are also mentioned. Finally, Section 2.4 
concludes the findings and suggestions for the regulators.  
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2.2 Model  
There are only two mobile network operators providing one type of service 
8
 
with the same quality in the market. Network 1 has lower cost than network 2. From a 
static point of view, both networks have already invested in network facilities and 
entered the price competition. A consumer can subscribe to only one network. 
According to Mobile Number Portability, it is assumed that subscribers can change 
their mobile networks without switching cost. Consequently, there is no locked-in 
consumer. The networks compete for subscribers who are uniformly differentiated 
based on the standard Hotelling model. Consumers are located on the interval [0,1]. 
Both networks are available with full coverage, and they situated at both ends of  
the Hotelling line. Network 1 is at point 0 and network 2 is at point 1. Consumers  
have different preferences. A consumer’s preference for a particular network can be 
interpreted as the distance between the consumer’s location and the network’s 
location. The closer the consumer and the network are located, the stronger preference 
for the network the consumer has. This is because the consumer has disutility known 
as transportation cost in the Hotelling model. The disutility corresponds to the 
discrepancy between the consumer’s ideal network and the network which is available 
for him to join. In the model of two mobile networks, 𝑡 represents disutility per unit of 
distance on the interval [0,1]. The disutility is assumed to be a linear function of 
distance.  
According to the assumption of full coverage, following Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole (1998a), fixed surplus of connecting to network 𝑖 (𝜇𝑖) presumably outweighs 
the disutility from not connecting to an ideal network.
9
 As a result, no one rejects 
joining a network.  𝜇𝑖   is constant and derived from network 𝑖 ’s reputation related to 
its popularity, reliability of service or brand image. The network with a better 
                                                          
8
 This study can be applied to voice service, texts and other types of service. 
9
 Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) assumed that in the setting of symmetric networks, both 
networks offer consumers equal fixed surplus from being connected to either network. 
However, in this study, asymmetric networks provide different levels of fixed surplus. 
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reputation gives a higher level of fixed surplus to consumers.  𝛽 is the parameter of 
asymmetry in reputation, which represents the difference between the fixed surplus 
levels of the two networks.  𝛽 = 𝜇1 − 𝜇2.  In addition to the model of Carter and 
Wright (2003), which only assumed  𝛽 > 0 , this study adopts 𝛽  which can be 
positive, negative or zero. 𝛽 > 0 if network 1 (the low-cost firm) provides larger 
fixed surplus than network 2 (the high-cost firm), e.g. network 1 may be well-known or 
more reliable than network 2, whereas 𝛽 < 0 if network 1 offers smaller fixed surplus 
than network 2 (network 2 earns a better reputation than network 1). Lastly, 𝛽 = 0 if 
the two networks offer the same amount of fixed surplus to consumers. Therefore, 
consumers perceive that the two networks are symmetric in reputation.
10  
In the absence of switching cost, consumers can alternate between the two 
networks unconditionally. A consumer will choose the network which offers him 
higher net utility. A subscriber choosing network 𝑖 will obtain net utility (𝑤𝑖). Both 
networks compete in two-part tariffs. Network 𝑖 offers on-net price (𝑝𝑖), off-net price 
(?̂?𝑖) and fixed fee (𝐹𝑖). After an agreement on interconnection, each network completes 
its incoming off-net calls and accordingly collects access charge from its rival. 
Network 𝑖 sets access charge (𝑎𝑖) unilaterally.   
Due to the balanced calling pattern assumption, every consumer has the same 
probability to be called. Thus, the number of receivers who are in the same network as 
a caller and that in the opposite network are indicated by market shares.  𝛼1 is the 
market share of network 1; accordingly,  𝛼2 = 1 − 𝛼1 is the market share of network 2. 
Utility of receiving calls is dropped out to simplify the model. A consumer’s net 
utility (𝑤𝑖) is detailed below.   
𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑖, ?̂?𝑖, 𝐹𝑖) = net surplus of making on-net calls + net surplus of making off-net calls  
     – fixed fee 
                                                          
10
 In this study, the networks’ reputations are exogenous and assumed to be constant. However, 
from a dynamic perspective, reputation may depend on endogenous variables such as market 
shares, service quality and networks’ strategies. For this reason, one may enable networks to 
vary their reputation levels in a model. 
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𝑤1(𝑝1, ?̂?1, 𝐹1) = 𝛼1𝜈(𝑝1) + 𝛼2𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝐹1                                  (2.1) 
𝑤2(𝑝2, ?̂?2, 𝐹2) = 𝛼2𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝛼1𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝐹2                                 (2.2) 
𝜈(𝑝) is a consumer’s net surplus from making a call as given below. 
𝜈(𝑝) =  max
𝑞
 {𝑈(𝑞) − 𝑝𝑞} =  
1
2
− 𝑝 +
𝑝2
2
                                   (2.3) 
𝑝 is usage price. 𝑝 ∈  { 𝑝1, 𝑝2, ?̂?1, ?̂?2}. Consumers have the identical demand function. 
However, each subscriber may generate different traffic flow of calls because he 
experiences different levels of retail prices according to the network he subscribes to. 
In this model, without the assumption of call externality, a caller has to pay for 
making a call (Calling Party Pays) and a receiver pays no charge to answer that call. 
A consumer’s gross surplus of making a call is given by 𝑈(𝑞) = 𝑞 −
1
2
𝑞2, where  𝑞 is 
call duration in terms of minutes, corresponding to associated usage price (𝑝) ; 
𝑞 ∈  { 𝑞1, 𝑞2, ?̂?1, ?̂?2}.
11
 
In equilibrium, a marginal consumer who is indifferent to both networks obtains 
the same utility from joining network 1 as network 2. This utility consists of the net 
utility (𝑤𝑖), fixed surplus from reputation (𝜇𝑖) and disutility from not connecting to 
his ideal network. The marginal consumer is situated at point 𝛼1 on the interval [0,1]. 
The position of the marginal consumer indicates the market share of network 1. Thus, 
                                                          
11
 For simplicity, every subscriber is assumed to have an identical utility function of making a 
call. As a result, demand function of making a call is shown below. 
 𝑈′(𝑞) = 𝑝 
1 − 𝑞 = 𝑝 
Consequently, the demand function is linear; 𝑞(𝑝) =  1 − 𝑝 where 𝑝 ∈ { 𝑝1, 𝑝2, ?̂?1, ?̂?2} and 
𝑞 ∈ { 𝑞1, 𝑞2, ?̂?1, ?̂?2} respectively. 
However, some studies assumed other forms of utility function and demand function. 
For example, Hoernig (2007) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a, 1998b) employed a constant 
elasticity demand function. 
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from the marginal consumer’s viewpoint, the utility from network 1 is equal to that 
from network 2 as shown below.  
𝑤1 + 𝜇1 − 𝑡𝛼1 = 𝑤2+ 𝜇2 − 𝑡(1 − 𝛼1) 
𝑤1 + 𝛽 − 𝑡𝛼1 = 𝑤2 − 𝑡(1 − 𝛼1)        
𝜎 ≡
1
2𝑡
  is the degree of substitutability between the two networks.
12
  
By substituting 𝑡 =
1
2𝜎
  in the above equation and rearranging it, market share 
of network 1 is    
𝛼1(𝑝1, ?̂?1, 𝑝2, ?̂?2, 𝐹1, 𝐹2) =
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝑤1(𝑝1, ?̂?1, 𝐹1) − 𝑤2(𝑝2, ?̂?2, 𝐹2)]        (2.4) 
The two networks have different cost structures. This asymmetry may result 
from sequential entry, asymmetric allocation in frequency spectrum resources, 
differences in frequency bands and/or discrepancies in technology deployment, which 
directly affect marginal costs. It is assumed that the networks incur different marginal 
costs of originating and terminating a call, but they have the same cost of connecting a 
subscriber. 𝑓𝑖  is the cost from connecting a subscriber such as network connection 
cost, billing cost and administration cost to deal with a customer as lump sum of firm 
𝑖; 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. For simplicity, assume 𝑓1 = 𝑓2.
13
 To deliver a call, the relevant networks 
provide call origination, call transit and call termination. Call transit occurs when 
signals or data is transferred from the originating facilities to the terminating facilities. 
Firm 𝑖 has marginal cost of originating a call (𝑐0𝑖) and marginal cost of terminating a 
                                                          
12
 Following Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a), the degree of substitutability (𝜎) is positive. If  
𝜎 approaches zero, the two networks are extremely differentiated. Conversely, if 𝜎 is high, 
the two networks are closely substitutable.  
13
 The purpose of this study is to investigate on-net prices and off-net prices offered by the 
two networks which have different cost structures. This model assumes that the networks have 
asymmetric origination and termination costs because these costs play an important role in 
price setting. The cost of connecting a subscriber may vary among competing firms according 
to administration and management, which are not the main focus of this study. For simplicity, 
both networks’ fixed costs of connecting a subscriber (𝑓𝑖) are assumed to be identical.  
 
 
58 
 
call (𝑐𝑡𝑖) in terms of per-minute expense; 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. Cost of call transit is assumed to 
be zero for simplicity. Therefore, total marginal cost for an on-net call is 𝑐0𝑖 + 𝑐𝑡𝑖. It is 
assumed that marginal origination cost and marginal termination cost of one network 
are identical because they involve the same facilities to originate an outgoing call and 
terminate an incoming call.
14
 Moreover, fixed cost such as joint cost and common 
cost on facilities is assumed to be zero.  
In this study, it is assumed that the two networks do not enter the market at the 
same time. The new firm enters the market when the established firm has already 
operated in the market. The established firm may have experience or economies of 
scale in the monopolistic period, and accordingly its marginal cost is lower than that 
of the new firm. In contrast, it is also possible that the established firm has higher 
cost. The new firm may invest in cost-reduction technology or have the advantages of 
frequency spectrum allocation, while the established firm still sticks to the sunk cost 
of its old facilities and cannot upgrade its facilities immediately. As a result, the new 
firm may incur lower cost than the established firm.
15
 In this model, origination and 
termination costs of network 1 are assumed to be lower than network 2. Origination 
cost (𝑐0𝑖) and termination cost (𝑐𝑡𝑖) can be compared in the following way.  
 𝑐0𝑖 = 𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 ;  𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
𝑐1 < 𝑐2  and  𝑓1 = 𝑓2 
In order to assess the asymmetric access charge regulation which tends to be 
implemented to stimulate market entry in the situation where the new firm has the 
disadvantage of its higher cost, this study focuses mainly on the case that the 
established firm incurs lower cost.  
                                                          
14
 For instance, some Thai mobile network operators revealed that their origination cost and 
termination cost are equal because the technical process of call origination and termination 
normally deploys the same network facilities (NBTC, 2012). 
 
15
 An example of the different technologies is 3G technology which is more advanced and 
expected to yield lower marginal cost than 2G technology (Ofcom, 2011). 
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The structure of two-part tariffs (post-paid scheme)  
 Both networks impose two-part tariffs (post-paid pricing scheme) under 
network-based price discrimination. A subscriber first spends on fixed fee (𝐹𝑖) to 
connect to a network. Then, he pays usage fees (𝑝𝑖, ?̂?𝑖) when he makes calls.
16
 Profit 
of network 𝑖 is comprised of the revenue from providing service to its subscribers and 
the access revenue. The revenue collected from its subscribers consists of profit from 
providing on-net calls, originating off-net calls, and charging fixed fee. In addition, 
network 𝑖 collects per-minute access charge (𝑎𝑖) from network 𝑗 when it terminates 
incoming calls originated by network 𝑗;  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2}  and  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Profit function can be 
written as 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖[𝛼𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 2𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖) + 𝛼𝑗(?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑖 − (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗)?̂?𝑖) + 𝐹𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖]                      
                  +𝛼𝑗[𝛼𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗].                                                                             (2.5) 
Timing of the game 
To find the equilibrium outcome, a two-stage game is set up and solved by 
backward induction.
17
 
Stage 1 The two networks agree on interconnection and set their own access 
charges simultaneously.  
Stage 2 The networks compete in price competition by setting fixed fees, on-net 
prices and off-net prices simultaneously.  
 
                                                          
16
 In several countries such as the UK, networks recently offer a wide variety of mobile 
contracts instead of typical two-part tariffs (monthly subscription and usage fees). However, 
the model follows the conventional models of two-part tariffs. In this setting, the cost of 
connecting a customer (𝑓𝑖) may include cost of free allowance of service, which is offered in  
a recent pricing scheme. If a consumer uses up his free allowance, then he has to pay usage 
fees for additional calls.    
17
 In this model, the entrant has already entered in the market and hence a dynamic viewpoint 
of entry and exit is beyond this framework.   
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Scenarios 
The market outcomes are investigated in the three following scenarios. The first 
two scenarios are observed as benchmarks. The market outcome, aggregate consumer 
surplus and aggregate producer surplus in the last scenario will be compared with the 
two benchmarks.   
I. Benchmark 1: the unregulated market  
The first benchmark concerns the equilibrium market outcome without any 
regulatory intervention. Both networks can set their own access charges unilaterally. 
II. Benchmark 2: the symmetric cost-based access charge 
regulation 
The second benchmark introduces the symmetric regulation on access charge. 
Each network is regulated to set access charge at termination cost. Profit function of 
network 𝑖 is  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖[𝛼𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 2𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖) + 𝛼𝑗(?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑖 − (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗)?̂?𝑖) + 𝐹𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖]                (2.6)                     
where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
III. The asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation 
To assess the asymmetric regulation, which is usually adopted for the purpose 
of facilitating entry of a vulnerable entrant, this scenario focuses only on the situation 
where the new firm has higher cost and smaller market share. The established firm 
(network 1 with low cost) is regulated to impose cost-based access charge, 𝑎1 = 𝑐1. 
On the other hand, the new firm (network 2 with high cost) is allowed to set 𝑎2. Thus, 
profit functions of network 1 and network 2 are as follows. 
𝜋1 = 𝛼1[𝛼1(𝑝1𝑞1 − 2𝑐1𝑞1) + 𝛼2(?̂?1?̂?1 − (𝑐1 + 𝑎2)?̂?1) + 𝐹1 − 𝑓1]             (2.7) 
𝜋2 = 𝛼2[𝛼2(𝑝2𝑞2 − 2𝑐2𝑞2) + 𝛼1(?̂?2?̂?2 − (𝑐2 + 𝑐1)?̂?2) + 𝐹2 − 𝑓2]                       
+𝛼1[𝛼2(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]                                                                                  (2.8) 
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Social welfare 
Aggregate consumer surplus (𝐶𝑆) is the sum of all consumers’ utility. Each 
consumer’s utility consists of the net utility from making calls, the differential of the 
two networks’ fixed surplus levels from reputation (if he chooses network 1) and the 
disutility from choosing a network which is not his ideal networks.  
𝐶𝑆 =  [𝛼1(𝑤1 + 𝛽) − ∫ 𝛼𝑡
𝛼1
0
𝑑𝛼] + [𝛼2𝑤2 −∫ (1 − 𝛼)𝑡
1
𝛼1
𝑑𝛼]  
𝐶𝑆 =  𝛼1(𝑤1 + 𝛽) + (1 − 𝛼1)𝑤2 − [
[𝛼1
2 + (1 − 𝛼1)
2]
4𝜎
]                      (2.9) 
𝛼1(𝑤1 + 𝛽) is the sum of the net utility of the consumers who subscribe to 
network 1 (the low-cost firm), including the differential of fixed surplus levels. 
 (1 − 𝛼1)𝑤2 is the sum of the net utility of the consumers who subscribe to 
network 2 (the high-cost firm). 
 [
[𝛼1
2+(1−𝛼1)
2]
4𝜎
] is the total of all consumers’ disutility from connecting to either 
network 1 or network 2 which is not their ideal networks.  
Aggregate producer surplus (𝑃𝑆) is the sum of both networks’ profits. 
𝑃𝑆 = 𝜋1+𝜋2                                                            (2.10) 
Social welfare is the total of consumer surplus and producer surplus. 
2.3 Analysis    
 The market outcomes of the three scenarios are compared in the following 
sections. The equilibrium outcome of the unregulated market and that of the symmetric 
cost-based access charge regulation are benchmark 1 and benchmark 2 respectively. 
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2.3.1 Benchmark 1: the unregulated market 
 In this scenario, firms are allowed to set their own access charges unilaterally. 
 The behaviour of mobile network operators in the unregulated 
market 
Firms have three instruments (on-net price (𝑝𝑖), off-net price (?̂?𝑖) and fixed 
fee (𝐹𝑖)) to compete for subscribers in the second stage of the game. For simplicity, 
fixed fee (𝐹𝑖) is rearranged as a function of market share 𝛼𝑖. If a network varies its 
usage prices and intends to keep its market share constant, it has to change its fixed 
fee in order to balance its net utility. In the second stage of the game, after 
differentiating profit function with respect to on-net price, off-net price, and market 
share, the profit maximising outcome is as follows.  
𝑝𝑖
∗ = 2𝑐𝑖  and  ?̂?𝑖
∗ = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗 ;  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                      (2.11) 
Proposition 2.1 
When asymmetric networks compete under network-based price discrimination 
and two-part tariffs, both the high-cost firm and the low-cost firm set usage prices 
equal to their perceived costs 
18
 (marginal cost pricing). The high-cost firm offers 
higher on-net price than the low-cost firm, i.e. 𝑝2
∗ > 𝑝1
∗.   
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.1). 
Both equilibrium on-net prices and off-net prices are based on marginal cost 
pricing. This outcome is not different from the relevant literature about two-part 
tariffs in the setting of identical cost among firms (Cambini and Valletti, 2003; Gans 
and King, 2001; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b; Lopez and Rey, 2009; Peitz, 2005). 
When networks charge two-part tariffs, they set usage prices at perceived costs and 
                                                          
18
 Perceived costs vary according to call termination. The perceived cost of an on-net call is 
the sum of actual marginal costs of call origination and call termination in the same network. 
The perceived cost of an off-net call is the total of actual marginal origination cost and access 
charge imposed by the terminating network. 
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cannot make profit from originating calls. Therefore, the profit function depends only 
on the revenue from fixed fee and the revenue from terminating incoming off-net calls 
(access revenue). In addition, when a firm increases fixed fee, two effects on profit 
occur. On one hand, the direct effect of an increase in fixed fee leads to an increase in 
profit from subscription. On the other hand, the indirect effect may reduce its market 
share because its corresponding net utility drops and the marginal consumer may 
switch to the other network instead. When the firm loses its market share, there is a 
reduction in the total fixed fee revenue and access revenue may also decrease. As a 
result, the profit-maximising fixed fee should balance these two effects in order that 
the network’s profit reaches the maximum.  
Remark 2.1  
In the unregulated market, the critical value of asymmetry parameter (?̂?) 
indicating the dominant network is 
?̂? = −
1
2
[𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗) − 𝜈(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(𝑐2 + 𝑎1
∗) + 𝜈(2𝑐1)]  < 0. 
The low-cost firm (network 1) holds larger market share than the high-cost firm if 
𝛽 > ?̂?. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.2). 
The critical value of asymmetry parameter (?̂?) is determined by costs of the 
two networks. ?̂? is negative. Even though the low-cost has a worse reputation than the 
high-cost firm (but the asymmetry parameter is still greater than the critical level ?̂?), 
the low-cost firm still serves a majority of consumers. This is because the low-cost 
firm is more efficient in cost and offers lower usage prices to attract customers. From 
a static point of view, marginal cost is exogenous, so firms cannot adjust their cost 
structure in the short run. To take over the dominant position, the high-cost firm has 
to build up its reputation to be much better than the low-cost firm until the asymmetry 
parameter is less than the critical level. In addition, when the cost differential 
decreases, the critical value of asymmetry parameter increases and the gap between 
the two networks’ market shares is narrowed. A network’s market share is determined 
by the asymmetry parameter and both networks’ cost structures.  
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Proposition 2.2  
The network with larger market share sets higher fixed fee and earns higher 
profit than the network with smaller market share.  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.3).  
 According to marginal cost pricing for usage fees, the networks have profit 
only from fixed fee revenue and access revenue. Assuming both firms have the same 
per-subscriber connecting cost (𝑓1 = 𝑓2 ), when the two networks have different sizes 
of market shares in the asymmetric equilibrium, the large firm (the firm with larger 
market share) will charge higher fixed fee than the small firm. Nevertheless, the large 
firm still holds larger market share despite its higher fixed fee because it offers more 
attractive utility from lower on-net price and/or higher fixed surplus from reputation. 
Consequently, the majority of the consumers still perceive that the large firm’s benefit 
outweighs the disadvantage of its higher fixed fee.  
Proposition 2.3 
Both networks unilaterally choose above-cost access charges, i.e. 𝑎1
∗ > 𝑐1 and 
𝑎2
∗ > 𝑐2. The network with larger market share sets higher mark-up on access charge 
than the network with smaller market share.  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.4).  
In the absence of access charge regulations, both firms unilaterally charge 
mark-ups on access charges in the first stage of the game. Accordingly, the off-net 
prices, which are equal to their perceived costs, are higher than their actual marginal 
costs because the prices are set to cover the associated access mark-ups. Similar to the 
findings under uniform pricing reported by Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole (1998a), this result strongly indicates the appearance of tacit collusion in this 
environment of cost asymmetry. They will not trigger price war through off-net call 
pricing. In contrast to some findings supporting that firms with identical costs would 
agree on a cost-based reciprocal access charge (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b) or 
even a below-cost reciprocal access charge (Calzada and Valletti, 2008; Gans and 
King, 2001), this study reveals that when the networks have different costs, the 
dominant firm will take advantage of the cost difference and a gap in above-cost 
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access charges. The above-cost off-net prices do not approach the socially optimal 
prices, which should equal the actual marginal costs. Regardless of the access mark-
ups, on-net prices are intact. Both networks still charge their on-net prices at the 
actual marginal costs.  
It is also found that the large network sets not only higher fixed fee, but also 
higher access charge than the small network. When a network increases access 
charge, there are both positive and negative effects on its own profit. First, when its 
access charge increases, its rival’s off-net price is pushed up. As a result, its own 
market share may expand, and its profit increases accordingly. Second, when its 
access charge increases, its rival adjusts by lowering its fixed fee. In order to tackle its 
rival’s reaction, the network has to lower its fixed fee, which has a negative impact on 
its own profit. For the large network, the first effect more significantly outweighs the 
second effect, compared to the small network. Therefore, the large network can set 
higher access charge and earn higher profit than the small network.  
In the absence of asymmetry in reputation (𝛽 = 0), the low-cost firm certainly 
has larger market share because of its cost efficiency. Further, when the two networks 
are different in reputation, the low-cost firm is more likely to be the large network. If 
its reputation is not too bad, compared to that of the high-cost firm, the low-cost firm 
has larger market share and gains higher profit than the high-cost firm. However,  
the differences in the firms’ market shares and profits become subtle when the 
discrepancy in reputation decreases. When the low-cost firm’s reputation declines 
(𝛽 decreases), the low-cost firm loses its power to set a comparatively high fixed fee 
and a relatively high access charge (to forcibly increase its rival’s off-net price) 19. As 
a result, the firm loses profit. Moreover, when its reputation is comparatively extremely 
bad, the low-cost firm cannot preserve its dominant position in the market. The low-
cost firm becomes the small network and earns lower profit than the high-cost firm, 
which turns to be the large network instead. 
                                                          
19
  
𝑑𝑚1
𝑑𝛽
> 0 where  𝑚1 is a mark-up on access charge of network 1;  𝑚1 = 𝑎1 − 𝑐1. See proof 
in the appendix (Section 2.5.5). 
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 Comparative statics analysis  
In the unregulated market, the effects of the asymmetry parameter (𝛽), the 
degree of substitutability (𝜎) and the networks’ costs on the equilibrium outcomes are 
as follows.  
Observation 2.1  
(i) When the asymmetry parameter increases, the low-cost firm can expand its 
market share, i.e.  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝛽
> 0.   
(ii) When the degree of substitutability between the networks is higher, the 
market share of the large network expands. As a result, the gap between the market 
shares of the two networks is wider, i.e. when 𝛼𝑖
∗ > 𝛼𝑗
∗,  
𝜕𝛼𝑖
∗
𝜕𝜎
> 0 and  
𝜕(𝛼𝑖
∗−𝛼𝑗
∗)
𝜕𝜎
> 0; 
𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
(iii) When a network’s cost increases, its market share decreases but its rival’s 
market share increases, i.e. 
𝜕𝛼𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑐𝑖
< 0, 
𝜕𝛼𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑐𝑖
> 0 where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
(iv) When a network decides to increase its access charge, equilibrium fixed 
fees of both networks decrease, i.e. 
𝜕𝐹𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
< 0, 
𝜕𝐹𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
< 0 where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.6). 
 Market share is affected by several exogenous factors. Firstly, when a network’s 
reputation grows, the network can increase the number of its subscribers and finally 
expand its market share.  
Secondly, if the two networks are slightly substitutable, some consumers 
decide not to switch to join the large network because they still have some benefit 
from the small network which is closer to their ideal networks than the large network. 
On the other hand, if the two networks are more substitutable, some of these 
consumers may decide to join the large network instead. Therefore, if the networks 
are closer competitors in terms of substitutability, the large network can expand its 
market share more easily. Subsequently, the small network is more likely to leave the 
market. As a result, differentiating service can be one of the small firm’s strategies to 
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penetrate the market in this setting. In other words, when the degree of substitutability 
is higher or the horizontal differentiation (represented by 𝑡) is closer to zero, the 
competition approaches the conventional Bertrand price competition. However, this 
study focuses on the shared-market equilibrium. Thus, the degree of substitutability 
should not be too high when compared to the cost differential.
20
  
Thirdly, the difference in cost is a key factor in the asymmetric outcomes. 
When a network’s cost increases, its on-net price certainly goes up. From consumers’ 
perspective, the network’s service is less attractive. Some of its subscribers switch to 
its rival, and consequently its market share decreases. Accordingly, its rival’s market 
share increases.  
In addition to the three exogenous factors, in equilibrium, a network’s decision 
on access charge affects fixed fee pricing in the later stage. When a network increases 
its access charge, it is likely to gain more profit from access revenue. Nevertheless, its 
rival will react by reducing fixed fee. The network has to decrease its own fixed fee to 
discourage some customers from switching to its rival. Consequently, if a network 
decides to push up its access charge, the profit-maximising fixed fees of both firms 
will decrease. 
2.3.2 Benchmark 2: the symmetric cost-based access charge 
regulation 
The high-cost firm and the low-cost firm are regulated to set their access 
charges at termination costs.  
 The behaviour of mobile network operators under the symmetric 
cost-based access charge regulation. 
When 𝑎1 = 𝑐1 and 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 in the first stage of the game, according to (2.11), 
the on-net and off-net prices are shown below.  
                                                          
20
 See proof in the appendix (Section 2.5.7). 
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𝑝𝑖
∗ =  2𝑐𝑖   and   ?̂?𝑖
∗ = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗  ;  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
According to the assumption that the marginal costs of network 1 are less than 
those of network 2, the on-net price of the high-cost firm is higher than off-net prices 
of both networks.  𝑝2
∗ > ?̂?2
∗ = ?̂?1
∗ > 𝑝1
∗. 
Proposition 2.4  
Under the symmetric cost-based access charge regulation, both firms set their 
on-net prices at actual marginal cost. The high-cost firm offers higher on-net price 
than the low-cost firm. However, both firms offer the same level of off-net prices 
which equals actual marginal cost.  
Proof  
Both networks still set the profit-maximising usage fee in accordance with 
marginal cost pricing. From (2.11), 𝑝1
∗ = 2𝑐1, 𝑝2
∗ = 2𝑐2, ?̂?1
∗ = ?̂?2
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2.      
 Under the symmetric regulation, on-net and off-net prices of the two networks 
are set at cost because no access mark-up is allowed. The low-cost firm can set on-net 
price lower than the high-cost firm due to its cost efficiency. 
Remark 2.2  
Under the symmetric cost-based access charge regulation, the critical value of 
asymmetry parameter (?̂̂?) is  
?̂̂? = −
1
2
[𝜈(2𝑐1) − 𝜈(2𝑐2)]  < 0. 
The low-cost firm has larger market share if 𝛽 > ?̂̂?. Moreover, the critical value under 
the symmetric regulation (?̂̂?) is greater than that in the unregulated market (?̂?), i.e. 
?̂̂? > ?̂?. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.8). 
The symmetric regulation eliminates the effect of access mark-up that is 
strategically imposed by the low-cost firm. As a result, the critical value of asymmetric 
parameter is higher than that in the unregulated market because it depends only on the 
cost differential. The high-cost firm has a greater tendency to take over the dominant 
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position under the symmetric regulation than in the unregulated market
21
, especially 
when the high-cost firm has a better reputation. 
Proposition 2.5 
Under the symmetric cost-based access charge regulation, the network with 
larger market share sets higher fixed fee and earns higher profit than the network with 
smaller market share. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.9).  
 Under the symmetric regulation, both on-net prices and off-net prices are 
equal to their actual marginal costs. Firms generate profit only from fixed fees due to 
marginal cost pricing and the absence of access mark-up. Similar to the outcome in 
the unregulated market, the large network can charge higher fixed fee and still serve 
the majority of consumers because of its comparatively attractive benefit in terms of 
cost efficiency and/or reputation.  
2.3.3 The asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation 
The new firm may be a potential competitor that can increase the degree of 
competition in the market if it is cost-efficient and/or if its reputation is excellent 
enough. For example, its cost may be lower than the established firm. As a close rival, 
the new firm is capable of competing fiercely, and social welfare will be improved 
accordingly. In this case, the asymmetric regulation is unnecessary. Nevertheless, in 
the initial stage of entry, the new firm is more likely to be inefficient in terms of cost 
and reputation, and as a consequence it is disadvantaged and at a risk to shut down. 
Despite the entrant’s inefficiency, the regulator may impose this regulation for the 
purpose of intensifying competition rather than let the established firm seize control 
of the whole market as a monopolist. 
                                                          
21
 For instance, suppose the asymmetry parameter is 𝑏 where ?̂? < 𝑏 < ?̂̂? < 0, the high-cost 
firm earns smaller market share than the low-cost firm in the unregulated market but it 
becomes dominant with larger market share under the symmetric regulation.  
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This section focuses on the situation where the new firm has higher cost and 
earns smaller market share in order to assess the asymmetric regulation as an entry-
facilitating policy. Under this regulation, the established firm (the low-cost firm) is 
regulated to set access charge at cost. In contrast, the new firm (the high-cost firm) is 
allowed to choose its access charge in this setting.   
 The behaviour of mobile network operators under the asymmetric 
cost-based access charge regulation 
Network 1 (the established firm with low cost) sets its access charge equal to 
its marginal cost, and network 2 (the new firm with high cost) can set its own access 
charge. According to (2.11), on-net and off-net prices in equilibrium are as follows. 
𝑝𝑖
∗ = 2𝑐𝑖 ;  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
?̂?1
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑎2 
?̂?2
∗ = 𝑐2 + 𝑐1 
𝑝2
∗ > ?̂?2
∗ > 𝑝1
∗ and  ?̂?1
∗ > ?̂?2
∗ > 𝑝1
∗ because network 2 will choose a mark-up on 
access charge.  
Proposition 2.6 
Under the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation, the new firm with 
high cost sets a mark-up on access charge. When the asymmetric regulation is imposed 
instead of the symmetric regulation, its effects on the equilibrium outcomes are as 
follows. 
(i) The market share of the low-cost established firm decreases, but that of the 
new firm increases. 
(ii) Equilibrium fixed fees of both firms decrease. 
(iii) Overall, the profit of the new firm increases, but that of the established 
firm decreases.  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.10).  
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While the access charge of the low-cost established firm is fixed at cost by 
regulation, the new firm with high cost will choose above-cost access charge to 
maximise its profit. The asymmetric regulation has significant effects on the market 
outcome. Firstly, the access mark-up of the new firm can expand the firm’s market 
share and shrink that of the established firm. This is because the new firm can raise 
the established firm’s off-net price through its access mark-up.  
Secondly, the access mark-up also causes the established firm to react by 
decreasing its fixed fee. Accordingly, the equilibrium fixed fee of the new firm is 
affected in two different ways. When the established firm’s off-net price increases 
according to the new firm’s access mark-up, the established firm’s service seems less 
attractive. Thus, the market share of the new firm may increase. The new firm will 
receive more profit if it decides to raise its fixed fee. However, when it charges an 
access mark-up, the established firm decides to reduce its equilibrium fixed fee 
(
𝜕𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0) as a response. If the new firm does not reduce its fixed fee, it will 
lose market share and it cannot take full advantage of its access mark-up. Therefore, 
the new firm finally maximises its profit by lowering its fixed fee. In summary, when 
the new firm sets a mark-up on access charge, both equilibrium fixed fees decrease. 
This finding is similar to the result of Peitz (2005), studying asymmetric networks 
with different fixed utilities but identical cost.  
Thirdly, the fixed fee of the established firm changes more drastically than that 
of the new firm, and its off-net price is higher. This leads to a reduction in the 
established firm’s market share. Consequently, the established firm’s profit decreases 
and the new firm’s profit certainly increases from the symmetric regulation benchmark.  
Remark 2.3  
Under the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation, the critical value 
of asymmetry parameter (?̂̂?
̂
) is  
?̂̂?
̂
= −
1
2
[𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗) − 𝜈(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) + 𝜈(2𝑐1)]. 
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The low-cost firm has larger market share if 𝛽 > ?̂̂?
̂
. The critical value under the 
asymmetric regulation is the greatest, followed by those under the symmetric 
regulation (?̂̂?) and in the unregulated market (?̂?) respectively, i.e. ?̂̂?
̂
> ?̂̂? > ?̂?. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.11). 
 Under the asymmetric regulation, the critical value of asymmetry parameter is 
greater than those under the symmetric regulation and in the unregulated market 
respectively. Regarding benchmark 1 and benchmark 2, the high-cost firm has to offer 
significantly higher fixed surplus than the low-cost firm in order to occupy larger 
market share. The huge discrepancy in reputation is necessary for the high-cost firm 
to achieve dominance in the market. However, to become the large network under the 
asymmetric regulation, the high-cost firm requires only a smaller discrepancy in 
reputation than those under other regulatory regimes. 
Proposition 2.7a 
 When the established firm has lower cost and larger market share than the new 
firm, the comparison of market shares in the unregulated market (𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔), under the 
symmetric cost-based access charge regulation (𝑠𝑦𝑚) and under the asymmetric cost-
based access charge regulation (𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚) is shown below. 
(i) The comparison of the established firm’s market share is as follows. 
𝛼1𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ > 𝛼1𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ > 𝛼1𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  
(ii) The comparison of the new firm’s market share is as follows. 
𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ < 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ < 𝛼2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.12). 
The asymmetric regulation is most effective to facilitate entry of the new firm 
with high cost. Conversely, the low-cost established firm may prefer no regulatory 
intervention. This is because its market share decreases after the regulator adopts 
either the symmetric regulation or the asymmetric regulation. 
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Proposition 2.7b 
 When the established firm has lower cost and larger market share than the  
new firm, the comparison of the new firm’s profits in the unregulated market (𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔), 
under the symmetric cost-based access charge regulation (𝑠𝑦𝑚)  and under the 
asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation (𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚) is as follows. 
𝜋2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ < 𝜋2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ < 𝜋2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ . 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 2.5.13). 
 The asymmetric regulation is beneficial only to the new firm (the high-cost 
firm in this scenario). In comparison with the other regulatory regimes, the new firm 
can achieve market penetration and reap the highest profit under the asymmetric 
regulation. Conversely, the low-cost established firm inevitably loses profit as a 
consequence of the asymmetric regulation.
22
 
2.3.4 Social welfare analysis  
 The effects of the three regulatory regimes on social welfare are discussed as 
follows. 
 The unregulated market 
 As stated in Proposition 2.3, both networks set mark-ups on access charges, 
and consequently off-net prices are pushed up. The price distortions have adverse 
effects on consumers. Additionally, the large network takes full advantage of its 
dominance in order to threaten the small network by means of aggressive pricing on 
access charge. Therefore, deregulation is not an appropriate policy in this setting. 
 The symmetric cost-based access charge regulation 
 Compared to the market outcome in the unregulated market, off-net prices 
dramatically decrease because access mark-ups are not allowed under this regulation. 
                                                          
22
 See proof in the appendix (Section 2.5.13). 
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Moreover, the large network can no longer use its access mark-up as a predatory tool 
for undermining its small rival. As a result, the distortions of usage fees are avoidable. 
Due to the cost-based access charges and usage prices, consumers and the underdog 
firm benefit greatly from this regulation, as stated in Proposition 2.7b. 
 The asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation 
In the unregulated market (benchmark 1), both networks unilaterally set their 
access charges above cost and generate some profits from mark-ups on access charges. 
The on-net prices are set at actual marginal costs, but the off-net prices are distorted 
by the access mark-ups. This may reduce aggregate consumer surplus. The symmetric 
regulation and the asymmetric regulation may be pragmatic approaches to alleviate 
the distortion in this situation. When both networks are efficient in terms of costs and 
reputation, it is appropriate that the symmetric regulation should be imposed to curb 
access mark-ups and retail prices.  
However, when the issues of facilitating entry and promoting the long-run 
competition are taken into consideration, the asymmetric regulation should be 
considered in comparison with the symmetric regulation.  
The next section is dedicated to the case in which network 1 is the low-cost 
established firm with larger market share than network 2, which is the new firm with 
high cost. The effects of the asymmetric regulation on aggregate consumer surplus 
and aggregate producer surplus are compared with the effect of the symmetric 
regulation (benchmark 2). 
Aggregate consumer surplus 
 According to (2.9), the asymmetric regulation, which allows the new firm to  
set access mark-up (𝑎2 > 𝑐2), has an ambiguous effect on consumer surplus. The 
asymmetric regulation may not guarantee an increase in the total of net utility of each 
consumer group. However, the asymmetric regulation certainly reduces the total 
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disutility.
23
 The difference between the two firms’ market shares becomes subtle 
when the new firm is allowed to set above-cost access charge. Compared with the 
outcome of the symmetric regulation, the new firm can steal some of market share 
from the low-cost established firm. Thus, the asymmetric regulation narrows the gap 
between the market shares of the two networks. Therefore, it is ambiguous to 
conclude that the asymmetric regulation can raise aggregate consumer surplus as a 
whole. The derivative of aggregate consumer surplus with respect to the new firm’s 
access charge is as follows. 
∂𝐶𝑆
∂𝑎2
 = 2𝛼1𝜈(𝑝1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼1
2)𝜈′(?̂?1)  + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 − 𝛼1
𝜕𝐹1
𝜕𝑎2
 
              −𝐹1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + 𝛽
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 − 2(1 − 𝛼1)𝜈(𝑝2)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?2)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
    
  −(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝐹2
𝜕𝑎2
   +
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
𝐹2    +
1
2𝜎
(1 − 2𝛼1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
                       
The asymmetric regulation may boost aggregate consumer surplus on 
condition that the parameter of asymmetry in reputation (𝛽) is not too high, and the 
cost differential is not too large when compared with the degree of substitutability 
(𝜎).24 When the asymmetric regulation is imposed, the new firm’s market share and 
profit increase. On the other hand, the low-cost established firm loses market share 
and profit. Thus, the difference in market shares becomes subtle under the asymmetric 
regulation. 
The asymmetric regulation makes two different effects on aggregate consumer 
surplus. First, a negative effect on consumer surplus occurs when the market share of 
the established network diminishes. A distinct example is the case in which the 
established firm offers greater fixed-surplus from reputation (𝛽 > 0)  but some 
consumers decide to switch to the new network. These consumers have to give up the 
extra fixed-surplus (𝛽) from joining the established firm. As a result, the asymmetric 
regulation causes a reduction in the consumers’ benefit from fixed surplus. Second, if 
                                                          
23
 See proof in the appendix (Section 2.5.14). 
24
 See proof in the appendix (Section 2.5.14). 
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the cost differential is not too large by comparison with the degree of substitutability 
(𝜎), there is a positive effect of the asymmetric regulation on consumer surplus. 
When some consumers switch to the new network, the total disutility from not 
connecting to consumers’ ideal networks decreases (the disutility is lowest when the 
two networks share the market equally). Meanwhile, the consumers of the new 
network have to incur higher average usage prices as a result of cost inefficiency. In 
summary, the benefit from the asymmetric regulation may outweigh its disadvantage 
if these conditions are satisfied: (1) the asymmetry parameter (𝛽) is not too high,  
(2) the degree of substitutability is low enough, and (3) the costs of both networks are 
not much different.   
Aggregate producer surplus 
Compared to the outcome under the symmetric regulation (benchmark 2), the 
low-cost established firm loses some profit whereas the new firm with high cost gains 
more profit under the asymmetric regulation. In the neighbourhood of cost-based 
access charges, when the new firm decides to charge an access mark-up, the magnitude 
of profit which the established firm loses outweighs that of profit which the new firm 
gains. Overall, aggregate producer surplus decreases.
25
  
 The optimal regulations   
If the newcomer is efficient enough to compete with the established firm, the 
regulator may choose the symmetric regulation to vanish the distortions of access 
charges and off-net prices, which inevitably occur in the unregulated market. However, 
it is questionable whether the asymmetric regulation should be imposed in an effort to 
encourage entry and foster market competition in the situation where the new firm has 
higher cost and smaller market share. Similar to the standard result of Baranes and 
Vuong (2012) and Peitz (2005), this study provides the clear evidence that the 
asymmetric regulation is an efficient measure to promote the new firm’s profit and 
market penetration. While the result of Peitz (2005) suggests that the asymmetric 
                                                          
25
 See proof in the appendix (Section 2.5.15). 
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regulation can increase consumer surplus, the present study finds that the effect of the 
asymmetric regulation on consumer surplus and social welfare are not clear-cut, as 
stated in the preceding section. It can enhance social welfare in the situation where the 
cost differential and the discrepancy in reputation are not significant and both 
networks’ services are differentiated enough.  
The main focus of this discussion is the efficiency of the entrant and its 
differentiated service. This study supports that the firm asymmetry caused by the 
entrant’s inherent inefficiency should not be the justification for imposing the 
asymmetric regulation. Additionally, the asymmetric regulation is socially acceptable 
when the entrant is launching an alternative to the legacy telecommunications services 
such as higher generation wireless telecommunications with an increasing trend in 
demand for mobile broadband. In the period of product introduction, the entrant  
may incur higher cost and the allowance of its access charge under the asymmetric 
regulation can preserve the viability of the entrant. From a social perspective, the 
asymmetric regulation is necessary to intensify market competition through the 
sufficiently differentiated service in this situation. In addition, the asymmetric 
regulation should be implemented as a temporary measure in the early phase of the 
new advanced service. When the firm asymmetry becomes subtle in the more mature 
phase, it is pointless to implement the asymmetric regulation.  
On the other hand, the asymmetric regulation dampens social welfare when 
the new firm has considerably higher cost, significantly worse reputation, and high 
substitutability with the established firm. This is because the new firm is obviously 
inefficient in terms of cost and reputation. Moreover, from consumers’ viewpoint, its 
product is not differentiated enough from the existing product, and it cannot fill in the 
gap in the market to satisfy consumers. Thus, any regulatory support for the new firm 
may distort the market and reduce social welfare. Meanwhile, on the supply side, the 
asymmetric regulation causes a reduction in the profit of the established firm and 
aggregate producer surplus. This may spark controversy by the established firm when 
an issue of the asymmetric regulation is publicly debated.    
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2.4 Conclusion 
 This study investigates competition between two asymmetric networks under 
two-part tariffs and network-based discriminatory pricing. The networks are different 
in cost and reputation. To maximise their own profits, both networks apply marginal 
cost pricing to usage fees. As a result, they have profits only from fixed fees and 
access revenues. When the market is unregulated, they unilaterally choose above-cost 
access charges. The low-cost firm has a greater tendency to have larger market share 
if its reputation is not too worse than that of the high-cost firm. When the discrepancy 
in reputation is smaller, the gap between the market shares of both networks is 
narrower. In addition, the network with larger market share can charge higher access 
charge, higher fixed fee and earn higher profit than the network with smaller market 
share.  
 Off-net prices of both networks are pushed up by each other because they 
choose above-cost access charges in the unregulated market. This is a threat to 
consumers. The regulator may impose the symmetric cost-based access charge 
regulation which can push down the two networks’ off-net prices to their actual 
marginal costs. A network can no longer make its rival’s off-net price less attractive 
by means of setting an access mark-up. Thus, the asymmetric market outcome directly 
reflects the cost differential and/or the discrepancy in reputation, and it is not distorted 
by the strategic access mark-ups. Compared with the outcome in the unregulated 
market, the symmetric regulation can narrow the gap between the two networks’ 
market shares. However, there is some concern about the viability of the new firm in 
the situation where the new firm has high cost and smaller market share. The 
regulator may choose the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation in order to 
encourage the new firm to enter the market and force the established firm to 
relinquish its monopoly power. Consumer welfare may increase if the cost differential 
and the discrepancy in reputation are not substantial and the two networks’ services 
are differentiated enough. On the other hand, the profit and market share of the 
established firm decrease. Consequently, the regulator should implement the 
asymmetric regulation instead of the symmetric regulation when the underdog high-
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cost firm with differentiated service is not too inefficient in terms of cost and 
reputation. Otherwise, the asymmetric regulation is more likely to cause a welfare-
undermining distortion of the market outcome. 
Compared to other regulatory approaches, these cost-based access charge 
regulations are more practical because the regulators require only the declaration  
of cost structure from mobile network operators to set cost-based access charge. 
Additionally, in a static framework, the asymmetric regulation can increase the profit 
of the new firm with high cost and may enhance consumer welfare in some situations. 
It is acceptable for the regulator to allow the new firm to set an access mark-up in 
order to facilitate market entry and the launch of the new advanced service in the 
initial market. Nevertheless, in the long run, both networks should compete strongly 
and increase efficiency such as cost reduction and quality improvement. The 
asymmetric regulation should act as an incentive for the new firm to enter the market, 
but it should not last long. In addition, the regulator should encourage networks to 
develop in the stronger competition. Further research is still needed to suggest optimal 
regulations in the long run. Moreover, this study assumes the networks provide only 
one service, so it is interesting to investigate the competition in multiple service 
markets. 
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2.5 Appendix 
2.5.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Substituting (2.1)-(2.3)  in (2.4)  and rearranging the equation, the explicit 
function of 𝛼1 is  
                              𝛼1 =
1
2 + 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈
(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) − 𝐹1 + 𝐹2]
1 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝1)]
 .                            (2. A1) 
𝔻 = 1 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝1)]   
𝔻 > 0 when there exists a stable shared-market equilibrium.  
Keeping the market share (𝛼𝑖) constant and treating 𝐹𝑖  as a function of 𝑝𝑖, ?̂?𝑖 
and 𝛼𝑖 from (2. A1), one can differentiate (2.5) with respect to 𝑝𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 as follows. 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖
2𝑞𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖
2𝑞𝑖
′(𝑝𝑖 − 2𝑐𝑖) + 𝛼𝑖 
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0    
Then, substituting  
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖 𝜈
′(𝑝𝑖) and 𝜈
′(𝑝𝑖) = −𝑞𝑖 in the above equation yields the 
following. 
𝑝𝑖 − 2𝑐𝑖 = 0             
𝑝𝑖
∗ = 2𝑐𝑖                                                        (2. A2) 
Therefore, the profit-maximising on-net price is equal to actual marginal cost.
26
 
Next, determine the profit-maximising off-net price. 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕?̂?𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗?̂?𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗(?̂?𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑎𝑗)?̂?𝑖
′ + 𝛼𝑖 
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕?̂?𝑖
= 0 
                                                          
26
  
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖2
= −𝛼𝑖
2 < 0, 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝜕𝑝𝑖
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2 = −𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗 < 0 to satisfy the second-order 
condition (SOC) for profit maximisation. 
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Substituting  
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 𝛼𝑗 𝜈
′(?̂?𝑖)  and 𝜈
′(?̂?𝑖) = −?̂?𝑖  in the above first-order condition 
(FOC) and the profit-maximising off-net price is 
?̂?𝑖
∗ = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗 .                                                     (2. A3)  
Thus, the profit-maximising off-net price is equal to perceived cost.
27
 
After substituting (2. A2) and (2. A3) in (2.5), the profit function is  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝐹𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑓𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗𝛼𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗.                                     (2. A4)                               
The derivative of the profit function (2. A4) with respect to fixed fee (𝐹𝑖) is  
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖   + 𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
  − 𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
  + (𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖)(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗  
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
= 0. 
Substituting  
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
= −
𝜎
𝔻
  in the above equation yields   
𝛼𝑖 (−
𝔻
𝜎
 ) + 𝐹𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖 + (𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖)(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗  = 0. 
After rearranging the equation, one finds that   
                                   𝐹𝑖
∗ = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝛼𝑖−𝛼𝑗)(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗                                      (2. A5) 
where 𝔻 = 1 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝1)], 𝜎 > 0, 𝔻 > 0 and  
𝔻
𝜎
 > 0. 
 The second-order condition (SOC) should be negative for the maximum profit.   
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
2 =  2
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
  − 2 (
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
)
2
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗   < 0 
where  
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
= −
𝜎
𝔻
 .  
                                                          
27
  
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2 = −𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗 < 0, 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝜕𝑝𝑖
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖2
= −𝛼𝑖
2 < 0 to satisfy the SOC for profit 
maximisation. 
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𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑖
2 = −2
𝜎
𝔻
[1 +
𝜎
𝔻
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗]   < 0  
The above expression holds when [1 +
𝜎
𝔻
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗] > 0. Consequently,  
                                                   (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗 > −
𝔻
𝜎
 .                                                    (2. A6) 
In other words, the access mark-up is assumed to be nonnegative or slightly less than 
termination cost in accordance with the concavity of profit function. The above 
assumption (2. A6) will be referred in the following analysis.  
2.5.2 Proof of Remark 2.1 
After substituting (2. A2), (2. A3) and (2. A5) in (2. A1), one can obtain the 
following equation. 
   𝛼1
∗ =
1
2
+
𝜎𝛽 +
𝜎
2 [𝜈
(?̂?1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝2
∗) − 𝜈(?̂?2
∗) + 𝜈(𝑝1
∗)]
𝔻∗ 
                   (2. A7) 
𝔻∗ = 3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1
∗ − 𝑐𝑡1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2
∗ − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?1]  > 0  
𝔻 = 1 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝2
∗) + 𝜈(?̂?2
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝1
∗)] 
According to (2. A7), 𝛼1
∗ ≥
1
2
  if 𝛽 ≥ −
1
2
[𝜈(?̂?1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝2
∗) − 𝜈(?̂?2
∗) + 𝜈(𝑝1
∗)]. 
Conversely, 𝛼1
∗ <
1
2
  if 𝛽 < −
1
2
[𝜈(?̂?1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝2
∗) − 𝜈(?̂?2
∗) + 𝜈(𝑝1
∗)] < 0. Therefore, 
?̂? = −
1
2
[𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗) − 𝜈(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(𝑐2 + 𝑎1
∗) + 𝜈(2𝑐1)].           
2.5.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2 
In the unregulated market, both networks charge access mark-ups. Suppose 
network 𝑖  has larger market share than network 𝑗  (𝛼𝑖 > 𝛼𝑗 ; 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ),  
a comparison can be made to compare the equilibrium fixed fees expressed in (2. A5). 
One may apply the condition for the profit-maximising access charge and find that 
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𝐹𝑖
∗ − 𝐹𝑗
∗ = 𝑓𝑖−𝑓𝑗 + (𝛼𝑖−𝛼𝑗) [
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗 + (𝑎𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)?̂?𝑖]. 
Since 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓𝑗 , 𝛼𝑖−𝛼𝑗 > 0 , (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗 > 0  and (𝑎𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)?̂?𝑖 > 0 , 𝐹𝑖
∗ − 𝐹𝑗
∗ > 0.  Thus, 
the large network charges higher fixed fee than the small network.  
 Suppose network 1 is the large firm (𝛼1 > 𝛼2), under the assumption of linear 
demand ( ?̂?𝑖 = 1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 −𝑚𝑗  and 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ; 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2}  and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ), The 
equilibrium profits of both networks in (2. A8) are 
𝜋1
∗ = 𝛼1
2  [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1
∗?̂?2] 
 𝜋2
∗ = 𝛼2
2  [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗ ?̂?1]. 
𝜋1
∗ − 𝜋2
∗ = (𝛼1
2 − 𝛼2
2)
𝔻
𝜎
  + 𝛼1
2𝑚1
∗(1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 −𝑚1
∗) − 𝛼2
2𝑚2
∗(1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 −𝑚2
∗) 
Let 𝜃 = 1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 > 0. Assume 𝜃 −𝑚1
∗ −𝑚2
∗  > 0 (demand is positive). According 
to Proposition 2.3, when 𝛼1 > 𝛼2, 𝑚1
∗ −𝑚2
∗  > 0.  
𝑚1
∗(𝜃 − 𝑚1
∗) − 𝑚2
∗(𝜃 −𝑚2
∗) = (𝑚1
∗ −𝑚2
∗)(𝜃 − 𝑚1
∗ −𝑚2
∗) > 0 
and  𝛼1
2 > 𝛼2
2. Thus, 𝜋1
∗ − 𝜋2
∗ > 0. 
2.5.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3 
 After substituting (2. A2), (2. A3), (2. A5) in (2.5), the profit function in stage 1 
of the game is  
                                        𝜋𝑖
∗(𝑎𝑖) =  𝛼𝑖
2  [
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗]                                        (2. A8) 
In stage 1, network 𝑖’s problem is 
max
𝑎𝑖
 𝜋𝑖
∗(𝑎𝑖) 
where  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2}.  
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Network 1 The FOC is   
                  
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1
=  𝛼1
2(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2
′ +  2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
 [
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2] = 0                  (2. A9) 
𝑎1
∗ cannot be expressed in closed form, but 𝑎1
∗  can be indicated by considering 
the profit function in the neighbourhood of 𝑎1 = 𝑐1.   
At 𝑎1 = 𝑐1 ,  
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
=  2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]  > 0,   
where  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
> 028 and 𝔻 > 0 according to the existence of a stable shared-market 
equilibrium. In the neighbourhood of 𝑎1 = 𝑐1, if network 1 increases its access charge 
above cost, its market share expands. This is because the significant impact of its 
access mark-up can push up its rival’s off-net price. Consequently, its rival is less 
attractive and its own market share tends to increase. Thus, 
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
> 0. Firm 1 will 
not set access charge at cost, but it has an incentive to increase access charge in order 
to earn more profit. In addition, if the access charge is set below termination cost 
(𝑎1 < 𝑐1), the FOC in (2. A9) will hold only when the second term is negative. This 
is because the first term (𝛼1
2(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2
′ ) is strongly positive. According to (2. A6), 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
  must be negative to make the equation (2. A9) hold in this case. However, when 
access charge is below cost, the derivative of network 1’s market share with respect to 
its access charge is positive (
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1<𝑐1
> 0).29 As a result, below-cost access charge 
cannot yield maximum profit. Thus, in the unregulated market, network 1 chooses 
above-cost access charge. 
 
                                                          
28
 See proof of  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
> 0 in the following section in the appendix.  
29
 See proof of 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1<𝑐1
> 0 in the following section in the appendix. 
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Network 2  
            
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
= 𝛼2
2(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?′1 −  2𝛼2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1] = 0              (2. A10) 
At 𝑎2 = 𝑐2,  
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
= − 2𝛼2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]  > 0. 
This is because at 𝑎2 = 𝑐2,  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0 30 and 𝔻 > 0 according to the existence of 
a stable shared-market equilibrium. If network 2 unilaterally raises its access charge 
above cost, its market share increases. Accordingly, network 1’s market share 
decreases. As a result of the access mark-up of network 2, network 1’s off-net price 
increases and some subscribers of network 1 may switch to network 2. Therefore, 
network 2 also has incentive to charge its access mark-up. Furthermore, at 𝑎2 < 𝑐2, 
the first term of (2. A10) is positive. Therefore, the profit-maximising access charge 
of network 2 should make the second term of (2. A10) negative. According to (2. A6), 
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1 > 0. To make (2. A10) hold, it is necessary that  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2<𝑐2
> 0 . In 
contrast, it is found that  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2<𝑐2
< 0.31 It is a contradiction. Thus, network 2 will 
not choose a below-cost access charge. Similar to network 1, network 2 will set a 
mark-up on access charge.   
Proof that  
𝝏𝜶𝟏
𝝏𝒂𝟏
|
𝒂𝟏=𝒄𝟏
> 𝟎 
After substituting (2. A2), (2. A3) and (2. A5) in (2. A1) and rearranging the 
equation, one can obtain 
 𝛼1
∗ =
1
2 + 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎
[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]
3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]
.   (2. A11) 
                                                          
30
 See proof of  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0 in the following section in the appendix. 
31
 See proof of  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2<𝑐2
< 0 in the following section in the appendix. 
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𝕋∗ =
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1 
𝔻∗ = 3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐𝑡1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?1] 
Taking differentiation of 𝛼1 with respect to 𝑎1 yields 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
∗
=
𝔻∗ 𝜎(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2
′ − 𝕋∗[(−𝜎)?̂?2 + 2𝜎(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2
′ ]
𝔻∗ 2
 . 
At 𝑎1 = 𝑐1 ,   
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
∗
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
=
𝕋∗[𝜎?̂?2]
𝔻∗ 2
  
where 𝔻∗ > 0 and 𝕋∗ > 0. Thus,  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
∗
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
> 0. 
Proof that  
𝝏𝜶𝟏
𝝏𝒂𝟏
|
𝒂𝟏<𝒄𝟏
> 𝟎 
 Differentiating (2. A11) with respect to 𝑎1 and rearranging it yields 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
∗
=
−𝜎𝔻∗ (𝑎1 − 𝑐1) + 𝜎𝕋
∗[?̂?2 + 2(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)]
𝔻∗ 2
 
where 
𝕋∗ =
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]  > 0 
𝔻∗ =  3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐𝑡1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?1]   > 0. 
Suppose the demand is high enough, ?̂?2 > |2(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)| and ?̂?2 + 2(𝑎1 − 𝑐1) > 0.  
Therefore, when 𝑎1 < 𝑐1 ,  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎1
|
𝑎1<𝑐1
> 0. 
Proof that  
𝝏𝜶𝟏
𝝏𝒂𝟐
|
𝒂𝟐=𝒄𝟐
< 𝟎  
Differentiating (2. A11) with respect to 𝑎2 yields 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
∗
=
𝔻∗ [−𝜎?̂?1 + 𝜎(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1
′  ]    −   𝕋∗[(−𝜎)?̂?1 + 2𝜎(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1
′ ]
𝔻∗ 2
. 
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At 𝑎2 = 𝑐2,   
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
∗
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
𝜎?̂?1(𝕋
∗ −𝔻∗ ) 
𝔻∗ 2
  
where 
𝕋∗ =
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]  > 0 
𝔻∗ =  3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐𝑡1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?1]   > 0. 
𝕋∗ < 𝔻∗  in a shared-market equilibrium (0 < 𝛼1
∗ < 1). Thus,  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
∗
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0. 
Proof that   
𝝏𝜶𝟏
𝝏𝒂𝟐
|
𝒂𝟐<𝒄𝟐
< 𝟎   
After differentiating (2. A11) with respect to 𝑎2  and rearranging it, one can 
find that  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
∗
=
−𝜎𝔻∗ [?̂?1 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2) ]   +    𝜎𝕋
∗[?̂?1 + 2(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)]
𝔻∗ 2
  
where 
𝕋∗ =
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]  > 0 
𝔻∗ =  3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐𝑡1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?1]  > 0. 
Suppose the demand is high enough, ?̂?1 > |2(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)| > |𝑎2 − 𝑐2|. Therefore, 
?̂?1 + 2(𝑎2 − 𝑐2) > 0 and ?̂?1 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2) > 0. In a shared-market equilibrium where 
0 < 𝛼1
∗ < 1,  𝕋∗ < 𝔻∗. Moreover, ?̂?1 + 2(𝑎2 − 𝑐2) < ?̂?1 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)  when 𝑎2 < 𝑐2. 
Therefore, when 𝑎2 < 𝑐2 ,  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2<𝑐2
< 0. 
To compare the access charges of the two networks, replacing access mark-up 
𝑚𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 in (2. A11) gives the market shares as shown below.  
𝛼1
∗ =
1
2 + 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎
[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[𝑚1
∗?̂?2 +𝑚2
∗ ?̂?1]
3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]
=
𝕋1
∗
 𝔻∗ 
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𝛼2
∗ =
1
2 − 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎
[𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝1)] + 𝔻 + 𝜎[𝑚1
∗?̂?2 +𝑚2
∗ ?̂?1]
3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]
=
𝕋2
∗
 𝔻∗ 
  
Suppose 𝛼1
∗ > 𝛼2
∗ , 𝕋1
∗ > 𝕋2
∗ .  Analogously, replacing 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖  in (2. A9)  and 
(2. A10) , the FOC for the profit-maximising access charge of network 1 can be 
rearranged as  
− 𝑚1
∗ +  2𝜎 [
−𝑚1
∗
𝕋1
∗ +
(𝜃 +𝑚1
∗)
 𝔻∗ 
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1
∗(𝜃 − 𝑚1
∗)] = 0.                (2. A12) 
The FOC for the profit-maximising access charge of network 2 can be rearranged as 
    − 𝑚2
∗ +  2𝜎 [
−𝑚2
∗
𝕋2
∗ +
(𝜃 +𝑚2
∗)
 𝔻∗ 
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗(𝜃 −𝑚2
∗)] = 0.          
  𝑚2
∗ =  2𝜎 [
−𝑚2
∗
𝕋2
∗ +
(𝜃 +𝑚2
∗)
 𝔻∗ 
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗(𝜃 − 𝑚2
∗)]                    (2. A13) 
Then, one can replace 𝑚1
∗  in (2. A12) with 𝑚2
∗  and obtain (2. A14). If (2. A14) equals 
zero, one may conclude that 𝑚2
∗ = 𝑚1
∗ . However, (2. A14) cannot be guaranteed to 
equal zero yet. 
− 𝑚2
∗ +  2𝜎 [
−𝑚2
∗
𝕋1
∗ +
(𝜃 +𝑚2
∗)
 𝔻∗ 
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗(𝜃 − 𝑚2
∗)]                     (2. A14) 
To compare 𝑚2
∗  with 𝑚1
∗ , substituting (2. A13)  in (2. A14)  yields the following 
expression. 
−2𝜎 [
−𝑚2
∗
𝕋2
∗ +
(𝜃 +𝑚2
∗)
 𝔻∗ 
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗(𝜃 − 𝑚2
∗)] + 2𝜎 [
−𝑚2
∗
𝕋1
∗ +
(𝜃 +𝑚2
∗)
 𝔻∗ 
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗(𝜃 − 𝑚2
∗)] 
The above expression is positive because 𝕋1
∗ > 𝕋2 
∗ . Therefore, 𝑚2
∗ ≠ 𝑚1
∗. If network 1 
chooses its access mark-up equal to 𝑚2
∗   rather than 𝑚1
∗, 
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1
> 0. Consequently, when 
𝛼1
∗ > 𝛼2
∗, the access mark-up of network 1 exceeds that of network 2 (𝑚1
∗ > 𝑚2
∗). 
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2.5.5 Proof that  
𝒅𝒎𝟏
𝒅𝜷
> 𝟎 
Substituting  𝑚1 = 𝑎1 − 𝑐1  and ?̂?2  = 1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2 − 𝑚1 = 𝜃 − 𝑚1  in (2. A9) 
gives the following equation in equilibrium. 
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1
= −𝛼1
2(𝑚1) +  2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
 [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] = 0 
Total differential of the above equation with respect to 𝑚1 and 𝛽 is shown below.  
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝑚1
. 𝑑𝑚1 + 
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝛽
. 𝑑𝛽 = 0 
𝑑𝑚1
𝑑𝛽
= 
−
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝛽
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝑚1
=  
𝔸
𝔹
 
𝑑𝑚1
𝑑𝛽
=  
2𝑚1𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝛽 − 2 [
𝔻
𝜎 +𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] (𝛼1
𝜕2𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝛽
+
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝛽 .
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)
−𝛼1
2 − 4𝑚1𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
+ 2 [𝛼1
𝜕2𝛼1
𝜕𝑎12
+ (
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)
2
] [
𝔻
𝜎 +𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)]
 
Denotation of 𝔸 and 𝔹 is as follows. 
𝔸 = −
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝛽
 
    = 2𝑚1𝛼1 (
𝜎
𝔻∗ 
) − 2 [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] (
𝛼1𝜎
2(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 2
+
𝜎
𝔻∗ 
.
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)  
    =  
2𝜎
𝔻∗ 
{𝑚1𝛼1 − [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] (
𝛼1𝜎(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 
+
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)}            
𝔹 = 
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝑚1
= −𝛼1
2 − 4𝑚1𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
+ 2 [𝛼1
𝜕2𝛼1
𝜕𝑎12
+ (
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)
2
] [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] 
At the profit-maximising access mark-up, (2. A9) can be rewritten as  
𝑚1𝛼1 = 2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
[
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)]. 
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Substituting the above expression into 𝔸 yields 
𝔸 =
2𝜎
𝔻∗ 
{2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
[
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] − [
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] (
𝛼1𝜎(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 
+
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)} 
     =  
2𝜎
𝔻∗ 
{[
𝔻
𝜎
+𝑚1(𝜃 − 𝑚1)] [2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
− (
𝛼1𝜎(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 
+
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
)]}. 
One can find that 
2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
− (
𝛼1𝜎(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 
+
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
) =
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎1
−
𝛼1𝜎(𝜃 + 𝑚1) 
𝔻∗ 
  
                                                             =
−𝜎𝔻∗ 𝑚1 + 𝜎𝕋
∗(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 2
−
𝜎𝕋∗(𝜃 + 𝑚1)
𝔻∗ 
< 0.  
Thus, 𝔸 < 0. Similarly, 𝔹 =
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎1𝜕𝑚1
= 
𝜕2𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎12
< 0 since the SOC should be negative 
due to the concavity of profit function. In summary, 
𝑑𝑚1
𝑑𝛽
> 0. 
2.5.6 Proof of Observation 2.1 
(i)  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝛽
=
𝜎
3𝔻+2𝜎[(𝑎1−𝑐1)?̂?2+(𝑎2−𝑐2)?̂?1]
> 0   
(ii) Rearranging (2. A11) gives 
 𝛼1
∗ =
1
2
+ 
𝜎𝛽 +
𝜎
2
[𝜈(𝑝1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(?̂?2)]
𝔻∗ 
 .                    (2. A15) 
𝔻∗ =  3𝔻 + 2𝜎[(𝑎1 − 𝑐1)?̂?2 + (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1], 𝑚1 = 𝑎1 − 𝑐1  and  𝑚2 = 𝑎2 − 𝑐2. 
The derivative of  𝛼1
∗ with respect to 𝜎 is 
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝜎
= (
1
𝔻∗ 2
) 
{
  
 
  
 𝔻∗ [𝛽 +
1
2
[𝜈(𝑝1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(?̂?2)]]
 
 − [
 
 (𝜎𝛽 +
𝜎
2
[𝜈(𝑝1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(?̂?2)]) ×
 
 [3[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝1)] + 2𝑚1?̂?2 + 2𝑚2?̂?1]
 ]  
}
  
 
  
 
. 
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When 𝛼1
∗ > 𝛼2
∗,  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝜎
> 0. Conversely, when 𝛼1
∗ < 𝛼2
∗,  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝜎
< 0. 
(iii) From (2. A11), differentiating 𝛼1
∗ with respect to 𝑐1 yields the following. 
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑐1
= (
1
𝔻∗ 2
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
[𝔻∗ (
𝜎
2
) [2𝜈′(𝑝1) + 𝜈
′(?̂?1)]]
 
− [(𝜎𝛽 +
𝜎
2
[
𝜈(𝑝1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)
+𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(?̂?2)
]) (
3𝜎[−2𝜈′(𝑝1) + 𝜈
′(?̂?1)]
−2𝜎(?̂?2 + 𝑎1 − 𝑐1)
)]
 }
 
 
 
 
 < 0 
One can conclude  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑐1
< 0 and  
𝜕𝛼2
∗
𝜕𝑐1
> 0. 
(iv) After inserting (2. A8) into (2. A5), the profit-maximising fixed fee can be 
rewritten as   
𝐹𝑖
∗ = 𝑓𝑖 +
𝜋𝑖
𝛼𝑖
−𝛼𝑗(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̂?𝑗. 
After considering the neighbourhood of 𝑎𝑖
∗, one may find that 
𝜕𝐹𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= −
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
(
𝔻
𝜎
)  −𝛼𝑗 (?̂?𝑗 − (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)) < 0 
because  
𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
|
𝑎𝑖=𝑎𝑖
∗
> 0. When network 𝑖 decides to increase its access charge in stage 1 
of the game, it also decreases its fixed fee in the later stage.  
Analogously, In the neighbourhood of 𝑎𝑖
∗, one can conclude that 
𝜕𝐹𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= −𝛼𝑗?̂?𝑗 +
𝜕𝛼𝑗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
(
𝔻
𝜎
) + 2
𝜕𝛼𝑗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
(𝑎𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)?̂?𝑖 < 0 
since  
𝜕𝛼𝑗
𝜕𝑎𝑖
|
𝑐𝑖<𝑎𝑖≤𝑎𝑖
∗
< 0. When network 𝑖 increases its access charge, network 𝑗 decides 
to reduce its own fixed fee in response. 
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2.5.7 Proof of the degree of substitutability in a shared-market 
equilibrium 
To focus on a shared-market equilibrium, the denominator of (2. A1) should 
be positive. 
1 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝1)] > 0 
1
𝜎
> −[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝1) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] 
𝑝 ∈ { 𝑝1, 𝑝2, ?̂?1, ?̂?2} whereas 𝑝1
∗ = 2𝑐1 , 𝑝2
∗ = 2𝑐2 , ?̂?1
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑎2 , ?̂?2
∗ = 𝑐2 + 𝑎1  and 
𝑚𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖. 
Substituting 𝜈(𝑝) =
1
2
− 𝑝 +
𝑝2
2
  in the above expression yields    
1
𝜎
>  (𝑐2 − 𝑐1)
2 + (𝑚1 +𝑚2)(1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑐2) −
1
2
(𝑚1
2 +𝑚2
2). 
Therefore, the degree of substitutability (𝜎) must not be too high when compared 
with cost differential in order that a shared-market equilibrium exists.  
2.5.8 Proof of Remark 2.2 
Both networks are regulated to set their access charges at cost, 𝑎1 = 𝑐1 , 
𝑎2 = 𝑐2. According to (2. A7), network 1 gains larger or equal market share when 
𝛽 ≥ −
1
2
[
𝜈(?̂?1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝2
∗)
−𝜈(?̂?2
∗) + 𝜈(𝑝1
∗)
]. In this scenario, the equilibrium prices are 𝑝1
∗ = 2𝑐1, 
𝑝2
∗ = 2𝑐1 and  ?̂?1
∗ = ?̂?2
∗ =  𝑐1 + 𝑐2. Thus, ?̂̂? = −
1
2
[𝜈(2𝑐1) − 𝜈(2𝑐2)]; ?̂? < ?̂̂? < 0.   
2.5.9 Proof of Proposition 2.5 
Under the symmetric regulation, 𝑎1 = 𝑐1, 𝑎2 = 𝑐2, 𝑝2
∗ > ?̂?2
∗
, ?̂?1
∗ > 𝑝1
∗ and 
?̂?1
∗ = ?̂?2
∗
. From (2. A5), the fixed fee of the low-cost firm (network 1) is  
𝐹1
∗ = 𝑓1 + 𝛼1
𝔻
𝜎
 . 
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The fixed fee of the high-cost firm (network 2) is  
𝐹2
∗ = 𝑓2 + 𝛼2
𝔻
𝜎
 .  
Suppose 𝛼1 > 𝛼2 and 𝑓1 = 𝑓2 with no access mark-up, it is found that 𝐹1
∗ > 𝐹2
∗.  
According to (2. A8) , when the symmetric regulation is imposed, access 
revenue vanishes and each firm earns profit only from its fixed fee revenue. The 
equilibrium profit is shown below. 
𝜋𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝑖
2  [
𝔻
𝜎
] 
If 𝛼1 > 𝛼2, 𝜋1
∗ − 𝜋2
∗ = (𝛼1
2 − 𝛼2
2) [
𝔻
𝜎
] > 0. As a result, network 1 with larger market 
share has higher profit than network 2.  
2.5.10 Proof of Proposition 2.6 
This scenario focuses on the situation where the established firm with low cost 
(network 1) is dominant in the market (𝛼1
∗ >
1
2
). 
(i) When the two networks’ access charges are set at cost by regulation (𝑎1 = 𝑐1 
and 𝑎2 = 𝑐2),  
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
= −2𝛼2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
(
𝔻
𝜎
)  > 0 
since  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
∗
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0. 
After considering the above derivative in the neighbourhood of 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 , 
network 2 increases its access charge to gain more profit. As a result, the market share 
of the low-cost established firm decreases while that of the new firm increases.  
(ii) The new firm can set 𝑎2 arbitrarily under the asymmetric regulation. By 
considering only at point 𝑎1 = 𝑐1 and 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 , one may rewrite (2. A5) as 
𝐹1
∗ = 𝑓1 + 𝛼1
𝔻
𝜎
. 
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Taking differentiation of the profit-maximising fixed fee with respect to the new 
firm’s access charge shows  
  
𝜕𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
= 𝛼1
∗(−?̂?1) +
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
(
𝔻
𝜎
) . 
When the regulator sets 𝑎1 = 𝑐1 , at 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 , 
  
𝜕𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= −𝛼1
∗?̂?1  +  (
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
)(
𝔻
𝜎
) 
where  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
𝜎?̂?1(𝕋
∗ −𝔻∗ ) 
𝔻∗ 2
 . 
Substituting 𝕋∗|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻  and 𝔻
∗ |𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= 3𝔻  in the 
above derivative of fixed fee yields the following. 
 
𝜕𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
 = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1  + (
𝜎?̂?1(𝕋
∗ −𝔻∗ ) 
𝔻∗ 2
) (
𝔻
𝜎
) 
                    = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1 − (
𝔻∗ − 𝕋∗ 
𝔻∗ 
) (
𝔻
 𝔻∗ 
) ?̂?1   
               = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1 − (1 − 𝛼1
∗) (
𝔻
3𝔻
) ?̂?1  
          = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1 − (1 − 𝛼1
∗) (
1
3
) ?̂?1 
                                                        = (−
1
3
−
2
3
𝛼1
∗) ?̂?1   
Since 𝛼1
∗|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
> 
1
2
 ,  
𝜕𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
  < 0. 
The new firm has incentive to set a mark-up on access charge. When the new 
firm sets its above-cost access charge, the market share of the low-cost established 
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firm decreases. Then, the established firm adjusts to the new equilibrium by reducing 
its fixed fee in order to compete with the new firm. 
  One may consider the effect of the new firm’s access mark-up on its own fixed 
fee from (2. A5) and find that 
𝐹2
∗ = 𝑓2 + (1 − 𝛼1
∗)
𝔻
𝜎
 + (1 − 2𝛼1
∗)(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1. 
𝜕𝐹2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
= (1 − 𝛼1
∗)[−?̂?1] −
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
𝔻
𝜎
+ (1 − 2𝛼1
∗)[(𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1′ + ?̂?1] 
At 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 ,  
𝜕𝐹2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= (1 − 𝛼1
∗)(−?̂?1)  − [(
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
)(
𝔻
𝜎
)]  + (1 − 2𝛼1
∗)?̂?1 
                                 = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1  − [(
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
)(
𝔻
𝜎
)]     
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
𝜎?̂?1(𝕋
∗ −𝔻∗ ) 
𝔻∗ 2
 
Substituting  𝕋∗| 𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
1
2
+ 𝜎𝛽 + 𝜎[𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝜈(𝑝2)] + 𝔻  and  𝔻
∗ | 𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= 3𝔻  in 
the derivative of the new firm’s fixed fee gives the following.  
                  
𝜕𝐹2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
 = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1  − [
𝜎?̂?1(𝕋
∗ −𝔻∗ ) 
𝔻∗ 2
(
𝔻
𝜎
)] 
                                        = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1 + (
𝔻∗ − 𝕋∗ 
𝔻∗ 
) (
𝔻
 𝔻∗ 
) ?̂?1 
                                   = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1 + (1 − 𝛼1
∗) (
𝔻
3𝔻
) ?̂?1 
                                  = −𝛼1
∗?̂?1 + (1 − 𝛼1
∗) (
1
3
) ?̂?1   
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                            = (−
4
3
𝛼1
∗ +
1
3
) ?̂?1                 
Since 𝛼1
∗|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
>
1
2
 ,  
𝜕𝐹2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0. When the new firm’s access charge increases, its 
equilibrium fixed fee decreases.  
The effect of the new firm’s access mark-up on its own fixed fee is  
𝜕𝐹2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
 = (−
4
3
𝛼1
∗ +
1
3
) ?̂?1. 
The effect of the new firm’s access mark-up on the low-cost established firm’s fixed 
fee is 
𝜕𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= (−
1
3
−
2
3
𝛼1
∗) ?̂?1.  
Comparing these two effects gives  
(−
1
3
−
2
3
𝛼1
∗) ?̂?1 < (−
4
3
𝛼1
∗ +
1
3
) ?̂?1 < 0.  
Hence, the effect of the asymmetric regulation on the low-cost established firm’s 
fixed fee outweighs the effect on the new firm’s fixed fee.  
(iii) From (2. A8), the new firm’s profit is  
𝜋2
∗ = 𝛼2
2 [
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎2 − 𝑐2)?̂?1]      
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
= 𝛼2
2(𝑎2 − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?′1 − 2𝛼2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
[
𝔻
𝜎
+ (𝑎2 − 𝑐𝑡2)?̂?1] = 0 
When the low-cost established firm sets access charge at cost by regulation, at 𝑎2 = 𝑐2, 
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= − 2𝛼2
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
(
𝔻
𝜎
) > 0. 
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This is because at 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 ,  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
< 0  and 𝔻 > 0. Cost-based access charge is not the 
profit-maximising outcome. When Network 2 can set its access charge, it increases 
access charge with access mark-up. Accordingly, its profit is higher than that under 
the symmetric regulation. 
From (2. A8), when the low-cost established firm is regulated, it has no profit 
from access revenue. Its equilibrium profit is shown below. 
𝜋1
∗ = 𝛼1
2  (
𝔻
𝜎
)      
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= 𝛼1
2𝜈′(?̂?1) +  2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 (
𝔻
𝜎
) 
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= 𝛼1
2(−?̂?1) +  2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 (
𝔻
𝜎
) 
Since  
𝜕𝛼1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0,   
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0.      
2.5.11 Proof of Remark 2.3 
Under the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation, 𝑎1 = 𝑐1, 𝑎2
∗ > 𝑐2. 
According to (2. A7), the low-cost established firm has larger market share when 
𝛽 > −
1
2
[𝜈(?̂?1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑝2
∗) − 𝜈(?̂?2
∗) + 𝜈(𝑝1
∗)]. In equilibrium, 𝑝1
∗ = 2𝑐1, 𝑝2
∗ = 2𝑐2,  
?̂?1
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗  and ?̂?2
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 . After substituting the equilibrium prices in the 
above expression, ?̂̂?
̂
= −
1
2
[𝑣(𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗)  − 𝜈(2𝑐2) − 𝑣(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) + 𝜈(2𝑐1)] > ?̂̂? > ?̂?.  
2.5.12 Proof of Proposition 2.7a 
 This section focuses only on the case in which the low-cost established firm 
(network 1) is dominant with larger market share. 
Rearranging (2. A15)  by replacing  𝛼2
∗ = 1 −  𝛼1
∗  in the equation, one can 
obtain 
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𝛼2
∗ =
1
2
+ 
(−𝜎𝛽) +
𝜎
2
[𝜈(𝑝2) − 𝜈(𝑝1) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(?̂?1)]
𝔻∗ 
.                 (2. A16) 
𝕄2 = (−𝜎𝛽) +
𝜎
2
[𝜈(𝑝2) − 𝜈(𝑝1) + 𝜈(?̂?2) − 𝜈(?̂?1)] and inserting it in (2. A16) yields 
the following expressions. 
 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ = 
1
2
+ 
𝕄2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 
𝔻∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
  
𝕄2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 = (−𝜎𝛽) +
𝜎
2
[𝜈(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐1) + 𝜈(𝑐2 + 𝑎1
∗) − 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗)] 
𝔻∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 =  3 + 3𝜎 [
−𝑣(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐1)
 
+𝜈(𝑐2 + 𝑎1
∗) + 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗)
] + 2𝜎𝑚1
 ∗?̂?2  + 2𝜎𝑚2
 ∗?̂?1 
 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ = 
1
2
+ 
𝕄2𝑠𝑦𝑚 
𝔻∗ 𝑠𝑦𝑚
  
𝕄2𝑠𝑦𝑚 = −𝜎𝛽 +
𝜎
2
[𝜈(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐1) + 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) − 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)] 
𝔻∗ 𝑠𝑦𝑚 =  3 + 3𝜎[−𝑣(2𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐1) + 2𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2)]  
In the unregulated market, both networks choose 𝑝1
∗ = 2𝑐1, ?̂?1
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑎2
∗, 
𝑝2
∗ = 2𝑐2 and ?̂?2
∗ = 𝑐2 + 𝑎1
∗. Under the symmetric regulation, the market outcome is 
𝑝1
∗ = 2𝑐1, ?̂?1
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2, 𝑝2
∗ = 2𝑐2 and ?̂?2
∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2. After substituting these market 
outcomes in the above expressions, one can find that 𝕄2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 < 0  certainly and 
𝕄2𝑠𝑦𝑚 < 0  in most situations where 𝛽 is not too strongly negative. A comparison 
between 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  and 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗   is shown below. 
 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ −  𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ = 
𝕄2𝑠𝑦𝑚 
𝔻∗ 𝑠𝑦𝑚
−
𝕄2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 
𝔻∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
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𝑚𝑖 is access mark-up of network 𝑖. Suppose network 1 is the dominant established 
firm, 𝑚1
∗ > 𝑚2
∗  in the unregulated market,
32
 one may write the following expressions.  
𝕄2𝑠𝑦𝑚 − 𝕄2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 = 
𝜎
2
[(𝑚1
∗ −𝑚2
∗) (𝜃 −
(𝑚1
∗ +𝑚2
∗)
2
)]   > 0 
𝔻∗ 𝑠𝑦𝑚  − 𝔻
∗ 
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 =  𝜎 (𝜃𝑚1
∗ +
𝑚1
2
∗2
+  𝜃𝑚2
∗ +𝑚2
∗2)   > 0 
It is implied that, 𝔻∗ 𝑠𝑦𝑚 > 𝔻
∗ 
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 > 0 > 𝕄2𝑠𝑦𝑚 > 𝕄2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔; accordingly, 
𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ − 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ > 0 and 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ > 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗  . 
Due to 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0, network 1’s market share decreases when network 2 
raises its access charge. In other words, under the asymmetric regulation, network 2 
sets a mark-up on access charge and expands its market share. Thus, 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ < 𝛼2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ .  
In summary, 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ < 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ < 𝛼2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗   and  𝛼1𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ > 𝛼1𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ > 𝛼1𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  . 
2.5.13 Proof of Proposition 2.7b 
One can rewrite (2. A8) as the equation shown below. 
𝜋2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ = ( 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ )
2
 [
𝔻𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
?̂?1]  
𝜋2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ = ( 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ )
2
 [
𝔻𝑠𝑦𝑚
𝜎
] 
𝜋2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ = ( 𝛼2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ )
2
 [
𝔻𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
?̂?1] 
where  
𝔻𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔 = 1 + 𝜎 [
𝜈 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2 +𝑚2
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
) − 𝜈(2𝑐2)
+𝜈 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2 +𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
) − 𝜈(2𝑐1)
] 
                                                          
32
 See proof in the appendix (Section 2.5.4). 
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 𝔻𝑠𝑦𝑚  =  1 + 𝜎[𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐2) + 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐1)]  
𝔻𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚 =  1 + 𝜎 [𝜈 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2 +𝑚2
∗
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
) − 𝜈(2𝑐2) + 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) − 𝜈(2𝑐1)]. 
Since 𝛼2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ > 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ , 
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
> 0  and 𝑎2
∗ > 𝑐2(𝑚2
∗
𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
> 0) , one can 
conclude that 𝜋2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ > 𝜋2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  . 
[
𝔻𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
?̂?1] − [
𝔻𝑠𝑦𝑚
𝜎
]
= −
𝑚2
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
2
+ [−𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
+ (𝑐1 + 𝑐2)𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
+
(𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
)
2
2
] 
It is concluded that the expression [−𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
+ (𝑐1 + 𝑐2)𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
+
(𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔)
2
2
] < 0 
since 𝜈′(𝑝) < 0  and 𝜈 (𝑐1 + 𝑐2 +𝑚1
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
) < 𝜈(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) . The first term is also 
negative because  𝑚2
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
> 0. Thus, [
𝔻𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
𝜎
+𝑚2
∗
𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
?̂?1] < [
𝔻𝑠𝑦𝑚
𝜎
]. The previous 
section shows that 𝛼2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ < 𝛼2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ . Therefore, 𝜋2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ < 𝜋2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ . In conclusion, 
𝜋2𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔
∗ < 𝜋2𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ < 𝜋2𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  . 
Differentiating (2. A8) with respect to 𝑎2 yields the following expression.  
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= −𝛼1
2?̂?1  + 2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]   < 0 
where  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0.  
 At 𝑎1 = 𝑐1, if network 2 increases its access mark-up (𝑎2 > 𝑐2), network 1 
inevitably loses its profit due to the asymmetric regulation, i.e. 𝜋1𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗ > 𝜋1𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚
∗  . 
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2.5.14 Proof of the effect of the asymmetric regulation on 
aggregate consumer surplus  
According to (2.9) , differentiating the sum of net utility of network 1’s 
subscribers with respect to 𝑎2 yields the following equation. 
𝜕𝛼1(𝑤1 + 𝛽)
𝜕𝑎2
= 2𝛼1𝜈(𝑝1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼1
2)𝜈′(?̂?1) + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
    
                                  − 𝛼1
𝜕𝐹1
𝜕𝑎2
  − 𝐹1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + 𝛽
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
   
                                  =  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
[2𝛼1𝜈(𝑝1) + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?1) − 𝐹1 + 𝛽]  
                                          +(𝛼1 − 𝛼1
2)𝜈′(?̂?1) − 𝛼1
𝜕𝐹1
𝜕𝑎2
 
The sign is ambiguous. The asymmetric regulation (𝑎2 > 𝑐2)  may not guarantee  
an increase in the total of net utility among the consumers of network 1.  
 
 The effect of 𝑎2 on the sum of the net utility of network 2’s subscribers is  
                     
𝜕(1 − 𝛼1)𝑤2
𝜕𝑎2
= −2(1 − 𝛼1)𝜈(𝑝2)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?2)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
  
                                                      −(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝐹2
𝜕𝑎2
 +
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
𝐹2     
                                              =
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
[−2(1 − 𝛼1)𝜈(𝑝2) + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?2) + 𝐹2] 
                                                    −(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝐹2
𝜕𝑎2
    
At 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 ,  
             
𝜕(1 − 𝛼1)𝑤2
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
[−2(1 − 𝛼1)𝜈(𝑝2) + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?2) + 𝐹2]   
                                                        −(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝐹2
𝜕𝑎2
 .    
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Note that  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0,  
𝜕𝐹2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0.  
The sign is also ambiguous. The asymmetric regulation may not guarantee an increase 
in the total of net utility among the consumers of network 2 either.  
The effect of the asymmetric regulation on the total disutility is shown below. 
𝜕 [
[𝛼1
2 + (1 − 𝛼1)
2]
4𝜎 ]
𝜕𝑎2
 =
𝜕 [ 
2𝛼1
2 − 2𝛼1 +  1
4𝜎  ]
𝜕𝑎2
  
                                           = (
1
2𝜎
) (2𝛼1 − 1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
  
At 𝑎2 = 𝑐2 , 
𝜕 [
[𝛼1
2 + (1 − 𝛼1)
2]
4𝜎 ]
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
= (
1
2𝜎
) (2𝛼1 − 1) (
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎2=𝑐2
)   < 0 
where  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0 and 𝛼1
∗|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
> 
1
2
  in case network 1 is the dominant established 
firm. The asymmetric regulation can decrease the total disutility. 
 
Consequently, the derivative of consumer surplus with respect to network 2’s 
access charge is as follows. 
∂𝐶𝑆
∂𝑎2
 = 2𝛼1𝜈(𝑝1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼1
2)𝜈′(?̂?1)  + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 − 𝛼1
𝜕𝐹1
𝜕𝑎2
 
              −𝐹1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + 𝛽
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 − 2(1 − 𝛼1)𝜈(𝑝2)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 + (1 − 2𝛼1)𝜈(?̂?2)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
    
  −(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝐹2
𝜕𝑎2
   +
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
𝐹2    +
1
2𝜎
(1 − 2𝛼1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
                       
Substituting 𝐹1
∗ and 𝐹2
∗ from (2. A5) in the above equation and rearranging it yield the 
following. 
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∂𝐶𝑆
∂𝑎2
= 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 
{
 
 
 
 
  
3(1 − 2𝛼1) [
1
𝜎
+ 𝑣(?̂?1) + 𝑣(?̂?2) − 𝑣(𝑝1) − 𝑣(𝑝2)]  + 𝛽
 
−(1 − 𝛼1)𝑣(𝑝2)  + 𝑣(𝑝1)  −
1
2𝜎
(1 − 2𝛼1)  −
1
𝜎
(
𝕋∗2
𝔻∗ − 𝕋∗
)
  
}
 
 
 
 
             
= 
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 
{
 
 
 
 
  
3(1 − 2𝛼1) [
1
𝜎
+ 𝑣(?̂?1) + 𝑣(?̂?2) − 𝑣(𝑝1) − 𝑣(𝑝2)]  + 𝛽
 
+[𝑣(𝑝1) − 𝑣(𝑝2)]  + 𝛼1𝑣(𝑝2)  +
1
𝜎
[(
1
2
) (
2𝕋∗ −𝔻∗
𝔻∗
) − (
𝕋∗2
𝔻∗ −𝕋∗
)]
  
}
 
 
 
 
 
Note that  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
< 0, 
1
𝜎
+ 𝑣(?̂?1) + 𝑣(?̂?2) − 𝑣(𝑝1) − 𝑣(𝑝2) > 0. After considering only 
the case of a shared-market equilibrium where network 1 is dominant, one can find 
out that (
1
2
) (
2𝕋∗−𝔻∗ 
𝔻∗ 
) − (
𝕋∗
2
𝔻∗ −𝕋∗
) < 0. If 𝛽 and 𝜎 is not too high and cost differential 
is not too significant, it is likely that an increase in network 2’s access mark-up 
enhances consumer surplus (
∂𝐶𝑆
∂𝑎2
> 0).   
2.5.15 Proof of the effect of the asymmetric regulation on 
aggregate producer surplus 
 Differentiating (2.10) with respect to 𝑎2 yields the following expressions.  
∂𝑃𝑆
∂𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
=
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
+ 
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
  
𝜕𝜋1
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= −𝛼1
2?̂?1  + 2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]   < 0 
𝜕𝜋2
∗
𝜕𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= − 2(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]   > 0 
where  
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0.  
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∂𝑃𝑆
∂𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= − 𝛼1
2?̂?1  + 2𝛼1
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]  − 2(1 − 𝛼1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
] 
= − 𝛼1
2?̂?1  − 2(1 − 2𝛼1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]         
where 𝛼1
∗|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
> 
1
2
 ,   
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
|𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
< 0. 
Therefore,  
 
∂𝑃𝑆
∂𝑎2
|
𝑎1=𝑐1
𝑎2=𝑐2
= − 𝛼1
2?̂?1  − 2(1 − 2𝛼1)
𝜕𝛼1
𝜕𝑎2
 [
𝔻
𝜎
]   < 0. 
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Chapter 3  
Infrastructure Sharing in 
Telecommunications 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In the broadband internet market, the upward trend is towards next generation 
access network, e.g. fibre optic network, with high capacity to satisfy the increasing 
demand for high-speed internet.
33
 In addition to high quality of service, network 
operators may gain advantage from cost reduction and product differentiation in 
consequence of the advanced technology. However, investment in new technology for 
quality-enhanced or value-added service involves a large amount of funding. A firm 
must incur high investment cost in building its own infrastructure if it chooses 
facility-based entry (a conventional mode of market entry). In accordance with entry-
facilitating policies by regulators, an entrant may choose service-based entry and pay 
a fee (access price) to the incumbent in return for leasing access network from the 
incumbent’s facilities. In line with the ladder of investment (Cave, 2006; Cave and 
Vogelsang, 2003), this mode of entry can stimulate competition in the retail market 
when facility-based entry is not a feasible option for an entrant because of a lack of 
funding and the unprofitable duplication of facility. Additionally, co-investment is an 
alternative to conventional investment to hasten the advanced-technology deployment, 
                                                          
33
 Likewise, in the mobile telecommunications market, 2G wireless technology has gradually 
been replaced by 3G and most recently 4G with the prospect of higher technology which 
enables consumers to enjoy not only voice service, but also value-added non-voice services 
such as data transfer and the Internet according to technological convergence.  
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especially in the areas with low demand and high investment cost. The co-investors 
may separately build their own infrastructure in the high-demand areas and agree on 
co-investment in the low-demand areas in compliance with the coverage obligation. 
Moreover, from the engineering aspect, some co-investors have contracts to share 
only a small portion of selected facilities, while other co-investors agree to share the 
whole infrastructure.
34
 It is asserted that cost saving is proportional to the intensity of 
infrastructure sharing (Beckman and Smith, 2005; Song, Zo and Lee, 2012).  
The optimal approach to stimulate investment in quality upgrade, especially 
the next generation network deployment, has been a debatable issue for over a decade 
under a tension between static and dynamic efficiency, as discussed in both 
theoretical and empirical literature. The concept of local loop unbundling has long 
been implemented to encourage service-based competition, but it is claimed that this 
approach cannot promote investment and innovation in the long run (Bacache, 
Bourreau and Gaudin, 2014; Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven, 2010; Briglauer, 
Ecker and Gugler, 2013; Briglauer, Gugler and Haxhimusa, 2015; Crandall, Eisenach 
and Ingraham, 2013; Grajek and Röller, 2012). Other infrastructure-sharing approaches 
have been critically discussed in the context of dynamic efficiency. The related 
studies examine the effects of co-investment in several aspects. Most of them focus 
only on how co-investment induces the extent of investment in the absence of firm 
asymmetry (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2013; Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; 
Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011). Nevertheless, telecommunications firms are usually 
asymmetric, especially in the immature market with a rapid change in technology. 
This leads to differences in cost structure and demand, discrepancies in service quality, 
predatory behaviours by the dominant firms and collusion that have significant effects 
on social welfare and the advanced-technology deployment in the future.  
                                                          
34
 In mobile telecommunications, due to a large amount of investment in base station, mobile 
network operators (MNOs) may outsource these facilities from a third-party company, e.g. 
TowerCo, which provides only costly facilities such as base station, tower and mast, feeder 
cables, antenna system and other equipment. The agreements vary from full sharing, roaming 
and mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) in order to satisfy the coverage obligation, 
especially in the rural areas with low business potential. 
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This study aims to investigate firms’ decisions on the extent of quality upgrade 
for advanced-technology services when other approaches of infrastructure sharing, 
especially co-investment, are alternative modes to launch new advanced services.  
On top of the various agreements, this model captures an issue of firm asymmetry,  
where firms’ cost structures vary. This study reveals that co-investment promotes 
higher consumer welfare than the fully-distributed-cost regulation in spite of lower 
investment in quality upgrade. However, compared to stand-alone investment, co-
investment brings about a welfare-undermining compromise over quality upgrade when 
infrastructure sharing induces a considerable amount of incremental cost of sharing 
facilities and operation. Therefore, in contrast to what telecommunications firms 
usually claim, co-investment may not be an appropriate way to stimulate the 
advanced-technology deployment in some situations. The regulator should closely 
monitor the co-investment negotiation on the grounds of tacit collusion, especially 
when firms have cost asymmetry in the advanced-technology deployment.  
Relevant literature 
The related literature emphasises that access price has a crucial effect on the 
degree of competition under infrastructure sharing in the presence of service-based 
entry. The facility-based incumbent may promote its wholesale profit and place the 
service-based entrant at a disadvantage by setting high access price. An increase in 
wholesale price causes the retail price to go up and finally dampens the competition 
(Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan, 2012; Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2015). 
Meanwhile, low access price can promote market competition by facilitating service-
based entrants to enter the market feasibly. Thus, for the purpose of static efficiency, 
cost-related access price regulation tends to be necessary. 
 However, from a dynamic perspective, access price has a significant effect on 
investment in advanced technology. Low access price may discourage the facility-
based firm from investing in higher technology because it cannot extract substantial 
profit under the regulated infrastructure sharing with low access price (Bourreau, 
Cambini and Hoernig, 2015; Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; Cambini and Valletti, 2003; 
Godinho de Matos and Ferreira, 2011; Kotakorpi, 2006; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011; 
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Vareda, 2010). On the other hand, high access price can encourage investment in the 
newer technology roll-out (Vereda, 2010), and it also stimulates entrants to duplicate 
infrastructure instead of choosing service-based entry. Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) 
compared the outcome of four different approaches of infrastructure sharing, 
including the regulatory holiday, the fully-distributed-cost regime, risk-sharing by co-
investment and long run incremental costs regulation (LRIC). They supported that 
service-based entry under the cost-based access price regulation (LRIC) leads to the 
smallest extent of next generation network (NGN) deployment and consumer welfare. 
In addition, risk-sharing by co-investment boosts the highest consumer welfare.  
 Compared to stand-alone investment, co-investment is claimed to stimulate 
investment in quality-enhanced services (Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; Nitsche and 
Wiethaus, 2011) and finally promote social welfare (Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; 
Foros, Hansen and Sand, 2002; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011). Moreover, co-investment 
gives an incentive to co-investors to expand their coverage under some conditions in 
the context of multiple-area competition (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2013; 
Krämer and Vogelsang, 2014). Cambini and Silvestri (2013) examined the broadband 
market in the setting of à la Cournot in a single area under three different alternatives 
of investment; (1) no investment sharing with a cost-based access price charged to a 
service-based firm, (2) basic investment sharing without side payment and (3) joint-
venture agreement with side payment. It is found that the joint-venture agreement 
yields the greatest incentive to invest in new technology. Despite the highest level of 
advanced technology, the joint-venture agreement may soften competition because the 
joint-venture firms will collude to set the above-cost reciprocal side payment. As a 
result, the joint-venture agreement with the side-payment collusion and the cost-based 
access price regime with less investment incentive both yield lower consumer surplus 
and social welfare than the basic investment sharing.  
Furthermore, Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2013) captured the effect of co-
investment on firms’ decisions about coverage expansion. In that setting, it is assumed 
that investment cost structure may change after the co-investment agreement according 
to benefits or additional costs from sharing infrastructure. Post-sharing investment 
cost may decline due to a reduction in financial risk. The investment cost probably 
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increases because of incremental cost of additional technical equipment for operating 
two networks on the shared infrastructure. Similar to the present study, they concluded 
that co-investment promotes coverage expansion when service differentiation and the 
benefit from cost reduction are sufficiently significant. Additionally, it is also found 
that substantial access price encourages an entrant to enter into the co-investment 
negotiation rather than choose service-based entry. The positive effect of co-investment 
on coverage expansion is also asserted by the more recent experimental evidence 
(Krämer and Vogelsang, 2014). The existing literature shows support for co-investment 
in expectation of the advanced-technology deployment. However, the present study 
cautions that co-investment may not be an appropriate approach to hasten investment 
in quality upgrade in some situations. 
This study is organised as follows. The model is introduced in Section 3.2. 
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 reveal the analysis of the equilibrium outcomes and the 
comparison of stand-alone investment and other approaches of infrastructure sharing 
respectively. Finally, the conclusion is in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Model  
This study concentrates on telecommunications services, especially broadband 
internet service with massive investment in advanced technology, which is an onerous 
burden for network providers and entrants. There are two firms investing in next 
generation technology in one region. The quality of new technology varies according 
to the level of quality upgrade that the two firms choose.
35
  
                                                          
35
 This study bases the model on the competition in the broadband internet market. The firms 
have been racing for higher quality through the next generation network (NGN) such as fibre-
to-the-home (FTTH), and the issue about co-investment in NGN has been hotly debated. 
However, this model can be applied to the next generation mobile network which is heading 
to 4G or a more advanced generation with technology convergence. Another application is 
quality enhancement on the existing technology. The speed of data transfer, a reduction in 
data traffic congestion, sustainable connectivity and customer service may be taken into 
consideration for the purpose of strategic planning. 
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Cost  
It is assumed that the investment cost of new technology deployment 
36
 when 
firm 𝑖 chooses to roll out its advanced service at the level of quality upgrade 𝑠𝑖 is 
𝑐𝑖(𝑠𝑖) =
𝛼𝑖
2
𝑠𝑖
2. 
𝑐𝑖
′(𝑠𝑖) > 0 and 𝑐𝑖
′′(𝑠𝑖) > 0. 𝛼𝑖 is cost parameter; 𝛼𝑖 > 0 and 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0, where 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}.
37
 
Therefore, investment cost strictly increases with 𝑠. For simplicity, constant marginal 
production costs of services are normalised to zero for both firms.
38
 Instead, this study 
emphasises cost asymmetry in investment cost structure where firm 1 has lower cost 
than firm 2.
39
  𝛼1 < 𝛼2 and Δ𝛼 denotes a cost-asymmetry parameter;  Δ𝛼 =  
𝛼2
𝛼1
> 1.  
 
                                                          
36
 The investment cost is the fixed cost involved with the advanced service rollout such as the 
fixed cost of facilities and operation according to a selected level of quality upgrade.  
37
 To upgrade basic service to advanced service, firms need to invest further in infrastructure 
to facilitate the newer technology. In addition, investment cost of advanced technology 
deployment may vary among areas with different geographic landscape, nature of demand and 
population density. However, this model assumes only one region and omits the coverage issue. 
38
 In the telecommunications markets, the quality-enhanced infrastructure involves an enormous 
amount of fixed cost in comparison with a negligible amount of variable production cost 
corresponding to unit of demand or subscriber. Thus, for simplicity, it is assumed that marginal 
production cost is constant regardless of the quality-upgrade level. Nevertheless, the firms’ 
decisions on the quality-upgrade extent may have an impact on the structure of variable 
production cost and then marginal production cost. For instance, the advanced technology 
may be developed to serve a higher quality of telecommunications services, and it may also 
reduce the associated variable production cost. 
39
 This model is set up on the assumption of perfect information on firms’ cost structures. Both 
firms have complete information on each other’s cost structure. The incumbent’s cost may be 
observed through its strategic behaviour and its obligation to reveal its cost structure to the 
regulator. Likewise, the reputation of the entrant as an international corporation or as an 
existing service provider in other regions may signal the entrant’s cost structure in this region. 
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Demand  
Following Foros (2004) and Kotakorpi (2006), representative consumers are 
uniformly distributed with different levels of willingness to pay for basic service on a 
continuum of (−∞, 𝑎]. They will gain additional utility from quality upgrade. Some 
consumers who have too low valuation of service will not subscribe. Under the 
assumption of unit demand,
40
 a representative consumer’s valuation for firm 𝑖's service is  
𝑣 + 𝑆(𝑠𝑖). 
𝑣 is willingness to pay for basic service, varying on the interval (−∞, 𝑎] among consumers. 
𝑆(𝑠𝑖) is additional utility from the quality upgrade of firm 𝑖’s service where firm 𝑖 
chooses the extent of quality upgrade at 𝑠𝑖;  𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0 and  𝑆(𝑠𝑖) ≥ 0; 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
If firm 𝑖 decides not to upgrade its basic service, 𝑠𝑖 = 0 and 𝑆(𝑠𝑖) = 0. To 
simplify the model, all consumers have homogeneous additional utility from the 
quality upgrade in the following form:
41
  
𝑆(𝑠𝑖) =  𝜔𝑠𝑖 
with parameter 𝜔 > 0.42  
                                                          
40
 The unit demand assumption is reasonable in the telecommunications sector. For example, 
in the broadband internet market, one household normally chooses to set up an internet 
connection to one internet provider in purchase of unlimited internet usage with a monthly 
fee. It is also seen in the mobile market where mobile network operators usually offer a 
monthly package of mobile usage including calls, texts and internet connection.  
41
 This model assumes the additive form of utility from service quality upgrade that affects all 
representative consumers in exactly the same way (Foros, 2004; Foros, Hansen and Sand, 
2002; Foros, Kind and Sand, 2005; Kotakorpi, 2006). Additionally, the discrete choice theory  
of product differentiation incorporates the product characteristics such as quality into the 
utility function in the additive form (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992, ch. 6 and 9). 
42
 As assumed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Valletti (2000) in the light of vertical 
differentiation, a consumer’s utility for a particular product is simply derived from the 
multiplication of his taste parameter and the product quality level. In other words, a 
representative 𝜃-taste-type consumer has constant marginal utility of quality equal to 𝜃.  
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This model is based on Cournot competition. Firm 𝑖 offers the quality-upgrade 
extent (𝑠𝑖); 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. Thus, the firms probably choose different levels of quality 
upgrade in the competition. A representative consumer evaluates the two services. He 
will subscribe to the firm that offers higher net utility whenever his net utility is still 
positive. For example, the consumer will buy firm i’s service instead of firm j’s 
service under the following condition. 
𝑣 + 𝜔𝑠𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑣 + 𝜔𝑠𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗 
where 𝑝𝑖 (respectively 𝑝𝑗) is retail price of advanced service of firm 𝑖 (respectively 
firm 𝑗) with the quality-upgrade extent of 𝑠𝑖 (respectively 𝑠𝑗); 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  
Quality-adjusted price of firm 𝑖 is  
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 − 𝜔𝑠𝑖 ;  𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
In this competition, firm j will be cornered if its quality-adjusted price (𝑃𝑗) is still 
higher than firm i’s (𝑃𝑖). This is because every consumer will give higher valuation to 
firm i’s service than firm j’s service. This study aims to shed light on the shared-
market equilibrium where both firms are still active in the market. Therefore, the 
quality-adjusted prices of both active firms’ services must be equal, otherwise the firm 
                                                                                                                                                                      
     Moreover, in the telecommunications industry, the majority of consumers are likely to be 
concerned with high quality. They easily adopt advanced technology with higher quality and 
capacity. Ofcom (2015) revealed that in the UK, smartphones have been rapidly adopted, 
especially among respondents aged 16-24. It also reported that 61 per cent of mobile users in 
2014, compared to 26 per cent in 2010, claim to possess smartphones.  
     Additionally, in the real business world, firms investing in higher quality technology can 
also operate low-quality or standard service on the same platform in order to compete in the 
niche market, targeting consumers who choose a lower quality service. Therefore, this study 
narrows down the various consumer types to just one consumer group with the identical taste 
parameter 𝜔, and the additional utility follows the linear functional form corresponding to 
constant marginal utility of quality. This study excludes the issue about classical vertical 
differentiation.       
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with higher quality-adjusted price would be driven out of the market. The quality-
adjusted price satisfying the shared-market equilibrium (𝑃) is shown below. 
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖 − 𝜔𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗 −  𝜔𝑠𝑗 
In this context, the industry output level (𝑄) is the number of consumers who 
subscribe to either service. A consumer whose utility is higher than or equal to 
quality-adjusted price (𝑃) will participate (𝑣 − 𝑃 ≥ 0). According to the assumption 
of uniformly distributed population and unit demand, the total number of subscribers 
is 𝑎 − 𝑃 at quality-adjusted price 𝑃.  It is implied that the aggregate demand function 
is 𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑃 and  𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2, where 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 are the quantity levels that firm 1 and 
firm 2 choose to serve, respectively.
43
 Thus, the inverse demand function faced by 
firm 𝑖 is derived below. 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑖 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2  where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.                              (3.1) 
Firm 𝑖’s price (𝑝𝑖) corresponds directly to its choices of quality upgrade (𝑠𝑖) and 
output level (𝑞𝑖).
44
 
                                                          
43
 To invest in new technology infrastructure in telecommunications, the facility capacity 
should be planned together with business strategy. For instance, firms decide on access 
network’s location and capacity to serve the targeted households with their broadband internet 
services. Another example is that mobile network operators plan for the allocation of mobile 
numbers by the regulator.  
    As seen in the studies of Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010), Cambini and Silvestri (2012), 
Cambini and Silvestri (2013), Foros (2004), Foros, Hansen and Sand (2002), Kotakorpi 
(2006) and Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), setting up Cournot competition instead of price 
competition is reasonable in these settings. However, most relevant studies show that the 
outcomes of various competition models are not significantly different and they draw the main 
conclusions in a similar way. 
44
 The aggregate demand function in this given area is  𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑃. 
After replacing 𝑄 with  𝑞1 + 𝑞2 and  𝑃 with  𝑝𝑖 −𝜔𝑠𝑖, 
      𝑞1 + 𝑞2  = 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑖 +𝜔𝑠𝑖. 
Thus,                                                           𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑖 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2. 
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This study examines the effects of infrastructure sharing on the firms’ decisions 
on quality-upgrade levels of advanced services. The model is designed to capture the 
competition regarding different approaches of infrastructure deployment. In this 
study, there are three practical approaches, introduced in the following cases.   
Case 1: The two facility-based firms separately invest in quality 
upgrade (stand-alone investment). 
The two firms are assumed to be asymmetric in investment cost structure of 
advanced service. They decide to invest separately with no infrastructure sharing and 
maximise their own profit.  Profit functions are 
𝜋𝑁1 = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑁1 − 𝑞𝑁1 − 𝑞𝑁2)𝑞𝑁1 –
𝛼1
2
𝑠𝑁1
2                                   (3.2) 
𝜋𝑁2 = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑁2 − 𝑞𝑁1 − 𝑞𝑁2)𝑞𝑁2 –
𝛼2
2
𝑠𝑁2
2                                   (3.3) 
where 𝑄𝑁 = 𝑞𝑁1 + 𝑞𝑁2.  
Timing of the game 
This model is set up in a static framework. Each firm makes a one-shot 
decision on the extent of quality upgrade for advanced-technology service (next 
generation network) in the following two-stage game, solved by backward induction.  
Stage 1 The firms choose the extent of quality upgrade simultaneously (𝑠𝑁1, 
𝑠𝑁2).  
Stage 2 The firms simultaneously choose their service quantity levels (𝑞𝑁1, 𝑞𝑁2). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
     In this setting of Cournot competition, firms decide on quality upgrade in the investment 
stage, and they later choose their output levels (the number of their subscribers to be served). 
Suppose the investment stage is exogenous, at a given pair of firms’ quality-upgrade levels, 
firms choose their own output levels which lead to the market-clearing quality-adjusted price 
(𝑃) and then their retail prices (subscription fees) must correspond to the quality-adjusted 
price in the shared-market equilibrium. When the investment stage is endogenous, firms 
strategically plan their quality upgrade. Their retail prices must correspond to the firms’ 
decisions on the extent of quality upgrade and output levels in the shared-market equilibrium.  
 
 
115 
 
Case 2: The two firms agree on co-investment. 
After the agreement, both firms choose the extent of mutual quality upgrade 
(𝑠𝐶).
45
 The low-cost firm shares its facilities and technology with its rival. Cost 
structure may change after accommodating the operations of the two firms instead of 
only one firm. 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  is the investment cost after the agreement of infrastructure 
sharing, which facilitates both firms’ services based on the low-cost firm’s facilities.  
𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑠𝐶) =
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2. 
𝜙  is a positive cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure sharing. 𝜙 = 1  when the 
infrastructure can be shared without any additional cost. 𝜙 > 1  when firms incur 
additional cost of equipment and operation in order to enable the two services to run 
on the shared infrastructure. 𝜙 < 1  when cost saving from infrastructure sharing 
outweighs the additional cost.
46  
The two firms negotiate on co-investment to reach a 
bargain on the basis of Nash Bargaining Solution. After a successful negotiation, they 
mutually choose the extent of quality upgrade (𝑠𝐶) and agree to portion the total 
investment cost.  𝛽 is the proportion of the total investment cost that firm 1 pays and 
firm 2 takes on the rest of the total investment cost burden, 1 − 𝛽.  
 
                                                          
45
 It is assumed that consumers’ preferences for quality-enhanced services offered by both 
firms are not different because both services run on the shared infrastructure at the mutual 
quality-upgrade level on the assumption of no firm-specific preference. 
46
 To guarantee the existence of a successful negotiation on co-investment, 𝜙 > 0 and  𝜙 
should not be too large in order that both asymmetric firms agree to share investment cost; i.e. 
the equilibrium proportion of total investment cost of the low-cost firm is positive, 𝛽∗ > 0. 
When infrastructure sharing causes a large amount of additional investment cost (𝜙 is too 
large), it is more likely that 𝛽∗ ≤ 0 because  
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝜙
< 0. If 𝛽∗ ≤ 0, the low-cost firm does not 
embark on setting up facilities at all and the infrastructure-sharing agreement on using the 
low-cost firm’s technology cannot occur. Consequently, the equilibrium under co-investment 
does not exist in this case. See proof in the appendix (Section 3.6.2).  
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Profit functions are 
𝜋𝐶1 = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶1 − 𝑞𝐶2)𝑞𝐶1 – 𝛽
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2                               (3.4) 
𝜋𝐶2 = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶1 − 𝑞𝐶2)𝑞𝐶2 – (1 − 𝛽)
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2                   (3.5) 
where 𝑄𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶1 + 𝑞𝐶2.  
Timing of the game 
The following two-stage game is solved by backward induction in a static 
framework. Both firms successfully reach an infrastructure-sharing agreement on the 
extent of mutual quality upgrade (𝑠𝐶) and the allocation of the total investment cost 
(𝛽) following Nash Bargaining Solution in stage 1. Then, they enter Cournot competition 
in the retail market in stage 2. 
Stage 1 The firms negotiate on the extent of mutual quality upgrade (𝑠𝐶) and 
(𝛽) on the basis of Nash Bargaining Solution.  
Stage 2 The firms simultaneously choose their own service quantity levels 
(𝑞𝐶1, 𝑞𝐶2). 
Case 3: Access to infrastructure under a fully-distributed-cost regime 
 The entrant with higher cost decides to use the incumbent’s facilities to deliver 
its service in this region instead of building its own infrastructure. The incumbent is 
regulated to give access network to the entrant in accordance with cost-based access 
price. The payment is calculated on a fully-distributed-cost basis, and consequently 
the investment cost of quality upgrade is shared on the basis of usage proportions. In 
this case, the incumbent with lower cost (firm 1) unilaterally decides on the extent of 
quality upgrade (𝑠𝐹) in order to maximise its own profit in response to this regulatory 
regime.
47
  
                                                          
47
 To simplify the model, consumers perceive that the quality-enhanced service of the service-
based entrant does not differ from that of the incumbent which owns the infrastructure 
because they run on the shared infrastructure with the same extent of quality. In other words, 
consumers evaluate the services without firm-specific preference. 
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Profit functions are 
𝜋𝐹1 = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹 − 𝑞𝐹1 − 𝑞𝐹2)𝑞𝐹1 –
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐹
2 + (
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐹
2) (
𝑞𝐹2
𝑄𝐹
)              (3.6) 
𝜋𝐹2 =  (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹 − 𝑞𝐹1 − 𝑞𝐹2)𝑞𝐹2 – (
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐹
2) (
𝑞𝐹2
𝑄𝐹
)                                (3.7) 
where 𝑄𝐹 = 𝑞𝐹1 + 𝑞𝐹2.  
The service-based entrant pays the total access charge of  (
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐹
2) (
𝑞𝐹2
𝑄𝐹
)   to the 
facility-based incumbent according to the proportion of usage. 
Timing of the game 
As the low-cost incumbent, firm 1 gives access network to the service-based 
entrant in the following two-stage game, solved by backward induction.  
Stage 1 Firm 1 decides on the extent of quality upgrade (𝑠𝐹) to maximise its 
own profit.  
Stage 2 The two firms simultaneously choose their own service quantity levels 
(𝑞𝐹1, 𝑞𝐹2). 
Consumer surplus 
Consumer surplus can be calculated in the following way.  
Consumer surplus is 
𝐶𝑆𝑘 = (
1
2
) (𝑞𝑘1 + 𝑞𝑘2)
2.                                                  (3.8) 
𝑘 denotes the outcome of the three cases. 
𝑘 ∈ {𝑁, 𝐶, 𝐹} where 𝑁 denotes Stand-alone investment, 𝐶 denotes Co-investment and 
𝐹 denotes Fully-distributed-cost regulation. 
3.3 Analysis 
 The market outcomes are different regarding the various approaches of the 
infrastructure deployment in the three cases.  
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3.3.1 Case 1: The two facility-based firms invest in quality 
upgrade separately (stand-alone investment). 
In stage 2 of the game, firm 1 and firm 2 have their profit-maximisation 
problems, max𝑞𝑁1 𝜋𝑁1 and max𝑞𝑁2 𝜋𝑁2 respectively. From (3.2) and (3.3), the first-
order conditions are   
𝜕𝜋𝑁1
𝜕𝑞𝑁1
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑁1 − 2𝑞𝑁1 − 𝑞𝑁2 = 0                                       (3.9) 
𝜕𝜋𝑁2
𝜕𝑞𝑁2
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑁2 − 𝑞𝑁1 − 2𝑞𝑁2 = 0.                                    (3.10) 
Solving the above FOCs gives the equilibrium quantity levels as below. 
𝑞𝑁𝑖
∗ (𝑠𝑁𝑖, 𝑠𝑁𝑗 ) =
𝑎
3
+
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁𝑖 −
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁𝑗   where  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.               (3.11)                              
Substituting 𝑞𝑁𝑖
∗  in profit function (3.2) and (3.3) yields the following profit 
functions in stage 1.  
𝜋𝑁𝑖(𝑠𝑁𝑖, 𝑠𝑁𝑗 ) =  (
𝑎
3
+
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁𝑖 −
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁𝑗 )
2
−
𝛼𝑖
2
𝑠𝑁𝑖
2   where  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.   (3.12) 
 Firm 𝑖 ’s problem is max𝑠𝑁𝑖 𝜋𝑁𝑖 . Differentiating the reduced-form profit 
functions with respect to associated quality-upgrade levels gives the following: 
𝜕𝜋𝑁𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑁𝑖
= 
4
9
𝑎𝜔 + 
8
9
 𝜔2𝑠𝑁𝑖 −
4
9
  𝜔2𝑠𝑁𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖𝑠𝑁𝑖 =  0                         (3.13) 
where  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
 In equilibrium, the quality-upgrade levels of the two firms are 
𝑠𝑁1
∗ =
12𝑎𝜔𝛼2 − 16𝑎𝜔
3
27𝛼1𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 − 24𝜔2𝛼2 + 16𝜔4
                             (3.14) 
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𝑠𝑁2
∗ =
12𝑎𝜔𝛼1 − 16𝑎𝜔
3
27𝛼1𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 + 16𝜔4
                             (3.15) 
Proposition 3.1 
 In the absence of infrastructure sharing, the low-cost firm chooses higher 
quality-upgrade level and offers a greater number of subscribers with higher price 
than the high-cost firm, i.e. 𝑠𝑁1
∗ > 𝑠𝑁2
∗ , 𝑞𝑁1
∗ > 𝑞𝑁2
∗ , 𝑝𝑁1
∗ > 𝑝𝑁2
∗ . Finally, the low-cost 
firm gains higher profit than the high-cost firm, i.e. 𝜋𝑁1
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ .    
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.1). 
 The low-cost firm takes the dominant position because of its lower investment 
cost in quality upgrade. Due to cost efficiency, it can invest more heavily in quality 
upgrade to attract more consumers and gain larger market share and then make higher 
profit than the high-cost firm whose quality upgrade is costly. 
3.3.2 Case 2: The two firms agree on co-investment. 
The firms agree to share the whole infrastructure for advanced service. In 
stage 2, firm 1 and firm 2 have their profit-maximisation problems, max𝑞𝐶1 𝜋𝐶1 and 
max𝑞𝐶2 𝜋𝐶2 respectively. From (3.4) and (3.5), the FOCs are shown below. 
𝜕𝜋𝐶1
𝜕𝑞𝐶1
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶 − 2𝑞𝐶1 − 𝑞𝐶2 = 0                                       (3.16) 
𝜕𝜋𝐶2
𝜕𝑞𝐶2
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶1 − 2𝑞𝐶2 = 0                                       (3.17) 
From (3.16) and (3.17), one can solve the FOCs and obtain the equilibrium 
levels of service quantity as below. 
𝑞𝐶𝑖
∗ (𝑠𝑐 ) =
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑐   where  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.                               (3.18)                                    
Back to stage 1, substituting (3.18) in the profit functions (3.4) and (3.5) gives 
𝜋𝐶1(𝑠𝑐 ) =  (
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐶 )
2
 –  𝛽
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2                                        (3.19) 
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𝜋𝐶2(𝑠𝑐 ) =  (
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐶 )
2
 – (1 − 𝛽)
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2.                            (3.20) 
The firms enter into a negotiation on the mutual quality-upgrade level (𝑠𝐶) and the 
allocation of total investment cost (𝛽). The outcome is based on Nash Bargaining 
Solution. The outcome of the negotiation solves the following problem. 
max
𝛽,𝑠𝐶
 ( 𝜋𝐶1 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ )(𝜋𝐶2 − 𝜋𝑁2
∗ ) 
Ψ  denotes  (𝜋𝐶1 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ )(𝜋𝐶2 − 𝜋𝑁2
∗ ). 
𝜕Ψ
𝜕𝛽
= (𝜋𝐶1 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ )
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2 + (𝜋𝐶2 − 𝜋𝑁2
∗ ) (−
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2) = 0                     
𝜋𝐶1 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ = 𝜋𝐶2 − 𝜋𝑁2
∗                                                           (3.21) 
𝜕Ψ
𝜕𝑠𝐶
= 4𝑎𝜔 + 4𝜔2𝑠𝐶 − 9𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶 = 0                                                 (3.22) 
From (3.22), the level of mutual quality upgrade is 
𝑠𝐶
∗ =
4𝑎𝜔
9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2
 .                                                       (3.23) 
Proposition 3.2 
 By means of co-investment, the low-cost firm reaches a successful agreement 
to pay a smaller proportion of total investment cost of shared infrastructure, and then 
earns higher profit than the high-cost firm, despite the same equilibrium output level, 
i.e. 𝛽∗ <
1
2
 , 𝑞𝐶1
∗ = 𝑞𝐶2
∗ , 𝜋𝐶1
∗ > 𝜋𝐶2
∗  .  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.2). 
 In the light of stand-alone investment, the low-cost firm is in the dominant 
position with higher profit and higher quality upgrade. After co-investment, they  
have equal market shares because both services run on exactly the same shared 
infrastructure with the same quality-upgrade level. In stage 2, both firms offer the 
symmetric equilibrium outputs. However, in the co-investment negotiation in stage 1, 
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the low-cost firm has higher bargaining power to negotiate for the smaller proportion 
of total investment cost. The high-cost firm has to accept the larger proportion of total 
investment cost because the successful negotiation on co-investment finally brings it 
higher net profit than stand-alone investment. As a result, under co-investment, the 
low-cost firm has higher profit than the high-cost firm, even though their services are 
not different in terms of quality upgrade and service quantity from consumers’ 
perspective in the retail market.  
To elaborate on the outcome, this result can be analysed in accordance with 
Split-The-Difference Rule.
48
 Each firm first agrees to extract the same amount of its 
own profit as it would earn under stand-alone investment. Further, both firms reach a 
consensus to equally split the incremental aggregate profit that they both receive from 
choosing co-investment instead of stand-alone investment. Even though they earn 
equal shares of the incremental aggregate profit, the profits of the two firms are still 
different. This is because the low-cost firm has higher bargaining power to extract a 
higher amount of profit as a consequence of its opportunity cost from agreeing on co-
investment instead of entering the stand-alone investment competition.
49
  
Remark 3.1 
In the light of co-investment, the equilibrium quality-upgrade level is independent 
of the allocation of investment cost (𝛽). Nevertheless, the equilibrium quality-upgrade 
level decreases with the cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure sharing (𝜙).  
Proof 
 Differentiating (3.23) with respect to 𝛽 and 𝜙 gives 
  
𝜕𝑠𝐶
∗
𝜕𝛽
= 0  and   
𝜕𝑠𝐶
∗
𝜕𝜙
=
−36𝑎𝜔𝛼1
(9𝜙𝛼1−4𝜔2)2
< 0.                                                 
                                                          
48
 Muthoo (1999, p. 15) illustrates an example of Split-The-Difference Rule in which case two 
players bargain over a portion of a cake where the utility functions of the players are simply 
their shares of the cake. The utility of one player can be rewritten as a linear function of the 
utility of the other. After bargaining, they agree to obtain their first portions equal to what they 
would receive from the disagreement, and they further agree to split the remaining cake equally.  
49
 See proof in the appendix (Section 3.6.2). 
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 The co-investors choose their mutual quality-upgrade level regardless of the 
allocation of investment cost. The quality-upgrade level directly affects the amount of 
total investment cost. However, they decide on the quality-upgrade level only on the 
grounds of the magnitude of total investment cost after co-investment and consumers’ 
reservation price. The allocation of the total investment cost among the co-investors 
depends on their bargaining power. They have less incentive to upgrade quality when 
infrastructure sharing causes more substantial additional cost. Thus, the equilibrium 
quality-upgrade level decreases when the cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure 
sharing increases. 
3.3.3 Case 3: Access to infrastructure under a fully-distributed- 
cost regime 
In stage 2, firm 1 and firm 2 choose their output levels to maximise their own 
profits, max𝑞𝐹1 𝜋𝐹1 and max𝑞𝐹2 𝜋𝐹2 respectively. From (3.6) and (3.7), the FOCs are  
𝜕𝜋𝐹1
𝜕𝑞𝐹1
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹 − 2𝑞𝐹1 − 𝑞𝐹2 − (
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐹
2) (
𝑞𝐹2
𝑄𝐹
2)  = 0                     (3.24) 
𝜕𝜋𝐹2
𝜕𝑞𝐹2
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹 − 𝑞𝐹1 − 2𝑞𝐹2 − (
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐹
2) (
𝑞𝐹1
𝑄𝐹
2)  = 0.                    (3.25) 
To satisfy (3.24) and (3.25), the symmetric equilibrium at this stage is   
𝑞𝐹
∗(𝑠𝐹 ) = 𝑞𝐹1
∗ (𝑠𝐹 ) = 𝑞𝐹2
∗ (𝑠𝐹 ) =
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
6
+ √
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2
24
 .        (3.26) 
Under the fully-distributed-cost regulatory regime, firm 1 chooses the extent 
of quality upgrade in stage 1 to solve its problem, max𝑠𝐹 𝜋𝐹1 . After substituting 
(3.26) in (3.6), one can differentiate the reduced-form profit function of firm 1 and 
obtain the following equation. 
𝜕𝜋𝐹1
𝜕𝑠𝐹
= (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹 − 4𝑞𝐹1
∗ )
𝜕𝑞𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑠𝐹
+ 𝜔𝑞𝐹1
∗ −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2
=  0                     (3.27) 
 
 
123 
 
 The equilibrium level of quality upgrade (𝑠𝐹
∗) cannot be explicitly expressed 
in closed form. However, it can be shown in comparison with the outcomes of other 
cases, as seen in the next section.  
Proposition 3.3 
 Under the fully-distributed-cost regulatory regime, the market share and the 
profit of the low-cost facility-based firm equal those of the high-cost service-based 
rival that asks the low-cost firm for access network, i.e. 𝑞𝐹1
∗ = 𝑞𝐹2
∗  and 𝜋𝐹1
∗ = 𝜋𝐹2
∗ .  
Proof  
 Substituting (3.26) in (3.6) and (3.7) shows 𝜋𝐹1
∗ = 𝜋𝐹2
∗ . 
𝜋𝐹1 
∗ = 𝜋𝐹2
∗ = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗ − 2𝑞𝐹
∗)𝑞𝐹
∗  − (
𝜙𝛼1
4
𝑠𝐹
∗2)                                  
 Under the fully-distributed-cost regulation, the low-cost firm is regulated to 
allow its service-based rival to share its infrastructure. In the retail market, they 
compete with each other by offering exactly the same level of quality upgrade run on 
the shared infrastructure.
50
 Thus, the two firms are equal in market share and profit. 
Access to infrastructure by the unregulated access price approach 
When the low-cost facility-based firm is allowed to set access price without 
any intervention by the regulator, it will reject the infrastructure-sharing proposal or 
set a prohibitive access price until the service-based rival has no market share and 
consequently exits the market. Finally, the low-cost firm becomes a monopolist in the 
region and certainly imposes a limitation on the number of subscribers that induces an 
increase in retail price. Therefore, this approach is not optimal in terms of consumer 
welfare, even though it can stimulate investment by the facility-based incumbent.
51
  
                                                          
50
 In this model, it is assumed that there is no horizontal product differentiation among service 
providers (no firm-specific preference). Consumers consider only price and quality of service 
without brand preference. 
51
 See proof and further details in the appendix (Section 3.6.3). 
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3.4 The optimal regulatory regimes 
 Table 3.1 shows comparisons of the equilibrium market outcomes under 
different regulatory regimes to find out the most effective regulation/deregulation on 
the advanced-technology deployment in several facets of quality enhancement, the 
supply of service and overall consumer welfare. 
Table 3.1 Equilibrium market outcomes in comparison 
Scenario The extent of quality upgrade 
Case 1:  
Stand-alone investment 
𝑠𝑁1
∗ =
12𝑎𝜔𝛼2 − 16𝑎𝜔
3
27𝛼1𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 − 24𝜔2𝛼2 + 16𝜔4
 
𝑠𝑁2
∗ =
12𝑎𝜔𝛼1 − 16𝑎𝜔
3
27𝛼1𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 + 16𝜔4
 
Case 2: Infrastructure 
sharing by co-investment 
𝑠𝐶
∗ =
4𝑎𝜔
9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2
 
Case 3: Access to 
infrastructure under the 
fully-distributed-cost 
regulation 
n/a 
Scenario Industry output level 
Case 1:  
Stand-alone investment  
𝑄𝑁
∗ =
2𝑎
3
+ 
𝜔𝑠𝑁1
∗
3
+
𝜔𝑠𝑁2
∗
3
 
Case 2: Infrastructure 
sharing by co-investment 
𝑄𝐶
∗ = 
2(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
3
 
Case 3: Access to 
infrastructure under the 
fully-distributed-cost 
regulation 
𝑄𝐹
∗ = 
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)
3
+ 2√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
∗2
24
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Table 3.1 Equilibrium market outcomes in comparison (continued) 
Scenario Consumer Surplus 
Case 1:  
Stand-alone investment  
𝐶𝑆𝑁 = (
1
2
) (
2𝑎
3
+ 
𝜔𝑠𝑁1
∗
3
+
𝜔𝑠𝑁2
∗
3
)
2
 
Case 2: Infrastructure 
sharing by co-investment 
𝐶𝑆𝐶 = (
1
2
) (
2(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
3
)
2
 
Case 3: Access to 
infrastructure under the 
fully-distributed-cost 
regulation 
𝐶𝑆𝐹 = (
1
2
)(
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)
3
+ 2√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
∗2
24
)
2
 
  
Note: n/a is the equilibrium outcome that cannot be expressed in closed form. 
 The equilibrium outcomes vary according to circumstances. This study aims to 
bring co-investment to light, so the outcome of co-investment will be compared with 
other cases as a benchmark.   
 Co-investment VS Stand-alone investment  
 This section highlights comparisons between the outcomes of infrastructure 
sharing by co-investment and stand-alone investment. 
Proposition 3.4  
 Compared to stand-alone investment without infrastructure sharing, the co-
investors agree to mutually change the level of quality upgrade according to their 
adjusted cost structure after infrastructure sharing.  
(i) If the cost-adjustment parameter is very low, 0 < 𝜙 <
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
, 
the co-investors agree to increase the mutual quality-upgrade level, i.e. 𝑠𝑁2
∗ < 𝑠𝑁1
∗ < 𝑠𝐶
∗ .  
(ii) If the cost-adjustment parameter is moderate, 
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9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
≤ 𝜙 ≤
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
, the mutual quality-upgrade level ranges 
between that of the high-cost firm and that of the low-cost firm with stand-alone 
investment, i.e. 𝑠𝑁2
∗ ≤ 𝑠𝐶
∗ ≤ 𝑠𝑁1
∗ .  
(iii) Finally, if the cost-adjustment parameter is sufficiently high, 
𝜙 >
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
, the co-investors decrease the level of mutual quality upgrade, 
i.e. 𝑠𝐶
∗ < 𝑠𝑁2
∗ < 𝑠𝑁1
∗ .    
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.4). 
 When the benefit from cost reduction of infrastructure sharing is sufficiently 
significant, the co-investors can offer a higher level of mutual quality upgrade than 
the equilibrium outcome of stand-alone investment. The considerable cost-saving 
from infrastructure sharing can stimulate their mutual quality upgrade. However, if 
infrastructure sharing requires additional equipment and special operation that 
generate substantial incremental cost, the co-investors agree to choose a lower level of 
mutual quality upgrade than the outcome of stand-alone investment. This is because 
the co-investors incur substantial investment cost after the agreement. Hence, they 
agree to soften competition in quality upgrade by lowering the extent of mutual 
quality upgrade to earn more profit than that of stand-alone investment. 
The influence of the cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure sharing (𝝓) in 
the negotiation between the co-investors 
To highlight the effect of the cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure 
sharing (𝜙) on the firms’ incentive to upgrade quality, the two firms are assumed  
to be symmetric in investment cost structure (𝛼1 = 𝛼2). In this situation, the cost-
adjustment parameter (𝜙) has a significant effect on the negotiation over the extent of 
quality upgrade under co-investment as follows. 
Corollary 3.1 
When the two firms are symmetric in investment cost structure, the symmetric 
equilibrium outcome occurs, i.e. 𝑠𝑁1
∗ = 𝑠𝑁2
∗ . When 0 < 𝜙 < 1, 𝜙 = 1, or 𝜙 > 1, the 
mutual quality-upgrade level under the co-investment agreement is higher than, equal 
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to, or lower than those under the stand-alone investment respectively. Each co-investor 
agrees to pay half of the total investment cost of infrastructure sharing, i.e.  𝛽 =
1
2
 . 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.5). 
 In the special case of symmetric cost structure, the cost-adjustment parameter 
(𝜙) plays a crucial role in firms’ decisions on quality upgrade. In the absence of 
infrastructure sharing, both stand-alone firms choose the same level of quality 
upgrade and earn equal profit. They both have equal bargaining power when entering 
into the negotiation over co-investment. As a result, the total investment cost is 
divided equally among the co-investors.  When infrastructure sharing does not induce 
an increase in cost (𝜙 = 1) , the co-investors pay exactly the equal amount of 
investment cost and the co-investors’ decision problem is identical to the stand-alone 
investors’ decision problems. Therefore, after co-investment, firms do not change 
their equilibrium level of quality upgrade. However, when infrastructure sharing 
involves additional cost (𝜙 > 1), the co-investors agree to reduce the quality-upgrade 
extent in response to the additional cost. By contrast, when infrastructure sharing 
yields cost saving (0 < 𝜙 < 1), the cost of quality upgrade becomes a lighter burden 
after co-investment. The co-investors find it more profitable to enhance service 
quality to attract more consumers. Thus, in this setting of symmetric cost structure, 
even though firms can lighten their own burden of cost investment in quality upgrade 
through co-investment, it is not guaranteed that firms will have incentive to increase 
their mutual quality-upgrade level. When co-investment incurs additional cost to 
facilitate infrastructure sharing, the co-investors tacitly collude to lower the mutual 
quality-upgrade level through the co-investment negotiation.  
Similarly, back to the main model in the setting of asymmetric cost structures 
as seen in Proposition 3.4, the tacit collusion to decrease the mutual quality-upgrade 
level is likely to occur when co-investment incurs a considerable amount of additional 
investment cost to implement infrastructure sharing.  
In addition, the cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure sharing (𝜙) also 
plays a crucial role in the equilibrium industry output and consumer welfare under co-
investment, as stated in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 3.5 
 The equilibrium industry output level and consumer surplus change according 
to the co-investors’ cost structure.  
If 0 < 𝜙 ≤
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1+3𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔2
, the equilibrium industry output level and 
consumer surplus are higher than or equal to those of stand-alone investment, i.e. 
𝑄𝐶
∗ ≥ 𝑄𝑁
∗  and 𝐶𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝐶𝑆𝑁 .   Conversely, if  𝜙 >
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1+3𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔2
, the equilibrium 
industry output level and consumer surplus are lower than those of stand-alone 
investment, i.e. 𝑄𝐶
∗ < 𝑄𝑁
∗  and 𝐶𝑆𝐶 < 𝐶𝑆𝑁 .  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.6). 
 When the co-investors find that co-investment leads to considerable incremental 
cost of infrastructure sharing (𝜙 >
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1+3𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔2
> 1), they decide to decrease the 
total number of subscribers in the area. According to Proposition 3.4, compared to 
stand-alone investment, if the cost-adjustment parameter is very high, the co-investors 
focus on offering a low level of quality upgrade to save cost. Even though this strategy 
forces the co-investors to give up some subscribers, it can increase the co-investors’ 
profit by dampening competition in quality upgrade. Consequently, when the co-
investors incur high investment cost after sharing infrastructure, they will collude to 
soften competition by providing services with a lower quality-upgrade level. This 
causes a reduction in consumer surplus. In contrast, if co-investment yields cost saving 
or only a small amount of additional cost, 0 < 𝜙 <
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1+3𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔2
, the co-investors 
have an incentive to increase the total number of subscribers in the market. Compared 
to stand-alone investment, all of the active consumers in case of the sufficiently low 
cost-adjustment parameter and most of the active consumers in case of the moderate 
cost-adjustment parameter both benefit from higher levels of quality upgrade. Thus, the 
consumer base is expanded and consumer surplus increases accordingly.  
 Co-investment VS Fully-distributed-cost regulation 
 Comparison of the two approaches to infrastructure sharing is made in terms of 
quality upgrade, the supply of service, price and consumer surplus. 
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Proposition 3.6 
 Infrastructure sharing under the fully-distributed-cost regulation causes a 
higher quality-upgrade level but a lower industry output level with higher retail price 
than the outcomes of co-investment, i.e. 𝑠𝐹
∗ > 𝑠𝐶
∗ , 𝑄𝐹
∗ < 𝑄𝐶
∗  and 𝑝𝐹
∗ > 𝑝𝐶
∗ . Overall, the 
regulation generates lower consumer surplus than co-investment, i.e. 𝐶𝑆𝐹 < 𝐶𝑆𝐶. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.7). 
 In the absence of horizontal differentiation in brand preference, the competition 
between the facility-based firm and its service-based rival in the retail market finally 
ends up with equal market shares. Then, they share half of the total investment cost 
under the fully-distributed-cost regulation. However, the low-cost facility-based firm 
invests in the whole facilities and has the right to unilaterally decide on the level of 
quality upgrade. Compared to co-investment, the facility-based firm finds it more 
profitable to attract consumers by raising the quality-upgrade level which allows it to 
charge higher retail price under this regulation. Despite more attractive advanced 
service, consumer surplus under the fully-distributed-cost regulation is less than that 
under co-investment. This is because the facility-based firm aims to limit the number 
of industry output (then the corresponding retail price increases) in order to maximise 
its own profit.   
 The effects of infrastructure sharing on firms’ profitability 
This section discusses the effects of the different approaches of infrastructure 
sharing on firms’ profitability. 
Proposition 3.7a 
 Both facility-based firms tend to reach a successful co-investment agreement 
because their profits of co-investment are higher than those of stand-alone investment 
according to the benefit from the cost-adjustment parameter of infrastructure sharing 
(𝜙), i.e.  𝜋𝐶1
∗ > 𝜋𝑁1
∗   and  𝜋𝐶2
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ .  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.8). 
Under the assumption that the total investment cost of stand-alone investment 
is greater than that of infrastructure sharing, the low-cost facility-based firms find it 
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more profitable to agree on co-investment instead of building their own infrastructure 
separately. Similarly, the high-cost firm also benefits from the low-cost facilities 
provided by the low-cost firm. Hence, the two firms reach a successful agreement on 
co-investment instead of separate investment.  
Proposition 3.7b 
 (i) The comparison between the low-cost firm’s profits under co-investment 
and under the fully-distributed-cost regulation is ambiguous.  
If the cost-asymmetry parameter is very low (Δ𝛼 approaches one), the low-cost 
firm’s profit under the fully-distributed-cost regulation is higher than that under co-
investment, i.e. 𝜋𝐹1
∗ > 𝜋𝐶1
∗ .  
Conversely, if the cost-asymmetry parameter (Δ𝛼)  is sufficiently high, the 
low-cost firm’s profit under the fully-distributed-cost regulation has a tendency to be 
lower than that under co-investment, i.e.  𝜋𝐹1
∗ < 𝜋𝐶1
∗ .  
(ii) The low-cost facility-based firm prefers infrastructure sharing by the 
unregulated access price approach to co-investment, i.e. 𝜋𝐴1
∗ > 𝜋𝐶1
∗ .  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.9). 
When the regulator intervenes with the fully-distributed-cost regulation, the 
low-cost facility-based firm may gain or lose profit due to this regulation. When the 
cost asymmetry is less significant, the bargaining power of the low-cost firm is less 
dominant. Its equilibrium profit under co-investment is less than that under the fully-
distributed-cost regulation. This is because under the fully-distributed-cost regulation, 
the low-cost firm has the right to unilaterally choose the quality-upgrade level to 
maximise its own profit. Meanwhile, under co-investment, the low-cost firm has to 
negotiate with the other co-investor to choose the mutual quality-upgrade level by 
taking its rival’s interest into account. On the other hand, when the cost asymmetry is 
sufficiently significant, the low-cost firm’s profit under co-investment is greater than 
that under the fully-distributed-cost regulation. The low-cost firm has clear dominance 
in the co-investment negotiation. It pays a considerably smaller proportion of total 
investment cost under co-investment, whereas it has to share half of the total 
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investment cost under the fully-distributed-cost regulation according to the equal 
output levels in equilibrium. As a result, its profit under co-investment is likely to be 
larger than that under the fully-distributed-cost regulation. 
When the low-cost facility-based firm is allowed to set access price, it can 
corner the market by charging extremely high access price. The monopolistic profit of 
the low-cost firm under this regime is definitely higher than that of co-investment in a 
duopoly. 
Proposition 3.7c 
 In the presence of service-based entry, the high-cost firm prefers service-based 
entry under the fully-distributed-cost regulation to co-investment, stand-alone 
investment and service-based entry by the unregulated access price respectively 
because its profit under the fully-distributed-cost regulation is the highest, i.e. 𝜋𝐹2
∗ >
𝜋𝐶2
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ > 𝜋𝐴2
∗ . 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 3.6.10). 
When the regulator intervenes with the fully-distributed-cost regulation, the 
high-cost firm chooses service-based entry instead of co-investment in order to 
increase profit. However, when the low-cost facility-based firm is allowed to set 
access price, the high-cost firm will be driven out of the market if it asks the low-cost 
firm for access network. Therefore, the high-cost firm prefers the fully-distributed-
cost regulation. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This study examines the equilibrium outcomes in the presence of infrastructure 
sharing by various approaches. The two asymmetric firms have different cost structures 
of investment in quality. They choose the extent of quality upgrade that can enhance 
consumers’ utility and then choose the scale of consumer base to be served. Under 
stand-alone investment, the low-cost firm offer higher levels of quality upgrade, firm 
output and corresponding retail price than the high-cost firm. The low-cost firm is in 
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the better position with greater profit than the high-cost firm due to its advantage of 
lower cost.  
The two firms agree to co-invest in infrastructure sharing instead of stand-
alone investment because they can raise their own profits under cooperation. In 
accordance with Nash Bargaining Solution, the low-cost firm with dominant 
bargaining power will carry a lighter burden of investment cost than the high-cost 
firm. As a result, the low-cost firm earns higher profit. However, the comparison 
between the outcomes of co-investment and stand-alone investment is ambiguous. 
When infrastructure sharing yields substantial benefit of cost reduction (respectively 
infrastructure sharing leads to a considerable amount of incremental cost of infrastructure 
sharing), the equilibrium quality-upgrade level, firm output, industry output and 
consumer surplus under co-investment are greater than (respectively less than) those 
under stand-alone investment. Therefore, co-investment may soften competition if 
infrastructure sharing does not generate a sufficient amount of cost saving. In this 
situation, the negotiation on co-investment becomes collusion rather than promotes 
quality upgrades and consumer surplus.   
After the intervention of the fully-distributed-cost regulation, the high-cost 
service-based firm has an incentive not to co-invest in the shared infrastructure but 
seeks access network from the low-cost facility-based firm. Thus, they have equal 
market shares and profits because they both operate on the same network facility and 
offer identical quality-upgraded services. Compared to co-investment, the high-cost 
firm can raise its profit under this regulation because it bears a lighter burden of 
investment cost. When the cost structures of both firms are slightly different 
(respectively significantly different), the low-cost firm’s profit increases (respectively 
has a tendency to decrease). The low-cost firm decides to offer a higher quality-
upgrade level but serve a smaller group of subscribers than it would under co-
investment. As a result, the retail price under this regulation is higher than that under 
co-investment. Overall, the fully-distributed-cost regulation reduces consumer surplus.  
The telecommunications regulator should monitor a co-investment agreement, 
especially when infrastructure sharing does not yield the sufficiently substantial 
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benefit of cost saving. In this situation, firms may co-invest to dampen competition in 
quality upgrade, and consumer surplus finally decreases from the stand-alone 
investment outcome. In addition, the fully-distributed-cost regulation is more effective 
to promote service-based entry than co-investment and the unregulated access price 
approach. This regulation may also support the low-cost facility-based firm if the two 
firms are slightly different in cost structure. Conversely, if the cost structures of the 
two firms are significantly different, this regulation is likely to threaten the low-cost 
firm. This is because its bargaining power over cost allocation is much less dominant 
under the fully-distributed-cost regime than under co-investment. The fully-distributed-
cost regulation can stimulate the low-cost firm’s quality upgrade and accommodates the 
high-cost service-based entrant, but it causes a reduction in the size of consumer base 
and consumer surplus. The regulator should take this into consideration if it plans to 
impose this regulation in order to facilitate service-based entry of the high-cost firm 
instead of promoting the co-investment negotiation. The optimal regulation depends 
on what the regulator deems the highest priority.  
This study examines the competition of two firms with complete information 
on their investment cost structures. However, firms may have incomplete information 
on their rivals’ costs. Additionally, this study is based on the assumption of unit 
demand. Firms decide on the quality upgrade of only one service in the product line 
which has no line depth. Further research may be conducted in the light of the 
incomplete information on firms’ cost types. Further studies may be also extended to 
the case of multiple firms, variable demand and firms’ decisions on quality of a wider 
range of product line to serve different consumer groups. Moreover, other approaches 
of infrastructure sharing and the issue of telecommunications service coverage may be 
of interest. 
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3.6 Appendix 
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 
 From (3.14) and (3.15), 
𝑠𝑁1
∗ − 𝑠𝑁2
∗ =
12𝑎𝜔(𝛼2−𝛼1)
27𝛼1𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼2 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 + 16𝜔4
 
Firm 1 has lower cost than firm 2, 𝛼2−𝛼1 > 0, thus 𝑠𝑁1
∗ > 𝑠𝑁2
∗  .  
The inverse demand function is 𝑝𝑁𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝑁𝑖 − 𝑞𝑁1 − 𝑞𝑁2; 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}. 
When 𝑠𝑁1
∗ > 𝑠𝑁2
∗ , 𝑝𝑁1
∗ > 𝑝𝑁2
∗ .  
From (3.11), the differential between the two equilibrium levels of service 
quantity is 𝑞𝑁1
∗ − 𝑞𝑁2
∗ = 𝜔(𝑠𝑁1
∗ − 𝑠𝑁2
∗ ).  𝑠𝑁1
∗ > 𝑠𝑁2
∗  so 𝑞𝑁1
∗ − 𝑞𝑁2
∗ > 0. Therefore, 
𝑞𝑁1
∗ > 𝑞𝑁2
∗ .   
From (3.12), 
𝜋𝑁1
∗ − 𝜋𝑁2
∗ = [(
𝑎
3
+
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁1 −
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁2 )
2
− (
𝑎
3
+
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁2 −
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁1 )
2
]   
                            − (
𝛼1
2
𝑠𝑁1
2 −
𝛼2
2
𝑠𝑁2
2)                               
                     =  [(
2𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁1 +
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁2 ) (𝜔𝑠𝑁1 − 𝜔𝑠𝑁2 )] − (
𝛼1
2
𝑠𝑁1
2 −
𝛼2
2
𝑠𝑁2
2) 
𝑠𝑁1
∗ > 𝑠𝑁2
∗ ,  𝛼2 > 𝛼1 so one can conclude (
2𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁1 +
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁2 ) (𝜔𝑠𝑁1 − 𝜔𝑠𝑁2 ) > 0 
 and  
𝛼1
2
𝑠𝑁1
2 −
𝛼2
2
𝑠𝑁2
2 < 0.  Thus, 𝜋𝑁1
∗ − 𝜋𝑁2
∗ > 0.    
 To satisfy the requirement that 𝑠𝑁1
∗  and 𝑠𝑁2
∗  are non-negative in the shared-
market equilibrium, it is assumed that 𝛼1 >
4
3
𝜔2 and 𝛼2 >
4
3
𝜔2 where the investment 
cost in telecommunications is enormous relative to additional utility a consumer obtains 
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from quality upgrade. These assumptions comply with the second-order conditions; 
𝜕2𝜋𝑁𝑖
𝜕𝑠𝑁𝑖
2 =
8
9
𝜔2 − 𝛼𝑖 < 0  or  𝛼𝑖 >
8
9
𝜔2; 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}.                                            
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Substituting (3.12), (3.19) and (3.20) in (3.21) yields the following equation. 
(
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐶 )
2
− 𝛽∗
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2  − (
𝑎
3
+
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁1
∗ −
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁2
∗ )
2
 + 
𝛼1
2
𝑠𝑁1
∗  2 
 
= (
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐶 )
2
− (1 − 𝛽∗)
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
2  − (
𝑎
3
+
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁2
∗ −
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝑁1
∗ )
2
 +  
𝛼2
2
𝑠𝑁2
∗  2 
 
        𝛽∗𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
2 = 
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
2
2
−
2
3
𝑎𝜔𝑠𝑁1
∗ +
2
3
𝑎𝜔𝑠𝑁2
∗ −
1
3
𝜔2𝑠𝑁1
∗ 2 +
1
3
𝜔2𝑠𝑁2
∗ 2                
                               +
𝛼1
2
𝑠𝑁1
∗  2 −
𝛼2
2
𝑠𝑁2
∗  2                                                                           
        𝛽∗ =
1
2
+
−
2
3𝑎𝜔(𝑠𝑁1
∗ −𝑠𝑁2
∗ ) −
1
3𝜔
2(𝑠𝑁1
∗ 2 − 𝑠𝑁2
∗ 2) +
𝛼1
2 (𝑠𝑁1
∗  2 − Δ𝛼𝑠𝑁2
∗  2)
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
2       (3. A1) 
One may consider (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21). 
 If 𝛽∗ =
1
2
 , 𝜋𝐶1 =  𝜋𝐶2  and  𝜋𝑁1
∗ = 𝜋𝑁2
∗  in compliance with (3.21). It contradicts the 
result of Case 1 that  𝜋𝑁1
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ .  
If 𝛽∗ >
1
2
 , 𝜋𝐶1 < 𝜋𝐶2  along with  𝜋𝑁1
∗ < 𝜋𝑁2
∗  to make (3.21) hold. It also contradicts 
the result of Case 1 that  𝜋𝑁1
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ .   
If 𝛽∗ <
1
2
 , 𝜋𝐶1 > 𝜋𝐶2 and  𝜋𝑁1
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ . It is possible to make (3.21) hold with 𝛽∗ <
1
2
 . 
Therefore, 𝛽∗ <
1
2
 . 
 Substituting 𝛽∗ <
1
2
 and (3.23)  in (3.18)  - (3.20)  reveals that 𝑞𝐶1
∗ = 𝑞𝐶2
∗  and 
𝜋𝐶1
∗ > 𝜋𝐶2
∗ .  
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 In accordance with Split-The-Difference Rule, one may rewrite (3.19) and 
(3.20) as  
        𝜋𝐶1 =  𝕒 –  𝛽𝕓                                                          (3. A2) 
𝜋𝐶2 =  𝕒 – (1 − 𝛽)𝕓                                                (3. A3) 
where  𝕒 = (
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
2
,  𝕓 =
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
∗2  and  𝑠𝐶
∗ =
4𝑎𝜔
9𝜙𝛼1−4𝜔2
 . 
Substituting (3. A2) and (3. A3) in (3.21) gives the following result. (𝜋𝑁1
∗ , 𝜋𝑁2
∗ ) is the 
disagreement point. 
𝕒 –  𝛽𝕓 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ =  𝕒 – (1 − 𝛽)𝕓 − 𝜋𝑁2
∗                                     (3. A4) 
 𝛽∗ =
1
2
+
1
2𝕓
(𝜋𝑁2
∗ − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ )                                               (3. A5) 
Substituting (3. A5) into (3. A2) and (3. A3) yields   
𝜋𝐶1
∗ = 𝜋𝑁1
∗ +
1
2
(2𝕒 − 𝕓 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ −𝜋𝑁2
∗ ) ,                                   (3. A6) 
𝜋𝐶2
∗ = 𝜋𝑁2
∗ +
1
2
(2𝕒 − 𝕓 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ −𝜋𝑁2
∗ ) .                                   (3. A7) 
The term (2𝕒 − 𝕓 − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ −𝜋𝑁2
∗ )  in (3. A6)  and (3. A7)  is exactly the difference 
between the sum of (3. A2) and (3. A3) (the aggregate profit under co-investment) 
and the sum of the two firms’ profits under stand-alone investment. 
 According to the existence of a successful co-investment agreement, 𝛽∗ should 
be positive in this setting. Differentiating (3. A1) with respect to 𝜙 yields 
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝜙
=
{ 
[(18𝛼1)(96𝑎
2𝜔2𝜙𝛼1)(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)𝔾𝕊2]
 
− [(96𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1)(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)2𝔾𝕊2]
 }
(96𝑎2𝜔2𝜙𝛼1)2𝕊4
                     
                             = (96𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1)(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)𝔾𝕊2
 [18𝜙𝛼1 − (9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)]
(96𝑎2𝜔2𝜙𝛼1)2𝕊4
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                             = (9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)𝔾
[ 18𝜙𝛼1 − (9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2) ]
(96𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1)(𝜙)2𝕊2
  
                             = (9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)𝔾
[ 9𝜙𝛼1 + 4𝜔
2 ]
(96𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1)(𝜙)2𝕊2
  
where  𝕊 = 27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 16𝜔
4, 
𝔾 = 𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1(Δ𝛼 − 1)[−864(𝛼1 − 𝜔
2)(𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 𝜔
2) + 96𝜔4]. 
According to (3.23) , 𝜙𝛼1 >
4𝜔2
9
 to ensure that the equilibrium quality-
upgrade level is non-negative. Therefore, (9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2) > 0. Due to the existence of 
the shared-market equilibrium under stand-alone investment, 𝛼1 >
4
3
𝜔2. Δ𝛼 > 1. Thus, 
𝔾 < 0. Consequently,  
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝜙
< 0. 
3.6.3 Proof of the outcome of the unregulated access price 
approach 
 In contrast to Case 3, without regulation, the incumbent sets access price (𝑚) 
which is collected from the entrant in return for serving one subscriber (one unit of 
output) under the assumption of unit demand.
52
  
Profit functions are 
𝜋𝐴1 =  (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 − 𝑞𝐴1 − 𝑞𝐴2)𝑞𝐴1 −
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐴
2 +𝑚 𝑞𝐴2                        (3. A8) 
𝜋𝐴2 =  (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 − 𝑞𝐴1 − 𝑞𝐴2)𝑞𝐴2 –𝑚 𝑞𝐴2                                           (3. A9) 
where 𝑄𝐴 = 𝑞𝐴1 + 𝑞𝐴2.  
                                                          
52
 For simplicity, there is no firm-specific preference. Thus, from consumers’ perspective, the 
quality-enhanced service of the service-based entrant is not different from that of the incumbent 
that owns the infrastructure because they both run on the same shared infrastructure at an 
identical quality-upgrade level. 
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Timing of the game 
The following three-stage game is solved by backward induction.  
Stage 1 Firm 1 chooses the extent of quality upgrade (𝑠𝐴) to maximise its own 
profit.  
Stage 2 Firm 1 sets access price (𝑚).  
Stage 3 The two firms simultaneously choose their own service quantity levels 
(𝑞𝐴1, 𝑞𝐴2). 
In stage 3, the FOCs are shown below. 
𝜕𝜋𝐴1
𝜕𝑞𝐴1
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 − 2𝑞𝐴1 − 𝑞𝐴2  = 0                                       (3. A10) 
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝑞𝐴2
=  𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 − 𝑞𝐴1 − 2𝑞𝐴2 −𝑚 = 0                              (3. A11) 
 From (3. A10) and (3. A11), the equilibrium quantity levels are 
𝑞𝐴1
∗ (𝑚, 𝑠𝐴 ) =
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐴 +
𝑚
3
                                                   (3. A12) 
                      𝑞𝐴2
∗ (𝑚, 𝑠𝐴 ) =
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠𝐴 −
2
3
𝑚                                                (3. A13) 
 Substituting (3. A12) and (3. A13) into (3. A8) yields the following. 
𝜋𝐴1(𝑚, 𝑠𝐴 ) =  (
𝑎
3
+
𝜔𝑠𝐴 
3
+
𝑚
3
)
2
+𝑚(
𝑎
3
+
𝜔𝑠𝐴 
3
−
2𝑚
3
) – 
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐴
2                 (3. A14) 
 Back to stage 2, differentiating the reduced-form profit function in (3. A14) 
with respect to 𝑚 gives the profit-maximising access price as shown below. 
𝑚∗(𝑠𝐴 ) =  
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 
2
                                                          (3. A15) 
 One may substitute (3. A15) into (3. A14) and obtain the reduced-form profit 
function of firms 1 as shown below. 
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𝜋𝐴1(𝑠𝐴 ) =  (
𝑎
3
+
𝜔𝑠𝐴 
3
+
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 
6
)
2
+ (
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 
2
) (
𝑎
3
+
𝜔𝑠𝐴 
3
−
2
3
(
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴 
2
)
2
) 
− 
𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐴
2                                                                                               (3. A16) 
In stage 1, from (3. A16), firm 1 chooses the extent of quality upgrade which 
satisfies the following FOC.   
𝜕𝜋𝐴1
𝜕𝑠𝐴
=
𝑎𝜔
2
+
𝜔2𝑠𝐴
2
− 𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐴  = 0                                         (3. A17) 
𝑠𝐴
∗ = 
𝑎𝜔
(2𝜙𝛼1 − 𝜔2)
                                                      (3. A18) 
Substituting (3. A15) and (3. A18) in (3. A13) and (3. A9) yields 𝑞𝐴2
∗ = 0 and 
𝜋𝐴2
∗ = 0 respectively.    
 One may find that the unregulated access price approach undermines consumer 
welfare by comparing this approach with co-investment.    
Comparing (3.23) with (3. A18) yields 
𝑠𝐶
∗ − 𝑠𝐴
∗ =
4𝑎𝜔
9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2
−
𝑎𝜔
2𝜙𝛼1 − 𝜔2
 
=
−𝑎𝜔𝜙𝛼1
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)(2𝜙𝛼1 − 𝜔2)
< 0                                  
Therefore, 𝑠𝐴
∗ > 𝑠𝐶
∗  . 
 From (3. A12), (3. A13), (3. A15) and (3. A18),  
 𝑄𝐴
∗ = 𝑞𝐴1
∗ + 𝑞𝐴2
∗ = 
𝑎
2
+
𝜔
2
(
𝑎𝜔
2𝜙𝛼1 − 𝜔2
) + 0 
=
2𝑎𝜙𝛼1
4𝜙𝛼1 − 2𝜔2
                                           (3. A19) 
 From (3.18) and (3.23), 
𝑄𝐶
∗ = 2𝑞𝐶
∗ = 
2𝑎
3
+
2𝜔
3
(
4𝑎𝜔
9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2
) 
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=
6𝑎𝜙𝛼1
9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2
                                                 (3. A20) 
 Under the assumption that 𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
𝜔2 , comparing (3. A19)  with (3. A20) 
gives the following. 
𝑄𝐶
∗ − 𝑄𝐴
∗ =
6𝑎𝜙2𝛼1
2 − 4𝑎𝜔2𝜙𝛼1
(4𝜙𝛼1 − 2𝜔2)(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)
> 0 
Thus, 𝑄𝐴
∗ < 𝑄𝐶
∗   and  𝐶𝑆𝐴 < 𝐶𝑆𝐶. 
From (3.1), co-investment leads to the symmetric retail price in the retail 
market, i.e.  𝑝𝐶1
∗ = 𝑝𝐶2
∗ = 𝑝𝐶
∗   and  𝑝𝐴1
∗ = 𝑝𝐴
∗ .  To compare 𝑝𝐴
∗  with 𝑝𝐶
∗ , one can write 
𝑝𝐶
∗ − 𝑝𝐴
∗ = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗ −𝑄𝐶
∗) − (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐴
∗ − 𝑄𝐴
∗)  
      = 𝜔(𝑠𝐶
∗ − 𝑠𝐴
∗) + (𝑄𝐴
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗).                                                       
(𝑠𝐶
∗ − 𝑠𝐴
∗) < 0 and (𝑄𝐴
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗) < 0, thus  𝑝𝐴
∗ > 𝑝𝐶
∗ .  
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4  
 From (3.14), (3.15) and (3.23), one can write the following. 
𝑠𝑁1
∗ − 𝑠𝐶
∗ = 
12𝑎𝜔𝛼1 (9𝜙𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 12𝜔
2𝜙 − 9𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 8𝜔
2)
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)(27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 − 24𝜔2𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 16𝜔4)
   (3. A21) 
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2) > 0 and (27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 16𝜔
4) > 0 
The sign of (𝑠𝑁1
∗ − 𝑠𝐶
∗) corresponds to the sign of  ( 
9𝜙𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 12𝜔
2𝜙 − 9𝛼1Δ𝛼
+4𝜔2Δ𝛼 + 8𝜔
2
 ) .  
(9𝜙𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 12𝜔
2𝜙 − 9𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 8𝜔
2) > 0  when  𝜙 >
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
 .   
Therefore, if 0 < 𝜙 <
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
,  𝑠𝑁1
∗ < 𝑠𝐶
∗ .  If  
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
≤ 𝜙 < 2 ,  
𝑠𝑁1
∗ ≥ 𝑠𝐶
∗ . 
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𝑠𝑁2
∗ − 𝑠𝐶
∗ = 
12𝑎𝜔𝛼1 (9𝜙𝛼1 − 12𝜔
2𝜙 − 9𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2 + 8𝜔2Δ𝛼)
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)(27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 − 24𝜔2𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 16𝜔4)
    (3. A22) 
The sign of (𝑠𝑁2
∗ − 𝑠𝐶
∗) corresponds to the sign of  ( 
9𝜙𝛼1 − 12𝜔
2𝜙 − 9𝛼1Δ𝛼
 
+4𝜔2 + 8𝜔2Δ𝛼
 ).  
9𝜙𝛼1 − 12𝜔
2𝜙 − 9𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2 + 8𝜔2Δ𝛼 > 0 when  𝜙 >
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
 . Thus, 
if 0 < 𝜙 ≤
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
,  𝑠𝑁2
∗ ≤ 𝑠𝐶
∗ .   If 𝜙 >
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
,  𝑠𝑁2
∗ > 𝑠𝐶
∗ . 
 𝜙𝑎 =
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
 and  𝜙𝑏 = 
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
. To compare 𝜙𝑎 with  𝜙𝑏, 
one may rewrite these expressions as  
𝜙𝑎 =
9𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 8𝜔
2 − 4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 12𝜔2
= 1 −
4𝜔2(Δ𝛼 − 1)
9𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 12𝜔2
< 1 
𝜙𝑏 =
9𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 8𝜔
2Δ𝛼 − 4𝜔
2
9𝛼1 − 12𝜔2
=  1 +
(9𝛼1 − 8𝜔
2)(Δ𝛼 − 1)
9𝛼1 − 12𝜔2
> 1  
where Δ𝛼 > 1 and 𝛼1 >
4
3
𝜔2 to satisfy the requirements of shared equilibrium in the 
stand-alone investment case. 
They can be illustrated in the following number line. 
 
 
 
Therefore, if 0 < 𝜙 <
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
,  𝑠𝑁2
∗ < 𝑠𝑁1
∗ < 𝑠𝐶
∗ .  
If  
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2−4𝜔2Δ𝛼
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−12𝜔2
≤ 𝜙 ≤
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
,  𝑠𝑁2
∗ ≤ 𝑠𝐶
∗ ≤ 𝑠𝑁1
∗ .  
Finally, if  𝜙 >
9𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
9𝛼1−12𝜔2
,  𝑠𝐶
∗ < 𝑠𝑁2
∗ < 𝑠𝑁1
∗ .    
 
𝜙𝑎  𝜙𝑏  0 1 
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3.6.5 Proof of Corollary 3.1 
 If 𝛼2 = 𝛼1, (3.14) and (3.15) can be rewritten as  
𝑠𝑁1
∗ = 𝑠𝑁2
∗ =
4𝑎𝜔
9𝛼1 − 4𝜔2
 .                                              (3. A23) 
 Comparing (3. A23) with (3.23) yields the following results which vary with 
the magnitude of cost saving/ cost increment from infrastructure sharing.  
If 0 < 𝜙 < 1,  9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2 <  9𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2  and  𝑠𝐶
∗ > 𝑠𝑁1
∗ = 𝑠𝑁2
∗ .  
If 𝜙 = 1 , 𝑠𝐶
∗ = 𝑠𝑁1
∗ = 𝑠𝑁2
∗ . Finally, if 𝜙 > 1 , 9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2 >  9𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2  and 
consequently  𝑠𝐶
∗ < 𝑠𝑁1
∗ = 𝑠𝑁2
∗ . 
3.6.6 Proof of Proposition 3.5 
 From (3.8), (3.11) and (3.18),  
𝑄𝑁
∗ =
2
3
𝑎 +
𝜔
3
(𝑠𝑁1
∗ + 𝑠𝑁2
∗ ) and  𝑄𝐶
∗ =
2
3
𝑎 +
2
3
𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗  
𝐶𝑆𝑁 =
1
2
(𝑄𝑁
∗ )2 and  𝐶𝑆𝐶 =
1
2
(𝑄𝐶
∗)2. 
𝑄𝑁
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗ =
𝜔
3
(𝑠𝑁1
∗ + 𝑠𝑁2
∗ − 2𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)  
𝑄𝑁
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗ > 0  when  𝑠𝑁1
∗ + 𝑠𝑁2
∗ − 2𝑠𝐶
∗ > 0. 
𝑠𝑁1
∗ + 𝑠𝑁2
∗ − 2𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗      
=
36𝑎𝜔𝛼1 [3𝜙𝛼1 + 3𝜙𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 8𝜔
2𝜙 − 6𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2]
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)(27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔2𝛼1 − 24𝜔2𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 16𝜔4)
         (3. A24) 
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2) > 0 and  (27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 16𝜔
4) > 0 
The sign of (𝑠𝑁1
∗ + 𝑠𝑁2
∗ − 2𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗) is the sign of (
3𝜙𝛼1 + 3𝜙𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 8𝜔
2𝜙
 
−6𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2
).   
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3𝜙𝛼1 + 3𝜙𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 8𝜔
2𝜙 − 6𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2 > 0 when the cost-adjustment 
parameter is sufficiently high, i.e. 𝜙 >
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1Δ𝛼+3𝛼1−8𝜔2
. 
𝜙𝑐 =
6𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 − 4𝜔
2
3𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 3𝛼1 − 8𝜔2
= 1 +
3𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 3𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2
3𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 3𝛼1 − 8𝜔2
 
                      = 1 +
(3𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)(Δ𝛼 − 1)
3𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 3𝛼1 − 8𝜔2
 
Since Δ𝛼 > 1  and  𝛼1 >
4
3
𝜔2, 
(3𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 3𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2Δ𝛼 + 4𝜔
2) − (3𝛼1Δ𝛼 + 3𝛼1 − 8𝜔
2) < 0.  Thus, 1 < 𝜙𝑐 < 2. 
In conclusion, if 0 < 𝜙 ≤
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1+3𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔2
, 𝑄𝐶
∗ ≥ 𝑄𝑁
∗  and 𝐶𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝐶𝑆𝑁. On the 
contrary, if  𝜙 >
6𝛼1Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2Δ𝛼−4𝜔
2
3𝛼1+3𝛼1Δ𝛼−8𝜔2
, 𝑄𝐶
∗ < 𝑄𝑁
∗  and 𝐶𝑆𝐶 < 𝐶𝑆𝑁.  
3.6.7 Proof of Proposition 3.6 
 𝑠𝐹
∗  must satisfy the first-order condition (3.27). From (3.23) and (3.27), to 
compare  𝑠𝐹
∗   with  𝑠𝐶
∗ , one may substitute  𝑠𝐶
∗   in (3.27). 
𝜕𝜋𝐹1
𝜕𝑠𝐹
|
𝑠=𝑠𝐶
∗
= (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗ − 4(𝑞𝐹1
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ )) 
𝜕𝑞𝐹1
∗
𝜕𝑠𝐹
|
𝑠=𝑠𝐶
∗
  + 𝜔(𝑞𝐹1
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ )   −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗
2
    
=
𝑎2𝜔𝜙𝛼1
36(ℍ|𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗)(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
2)2
[
 
 
 
36𝜙𝛼1 − 8𝜔
2
 
− 12 (
9
4
(𝜙𝛼1)
2 −
2
3
𝜔2𝜙𝛼1)
1/2 
]
 
 
 
 (3. A25) 
where 
ℍ|𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ = 
√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
 . 
Assuming that 𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
𝜔2,  
𝜕𝜋𝐹1
𝜕𝑠𝐹
|
𝑠=𝑠𝐶
∗
> 0.  Thus,  𝑠𝐹
∗ > 𝑠𝐶
∗  .  
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 From (3.18)  and (3.26) ,  𝑞𝐹
∗(𝑠)  and 𝑞𝐶
∗(𝑠)  as output functions of quality-
upgrade levels (𝑠) will never intersect at any given 𝑠 > 0. The proof is as follows. 
𝑞𝐶
∗(𝑠) = 𝑞𝐹
∗(𝑠)   
𝑎
3
+
1
3
𝜔𝑠 = 
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠
6
+ √
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠2
24
 
It can be rearranged as 
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠
6
− √[
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)
6
]
2
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠2
24
= 0. 
The above expression will never hold when 𝑠 > 0. Therefore, there is no quality-
upgrade level yielding the same output of these two cases. At 𝑠 = 0,  𝑞𝐶
∗(0) =
𝑎
3
   and  
𝑞𝐹
∗(0) =
𝑎
6
 .  The slope of  𝑞𝐶
∗(𝑠) is  
𝜕𝑞𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑠
=
𝜔
3 
 . Meanwhile, the slope of 𝑞𝐹
∗(𝑠) is 
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
=
𝜔
6
+
(
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)𝜔
18 −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠
12 )
2√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)2
36 −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠2
24
 .                                   (3. A26) 
The second-order derivative of 𝑞𝐹
∗(𝑠) is  
                  
𝜕2𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠2
= −
(
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)𝜔
18 −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠
12 )
2
4 (
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)2
36 −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠2
24 )
√(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)
2
36 −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠2
24
 
−
(
𝜔2
18 −
𝜙𝛼1
12 )
2√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠)2
36 −
𝜙𝛼1𝑠2
24
                                                         (3. A27) 
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From (3. A26), at 𝑠 =  𝑠𝐶
∗  , 
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠= 𝑠𝐶
∗
=
𝜔
6
+
(𝑎 + 𝜔 𝑠𝐶
∗)𝜔
18 −
𝜙𝛼1 𝑠𝐶
∗
12
2√
(𝑎 + 𝜔 𝑠𝐶
∗)2
36 −
𝜙𝛼1 𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
                             (3. A28) 
Due to the fact that √
(𝑎+𝜔 𝑠𝐶
∗ )
2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1 𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
> 0, the sign of  
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠= 𝑠𝐶
∗
 corresponds to the 
sign of (
(𝑎+𝜔 𝑠𝐶
∗)𝜔
18
−
𝜙𝛼1 𝑠𝐶
∗
12
). 
Under the assumption that  𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
 𝜔2, one can rewrite the expression as 
(𝑎 + 𝜔 𝑠𝐶
∗)𝜔
18
−
𝜙𝛼1 𝑠𝐶
∗
12
=  
6𝑎𝜔𝜙𝛼1
36(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)
> 0. 
Therefore,  
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠= 𝑠𝐶
∗
> 0.  From (3. A27), since 𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
 𝜔2,  
𝜕2𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠2
< 0. 
 𝑠𝐹
𝑈  denotes an upper limit of 𝑠𝐹
∗  in association with a negative value of the 
second-order condition for profit maximisation in Case 3 (Access to infrastructure under 
the fully-distributed-cost regulatory regime), i.e. 𝑠𝐶
∗ < 𝑠𝐹
∗ < 𝑠𝐹
𝑈. From (3.24), 
𝜕2𝜋𝐹1
𝜕𝑞𝐹12
= −2 +
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2𝑞𝐹2
𝑄𝐹
3  < 0. 
In equilibrium,  𝑞𝐹1
∗ = 𝑞𝐹2
∗   in stage 2 of the game. Thus, 
𝜕2𝜋𝐹1
𝜕𝑞𝐹12
= −2 +
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2
8(𝑞𝐹1
∗ )2
< 0 
𝑞𝐹1
∗ > 
√𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2
4
                                                      (3. A29) 
From (3.26), the equilibrium output level (𝑞𝐹1
∗ ) should comply with (3. A29). 
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
6
+ √[
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹)
6
]
2
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2
24
>
√𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
2
4
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After rearranging the above expression, 𝑠𝐹
𝑈 is an upper limit of  𝑠𝐹
∗  as shown below. 
𝑠𝐹
∗ < 𝑠𝐹
𝑈 = 
4𝑎
5𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔
                                                 (3. A30) 
From (3. A26), under the assumption that 𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
𝜔2, 
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈
=
𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
𝑈
6
+ √
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
𝑈)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
𝑈2
24
                         (3. A31) 
=
108𝑎𝜔𝜙𝛼1 − 48𝑎𝜔
2√𝜙𝛼1 − 60𝑎√𝜙𝛼1𝜙𝛼1
12𝑎√𝜙𝛼1(5√𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔)
> 0                  
Therefore,  
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈
> 0. 
From (3.18) , (3.23) , (3.26)  and (3. A30) , one can compare  𝑞𝐹
∗ |
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈  with  
 𝑞𝐶
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗  as follows. 
 𝑞𝐶
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ −  𝑞𝐹
∗ |
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈 = 
𝑎
6
+ (
4𝑎𝜔2
3(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)
−
4𝑎𝜔
6(5√𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔)
) −
𝑎√𝜙𝛼1
6(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔)
 
=
3𝜙𝛼1 − 6𝜔√𝜙𝛼1 + 2𝜔
2
(54𝜙𝛼1 − 24𝜔2)(30𝜔√𝜙𝛼1 − 24𝜔2)
> 0                   (3. A32) 
When  𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
𝜔2,   𝑞𝐶
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ −  𝑞𝐹
∗ |
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈 > 0. 
According to 𝑠𝐶
∗ < 𝑠𝐹
∗ < 𝑠𝐹
𝑈 and the conclusion that 
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠= 𝑠𝐶
∗
, 
𝜕 𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠
|
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈
> 0  
and  
𝜕2𝑞𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑠2
< 0, one can conclude that  𝑞𝐹
∗ |𝑠= 𝑠𝐹∗ < 𝑞𝐹
∗ |
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈 . Further, one may employ 
transitivity to make a comparison of the equilibrium output levels. From (3. A32),  
𝑞𝐹
∗ |
𝑠=𝑠𝐹
𝑈 < 𝑞𝐶
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗  . Therefore, in the absence of the intersection of 𝑞𝐶
∗(𝑠) and 𝑞𝐹
∗(𝑠), 
it can be concluded that 𝑞𝐹
∗ |𝑠= 𝑠𝐹∗< 𝑞𝐶
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗  and 𝑄𝐹
∗ < 𝑄𝐶
∗ . From (3.8), 𝐶𝑆𝐹 < 𝐶𝑆𝐶. 
 According to (3.1), infrastructure sharing by co-investment and by the fully-
distributed-cost approach lead to the symmetric retail prices in the retail market, i.e.  
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𝑝𝐶1
∗ = 𝑝𝐶2
∗ = 𝑝𝐶
∗  and 𝑝𝐹1
∗ = 𝑝𝐹2
∗ = 𝑝𝐹
∗ . To compare 𝑝𝐹
∗  with 𝑝𝐶
∗ , one can write the 
following equation. 
𝑝𝐶
∗ − 𝑝𝐹
∗ = (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗) − (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗ − 𝑄𝐹
∗)  
  = 𝜔(𝑠𝐶
∗ − 𝑠𝐹
∗) + (𝑄𝐹
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗).                                                       
Since (𝑠𝐶
∗ − 𝑠𝐹
∗) < 0 and (𝑄𝐹
∗ − 𝑄𝐶
∗) < 0,  𝑝𝐹
∗ > 𝑝𝐶
∗ .  
3.6.8 Proof of Proposition 3.7a 
 Consider (3.12), (3.14) and (3.15). To satisfy the FOCs (3.21) and (3.22), 
(𝜋𝐶1
∗ − 𝜋𝑁1
∗ ) and (𝜋𝐶2
∗ − 𝜋𝑁2
∗ ) should be positive simultaneously. Thus,  𝜋𝐶1
∗ > 𝜋𝑁1
∗  
and 𝜋𝐶2
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗  .   
3.6.9 Proof of Proposition 3.7b 
 (i) The comparison between 𝝅𝑭𝟏
∗  and 𝝅𝑪𝟏
∗  is ambiguous according to the 
cost-asymmetry parameter (𝚫𝜶). 
From (3.6), (3.19), (3.23) and (3.26), 
𝜋𝐹1
∗ − 𝜋𝐶1
∗ = [
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)2
9
−
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
9
]  +
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)
3
√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
∗2
24
 
 
−2 [
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐹
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐹
∗2
24
]  + 𝜙𝛼1 [
𝛽∗𝑠𝐶
∗2
2
−
𝑠𝐹
∗2
4
]  
 
𝜕(𝜋𝐹1
∗ − 𝜋𝐶1
∗ )
𝜕Δ𝛼
=
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
2
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕Δ𝛼
 
 
= (
1
6𝕊2
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
864𝑎2𝜔4𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 432𝑎
2𝜔2𝛼1
3 − 432𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1
3(Δ𝛼 − 1)
 
−384𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1 − 384𝑎
2𝜔2(Δ𝛼 − 1)
 
  +
(24𝜔2𝛼1 + 27𝛼1
2) (  
864𝑎2𝜔4𝛼1
2(Δ𝛼
2 − 1)
 
−(864𝑎2𝜔2𝛼1
3Δ𝛼 + 768𝑎
2𝜔2𝛼1)(Δ𝛼 − 1)
  )
𝕊
 
 
}
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where 𝕊 = 27𝛼1
2Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1Δ𝛼 − 24𝜔
2𝛼1 + 16𝜔
4. 
In this section, it is assumed that the investment cost of firm 1 is not too low, 
𝛼1 ≥ 1.5𝜔
2.  At Δ𝛼 = 1 , 
𝜕(𝜋𝐹1
∗ −𝜋𝐶1
∗ )
𝜕Δ𝛼
|
Δ𝛼=1
< 0  and (𝜋𝐹1
∗ − 𝜋𝐶1
∗ )|Δ𝛼=1 > 0 . One may 
conclude that when  Δ𝛼 is very low, 𝜋𝐹1
∗ > 𝜋𝐶1
∗ . When Δ𝛼 increases from 1, the term 
𝜋𝐹1
∗ − 𝜋𝐶1
∗  decreases in value. Hence, it can be concluded that when Δ𝛼 is sufficiently 
high, there is a tendency that  𝜋𝐹1
∗ < 𝜋𝐶1
∗ .   
(ii) 𝝅𝑨𝟏
∗ > 𝝅𝑪𝟏
∗  
From (3.19), (3.23), (3. A14), (3. A15) and (3. A18),  
𝜋𝐴1
∗ |𝑚=𝑚∗
𝑠=𝑠𝐴
∗
= 
16𝑎2𝜙2𝛼1
2 − 8𝑎2𝜔2𝜙𝛼1
(8𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)2
 
 
𝜋𝐶1
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ = 
9𝑎2𝜙2𝛼1
2 − 8𝛽∗𝑎2𝜔2𝜙𝛼1
(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)2
 
𝜋𝐴1
∗ |𝑚=𝑚∗
𝑠=𝑠𝐴
∗
− 𝜋𝐶1
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ =
(
 
 
 
  
  
90𝑎2𝜙4𝛼1
4 − 153𝑎2𝜔2𝜙3𝛼1
3 + 64𝛽∗𝑎2𝜔2𝜙3𝛼1
3
 
+86𝑎2𝜔4𝜙2𝛼1
2 − 64𝛽∗𝑎2𝜔4𝜙2𝛼1
2
 
−16𝑎2𝜔6𝜙𝛼1 + 16 𝛽
∗𝑎2𝜔6𝜙𝛼1
 
  
)
 
 
(8𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)2(9𝜙𝛼1 − 4𝜔2)2
> 0 
Under the assumption that 𝜙𝛼1 >
16
9
𝜔2, 𝜋𝐴1
∗ |𝑚=𝑚∗
𝑠=𝑠𝐴
∗
− 𝜋𝐶1
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ > 0.   
3.6.10 Proof of Proposition 3.7c 
From (3.7), (3.20), (3.23), and (3.26), 
𝜋𝐶2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ =
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
9
− (1 − 𝛽∗)
 𝜙𝛼1
2
𝑠𝐶
∗2 
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𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ = [ 
2(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
3
− 2√
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
  ]
(
 
 
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
6
+
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
 
)
 
 
 
                         −
 𝜙𝛼1
4
𝑠𝐶
∗2 
𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ − 𝜋𝐶2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗  
                   = 2  √
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
  ( 
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
6
 − √
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
    ) 
                            + [  
(1 − 𝛽∗)
2
−
1
4
  ]  𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2 
𝛽∗ <
1
2
   so  [
(1−𝛽∗)
2
−
1
4
] > 0.  When  
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
> 0,   
(𝑎+𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
6
−√
(𝑎+𝜔𝑠𝐶
∗)
2
36
−
𝜙𝛼1𝑠𝐶
∗2
24
 > 0. 
Thus, 𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ − 𝜋𝐶2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ > 0. In other words, 𝜋𝐶2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ < 𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗  . 
From (3.26) and proof of Proposition 3.3, both firms have identical reduced-
form profit functions of 𝑠, i.e. 𝜋𝐹1
∗ (𝑠) = 𝜋𝐹2
∗ (𝑠).  Consequently, firm 1 maximises  
its own profit by choosing the level of mutual quality upgrade (𝑠𝐹
∗) that also generates 
firm 2’s maximum profit, i.e. arg max 𝑠 𝜋𝐹2 (𝑠)  =  𝑠𝐹
∗ . According to transitivity, 
𝜋𝐶2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ < 𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗   and  𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗ < 𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐹∗  ,  thus  𝜋𝐹2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐹∗ > 𝜋𝐶2
∗ |𝑠=𝑠𝐶∗  .   
Under the unregulated access price approach, access price is set so high that 
the service-based firm becomes cornered. As a result, 𝜋𝐴2
∗ = 0 < 𝜋𝐶2
∗ . According to 
Proposition 3.7a, 𝜋𝐶2
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ . After comparing these equilibrium market outcomes, one 
can conclude that 𝜋𝐹2
∗ > 𝜋𝐶2
∗ > 𝜋𝑁2
∗ > 𝜋𝐴2
∗ .   
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Chapter 4  
Bundling and Incentives for Quality 
Enhancement  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Digital convergence encourages telecommunications firms to expand their 
product lines and provide multiple services under the same brands. For example, in 
the UK, TalkTalk offers triple play including cable TV, broadband and phone.  
It exploits brand loyalty and offers a tempting bundle discount. Multi-product firms 
are likely to be dominant with more weapons to compete with single-product firms. In 
price competition, a multi-product firm can use the bundling strategy to enhance 
profit and expand its market share, while a single-product firm is likely to lose its 
profit and customers. If the bundling strategy is extremely aggressive, the small firm is 
probably on the verge of exit. On the demand side, even though some consumers who 
purchase the bundles benefit from a bundle discount, the distorted individual prices 
tend to threaten other consumers, especially single-product users (Armstrong, 2011; 
Reisinger, 2006) and undermine aggregate consumer surplus (Gans and King, 2006; 
Granier and Podesta, 2010; Reisinger, 2006; Rennhoff and Serfes, 2009). In the 
context of telecommunications with the rapid growth of advanced technology, the 
main focus of the bundling issue is not only price distortion but also incentive for 
quality enhancement. However, most of the existing literature emphasises the effects 
of bundling in the setting of the competition in price. Only some studies extend to 
firms’ decisions on other aspects in the context of bundling, e.g. quality choices and 
R&D in cost reduction (Avenali, D’Annunzio and Reverberi, 2013; Choi, 2004; Heeb, 
2003; Krӓmer, 2009).   
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From a broader viewpoint, this study extends to a model in which competing 
firms have not only price choices, but also further investment decision on distinct 
product features of quality.
53
 Firms in the two duopolistic markets can choose their 
own quality enhancement levels and then prices.
54
 The situation alters because a single-
product firm has additional tools to respond to the aggressive bundling strategies. 
With pure bundling, compared to the no-bundling benchmark, the single-product firms’ 
incentives for quality enhancement are undermined. Meanwhile, due in part to its 
concern about spillover, the multi-product firm increases its quality enhancement levels 
if the quality enhancement process is cost-efficient enough in terms of generating 
additional utility. The single-product firm’s price in the less competitive market 
certainly decreases. Similar to the multi-product firm, the single-product firm in the 
more competitive market can raise its price when it benefits significantly from a 
substantial reduction in competition intensity with a limited number of product 
choices after pure bundling. With mixed bundling, the multi-product firm offers a 
bundle discount in line with the standard results about individual price setting 
(Armstrong, 2011; Reisinger, 2006). In the more competitive market, the multi-
product firm’s quality enhancement is promoted in contrast to the deterioration of  
the single-product firm’s counterpart. The similar result can be found in the less 
competitive market when the two markets are not too different in terms of competition 
intensity. Both bundling strategies are likely to threaten consumer surplus when the 
two markets are significantly different in competition intensity. In this case, the 
inefficient distortion of the consumer allocation predominates. The sectoral regulators 
should monitor the implementation of bundling, especially when a more competitive 
market is tied with a much less competitive market. However, bundling strategies may 
be a boost for quality enhancement in some situations.  
                                                          
53
 For example, a broadband internet company may improve its connection stability or customer 
service to make its service comparatively more attractive than its rivals’ service. 
54
 In this context, this issue of quality does not concern vertical differentiation in quality, 
where consumers have different preferences for product quality. Instead, this model is based 
on horizontal differentiation where consumers have different tastes for a particular product 
offered by a particular firm. 
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Relevant literature 
The existing literature examines the market outcomes of bundling strategy  
in various situations according to the degree of competition and the correlation of 
valuations of products. In the setting of symmetric duopoly, the correlation of 
valuations has a crucial role. Under the negative correlation of valuations, consumers 
become more homogeneous when they evaluate bundles instead of individual products. 
The business-stealing effect dominates the sorting effect of bundling. Firms’ profits 
decline due to a prisoner’s dilemma when both firms choose to sell bundles rather 
than individual products. On the other hand, the opposite result is found under the 
positive correlation of valuations (Reisinger, 2006). This can apply to the situation of 
a merger among homogeneous single-product firms under the positive correlation of 
valuations in a circular model (Granier and Podesta, 2010) and the situation where 
competing firms collaborate in offering product bundles to extract consumers’ rent 
instead of compete in price such as tourist attractions (Armstrong, 2011). However, 
after bundling, individual prices increase despite a substantial bundle discount 
(Armstrong, 2011; Reisinger, 2006). Moreover, consumers are persuaded to buy 
bundles instead of a combination of preferred individual products. As a profit-
enhancing tool causing distributive inefficiency, the bundling strategy may threaten 
consumer welfare (Gans and King, 2006; Granier and Podesta, 2010; Reisinger, 2006; 
Rennhoff and Serfes, 2009) and even social welfare (Granier and Podesta, 2010; 
Reisinger, 2006; Rennhoff and Serfes, 2009).  
In addition, in the setting of asymmetric duopolistic competition, a multi-
product firm is in a better position than a single-product firm because of its bundling 
strategies. Nalebuff (2004) pointed out that bundling strategy is a credible strategy for 
a multi-product incumbent to increase profit regardless of entry decision of an entrant. 
This result conforms to Choi (1996, 2004), supporting the leverage theory where the 
incumbent transfers its monopoly power in the monopolistic market to the duopolistic 
market. The bundling strategy is more reasonable than the limit-pricing strategy which 
forces the incumbent to sacrifice some profit. Gans and King (2006) found that in 
their extended model of one integrated firm and two independent firms, social welfare 
decreases because of inefficiency in the consumer allocation in spite of no bundling 
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strategy of the independent single-product firms. In contrast, if the two independent 
firms are allowed to merge, they will agree to merge but finally the two integrated 
firms will not employ bundling in order to soften competition. This yields higher 
social welfare than the case of the allied independent firms with bundling.  
In the introduction of the single-product consumer group with the assumption 
of cost saving from one-stop shopping by the multi-product consumers, Thanassoulis 
(2007) concluded that under firm-specific preference, firms can increase profit by 
charging higher individual prices than the no-bundling outcome and offer a bundle 
discount to attract the multi-product consumers whose demand is more elastic than the 
single-product consumers. Under product-specific preferences (hybrid-bundles are 
available), a prisoner’s dilemma occurs when firms decide to sell bundles despite a 
decrease in profit. In addition, the individual prices are lower than those in the no-
bundling case. As a result, consumer surplus under firm-specific preferences decreases 
but consumer surplus under product-specific preferences increases after bundling.  
In the extended model of different degrees of product differentiation in the two 
markets, Thanassoulis (2011) found that under partial convergence, the merged firm 
can increase profit even though it does not offer a bundle discount. Individual prices 
in the more competitive market increase but those in the less competitive market 
decrease due to the bundling strategy which adversely impacts on the single-product 
consumers. The multi-product consumers are charged higher price, but consumer 
surplus of this consumer group is ambiguous according to the degree of competition 
of the markets. Under full convergence, both merged firms bilaterally decide to sell 
bundles so product bundles are less differentiated because of a taste cost reduction. As 
a result of more intense competition, both merged firms decide to offer bundle 
discounts. Compared to the no-convergence environment, the individual prices remain 
unchanged but the multi-product consumers enjoy competitive bundle discounts. 
Overall, aggregate consumer surplus is enhanced under the full convergence. The 
bilateral merged firm in the full convergence has lower profit than the unilateral 
merged firms in the partial convergence. In contrast to the merger-wave outcome of 
Granier and Podesta (2010) and Reisinger (2006) in the two-stage games where the 
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firms can decide on whether to offer a bundle discount, the first merger is at a distinct 
advantage but its rivals decide to remain independent in order to soften competition.  
Bundling also influences firms’ incentive to research and development. The 
multi-product firms with a bundling strategy invest more heavily in R&D in cost 
reduction and innovation while their single-product rivals strategically decrease their 
investment (Choi, 2004; Heeb, 2003). In a broader setting of vertical differentiation, 
firms offer different quality levels to target different groups of quality-preference type 
consumers (Tirole, 1988; Wauthy, 1996). In the presence of bundling, a multi-product 
firm can transfer its monopoly power in one market to another duopolistic market by 
the pure-bundling strategy. It becomes dominant and serves the high-quality type 
consumers. Its profit is higher than that of its single-product rival which avoids intense 
competition by choosing to serve the low-quality type consumers instead (Avenali, 
D’Annunzio and Reverberi, 2013; Krӓmer, 2009). From a broader perspective on 
quality investment, bundling may have a beneficial effect on social welfare in certain 
circumstances (Avenali, D’Annunzio and Reverberi, 2013). In the business world, 
firms attract consumers by various types of offers when market competition becomes 
more intense. It is necessary to further examine the vexed question of the bundling 
strategies’ effects on welfare in various aspects other than pricing in order that the 
regulator can make a careful and comprehensive assessment of bundling strategies.  
This study is organised as follows. The model of the two duopolistic markets 
is detailed in Section 4.2. The analysis of the market outcomes after bundling is in 
Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 contains conclusion and some suggestions for the 
regulators. 
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4.2 Model 
 There are one multi-product firm and two single-product firms in two 
duopolistic product markets. In market A, the multi-product firm competes with one 
single-product firm. In market B, it competes with the other single-product firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The two duopolistic markets 
In each market, there are two horizontally differentiated products from each 
pair of competing firms (differentiation in products, not in firms). Firm 1 has entered 
both markets. As seen in Figure 4.1, firm 1 offers product A1 and product B1 to 
compete with firm A2 and firm B2 in market A and market B respectively. Product A 
and product B can be independently consumed.
55
 Regarding an assumption of unit 
demand, each consumer can purchase only one unit of product A and one unit of 
product B.
56
 Firm 1 may implement a bundling strategy to attract consumers in both 
markets. 
 
                                                          
55
 This model focuses on telecommunications services such as cable TV and broadband 
internet. Unlike system goods, e.g. computers and software, these services can be consumed 
separately.  
56
 This assumption can be applied to most telecommunications services. For instance, one 
household normally monthly subscribes to only one service provider for a particular 
telecommunications service such as internet, cable TV, mobile and fixed line telephony. 
Market B Market A 
 Multi-product firm 
(Firm 1)  
Single-product firm 
(Firm A2) 
 Single-product firm 
(Firm B2) 
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Firms 
Firms have already entered the markets. Their products meet at least the 
standard-quality requirements by the regulator.
57
 Thus, the fixed costs of standard 
products are sunk so they are assumed to be zero. For simplicity, constant marginal 
cost of standard product is assumed to be zero and identical across firms.
58
 Basically, 
firms compete in price. 𝑃𝑘𝑖 is unit price of product 𝑘𝑖; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.  
In addition to price competition, firms are allowed to differentiate their 
products by improving their product quality. This model endogenises quality 
enhancement.
59
 Every consumer perceives this quality enhancement and has 
additional utility from the improved product quality. 𝛽𝑘𝑖  is a level of quality 
enhancement which a firm adds in its standard product 𝑘𝑖; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
This model has its focus only on 𝛽𝑘𝑖 > 0. Reducing quality from quality standard is 
not practical, especially in the markets that are closely monitored by the regulators. 
Firms will incur additional investment costs associated with the level of quality 
enhancement they choose. 𝐼𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖) is investment cost function of investing in quality 
enhancement at level 𝛽𝑘𝑖  in market 𝑘 ; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}  and 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} . Investment cost 
function is convex in quality enhancement level. 
𝐼𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖) = 𝑏𝑘𝛽𝑘𝑖
2  
𝑏𝑘  is constant and positive. In addition to investment cost, a firm’s quality 
enhancement may lead to a change in its marginal production cost. It is assumed that 
firms have constant marginal production cost (𝑚𝑐).  Due to zero marginal production 
cost of standard product, the marginal cost directly derives from quality enhancement, 
                                                          
57
 Telecommunications regulators keep monitoring the quality of telecommunications services 
regularly. 
58
 Most telecommunications services incur huge fixed costs of platform facilities, whereas 
their marginal costs are comparatively negligible. Moreover, in the business world, marginal 
cost is mostly calculated in constant term.  
59
 This issue is not vertical differentiation in quality. 
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i.e. 𝑚𝑐 = 0 + 𝐶𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖) = 𝐶𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖) . 𝐶𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖)  is assumed to be a linear function of 
additional marginal cost at quality enhancement level 𝛽𝑘𝑖 of product 𝑘𝑖.  
𝐶𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖) = 𝑐𝑘𝛽𝑘𝑖 
𝑐𝑘 is constant and positive.
60
 For example, if a firm chooses a high level of quality 
enhancement to add in its product, every unit sold has high marginal production cost 
due to high additional marginal production cost of quality enhancement. For 
simplicity, the investment cost function and the relationship between quality 
enhancement and marginal production cost are identical across firms in the same 
market.
61
  
Consumers 
 Each consumer purchases one unit of product A and one unit of product B 
(unit demand).
62
 Based on the Hotelling model, consumers are uniformly distributed 
on a unit square [0,1] 
2
. The pure combination of [A1B1] and [A2,B2] are located at 
(0,0) and (1,1) respectively. Meanwhile, the hybrid combination of [A1,B2] and 
[A2,B1] are located at (0,1) and (1,0) respectively. The number of consumers is 
normalised to 1.  
A consumer has a preference for a particular product according to the distance 
between his location and the location of the product. A consumer incurs disutility 
when the product he has chosen is not exactly his ideal product, which should be 
                                                          
60
 For example, a broadband company may add free wi-fi service in more public places for its 
consumers who subscribe its broadband service at home. The broadband company has to invest 
in additional investment cost for the public wi-fi service and incurs higher marginal cost.  
61
 Firms may have different cost function of quality improvement because they own different 
technologies, experiences and know-how. Moreover, to attract consumers, firms possibly use 
different methods to increase their product values. However, at the first stage of this study, 
the process of quality enhancement is assumed to be common knowledge so firms have the 
same cost functions of quality enhancement.  
62
 Some studies endogenised light users who buy either product A or product B. In this study, 
only heavy users who purchase both products are focused because they play a crucial role in 
the setting of product bundling.  
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located at his own location. 𝑡𝑘 is taste cost
63
 referring to the disutility per distance unit 
in market 𝑘; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. It is assumed that market A is more competitive than market B. 
𝑡𝐴 = 𝜃𝑡 ;  𝑡𝐵 = 𝑡;  𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
64
  𝑉𝑘 is gross utility from standard product 𝑘, which is 
identical across consumers. 𝑉𝑘 is large enough to ensure that every consumer 
participates and the markets are covered. When a firm chooses quality enhancement 
of product 𝑘𝑖  at level 𝛽𝑘𝑖 , consumers perceive the quality enhancement and have 
additional utility 𝑣𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖) from product 𝑘𝑖.  
𝑣𝑘(𝛽𝑘𝑖)  = 𝑎𝑘𝛽𝑘𝑖 
𝑎𝑘 is constant and positive. 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. Assume 𝑎𝑘 > 𝑐𝑘.
65
 
Consumers purchase both product A and product B.
66
 In this model, even though 
a consumer decides to buy a pair of products from firm 1, there is no economy of 
scope from the pure-combination consumption. Benefits from payment in a single bill 
or one-stop service are trivial and omitted for simplicity.  
                                                          
63
 As mentioned by Thanassoulis (2007), the term “taste cost” in this model is tantamount to 
the transportation cost in the Hotelling model, which inversely represents the degree of 
substitutability between the two rival products in the market.  
64
 When taste cost decreases, the two differentiated products in the market are more 
substitutable. Thus, the market is more competitive in the substitutability aspect.  
65
 With this assumption, a positive equilibrium level of quality enhancement exists.  
66
 In the initial model, it is assumed that consuming a combination of product A and product B 
yields additive gross utility, 𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵. However, due to technological support, different kinds 
of telecommunications services are (imperfectly) partially substitutable from consumers’ 
viewpoint. Thus, the gross utility from consuming a product combination may be sub-additive 
(Armstrong, 2011; Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003).  
    For instance, even though mobile voice service is obviously distinct from communicating 
via the Internet, advanced technology allows internet users to use communicating software 
such as Skype and to chat on Facebook. Therefore, mobile service and internet broadband 
may be partially substitutable especially because of the digital convergence. Nevertheless, for 
simplicity, this study assumes additive gross utility of a product combination.   
 
 
159 
 
A consumer, who is located at (𝑥, 𝑦) on a unit square [0,1]2 , has the four 
following choices as illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Consumers in the two-market horizontal product differentiation model  
(I) [A1B1] from firm 1 
His net utility from consuming product A1 and B1 is 
                            𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 .                           (𝐼) 
(II) [A1,B2] from separate firms 
His net utility from consuming product A1 and B2 is 
                      𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡– (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑃𝐵2 .                  (𝐼𝐼) 
(III) [A2,B1] from separate firms 
His net utility from consuming product A2 and B1 is 
                       𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − (1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡– 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵1 .                (𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
(IV) [A2,B2] from separate firms 
His net utility from consuming product A2 and B2 is 
               𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2 − (1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 – (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵2 .            (𝐼𝑉) 
1 
[A1B1] 
1 0 
(𝑥,𝑦) 
[A2,B1] 
𝑥𝜃𝑡 (1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 
𝑦𝑡 
(1 − 𝑦)𝑡 
[A1,B2] [A2,B2] 
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The gross utility of a product combination is assumed to be additive (𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵). 
𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 is the total price of combination [A1B1]. Firm 1 offers 𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 according to its 
bundling strategy.  
 In the no-bundling case, 𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 = 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑃𝐵1.  
 In the pure-bundling case, 𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 = ?̃? ( the price of pure bundle [A1B1] ).  
 In the mixed-bundling case, 𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 = 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑃𝐵1 − 𝛿 , where 𝛿  is bundle 
discount. 
As seen in Figure 4.2, the consumer at (𝑥, 𝑦)  compares net utility from 
available choices of (I) - (IV) and finally chooses the product combination which 
yields the highest net utility. In this model, the multi-product firm have three different 
options of pricing; (1) no bundling, (2) the pure-bundling strategy, and (3) the mixed- 
bundling strategy.  
(1) No bundling 
Firm 1 offers products separately at price 𝑃𝐴1 and 𝑃𝐵1. All four choices (I) - (IV) 
are available. Thus, market share is determined by the marginal consumer in each 
market. ?̂? and ?̂?  denote the locations of the marginal consumers in market A and 
market B respectively. The marginal consumers in market A and market B solve the 
following conditions, accordingly.  
 𝑉𝐴 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − ?̂?𝜃𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1  =  𝑉𝐴 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 − (1 − ?̂?)𝜃𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 
?̂? =
1
2
+ 
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)                                     (4.1) 
 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − ?̂?𝑡 − 𝑃𝐵1  =  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2 − (1 − ?̂?)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐵2 
?̂? =
1
2
+ 
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑃𝐵1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)                                     (4.2) 
The market shares are shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Market shares with no bundling  
According to the unit demand assumption, aggregate demand for each product 
directly derives from market share. 
Profit functions 
 Profit function includes revenue, less investment cost of quality enhancement. 
 Firm 1 
𝜋1(𝑃𝐴1, 𝑃𝐵1, 𝛽𝐴1,𝛽𝐵1) = ?̂?[𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1] + ?̂?[𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1] − 𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴1
2 − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵1
2  (4.3) 
Firm A2 
 𝜋𝐴2(𝑃𝐴2, 𝛽𝐴2)  = (1 − ?̂?)[𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2] − 𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴2
2                           (4.4)                              
 Firm B2 
𝜋𝐵2(𝑃𝐵2, 𝛽𝐵2) =  (1 − ?̂?)[𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2] − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵2
2                         (4.5)                              
 Consumer surplus 
 Consumers evaluate product A and product B separately. 
𝐶𝑆 = ∫ [
?̂?
0
 𝑉𝐴 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1] 𝑑𝑥  + ∫ [
1
?̂?
 𝑉𝐴 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 − (1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2] 𝑑𝑥   
1 
1 0 
[A1,B2] 
[A1B1] [A2,B1] 
[A2,B2] 
?̂? 
?̂? 
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             +∫ [
?̂?
0
 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑃𝐵1] 𝑑𝑦   
             +∫ [
1
?̂?
 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐵2] 𝑑𝑦,                                                         (4.6) 
where 
?̂? is market share of firm 1 in market A. 
?̂? is market share of firm 1 in market B. 
(2) The pure-bundling strategy 
Firm 1 sells only a bundle of product A and product B at price ?̃?. Consumers 
have only two choices, (I) and (IV). The consumers who are indifferent between 
[A1B1] and [A2,B2] have the following condition. 
𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − ?̃?
=  𝑉𝐴+ 𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2 − (1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 – (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵2 
Rearranging the above equation yields the following. 
𝜃𝑥 + 𝑦 =
1 + 𝜃
2
+ (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 + 𝑃𝐵2 − ?̃? + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2] 
𝑌(𝑥) = 𝑦 =
1 + 𝜃
2
− 𝜃𝑥 + (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 + 𝑃𝐵2 − ?̃? + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2] 
We can write 𝑦 as a function of 𝑥 which is denoted by 𝑌(𝑥) and represented by 
the dotted line in Figure 4.4. The marginal consumers are located on this line. At a 
given 𝑥 , the marginal consumer who is indifferent between product [A1B1] and 
[A2,B2] is located at (𝑥, 𝑌(𝑥)). Consumers in area 𝐼 buy bundle [A1B1]. The rest in 
area 𝐼𝐼 buy [A2,B2]. Due to the unit demand assumption, demand for product A1 and 
B1 derive from area 𝐼 and demand for product A2 and B2 derive from area 𝐼𝐼.   
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Figure 4.4 Market shares with the pure-bundling strategy 
 
Profit functions 
 Profit function includes revenue, less investment cost of quality improvement.
67
 
 Firm 1 
𝜋1(?̃?, 𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐵1) =
1
2
[𝑌(0) + 𝑌(1)][?̃? − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1]  − 𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴1
2 − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵1
2  (4.7) 
Firm A2 
 𝜋𝐴2(𝑃𝐴2, 𝛽𝐴2)  =  {1 −
1
2
[𝑌(0) + 𝑌(1)]} [𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2] − 𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴2
2      (4.8)          
 Firm B2 
𝜋𝐵2(𝑃𝐵2, 𝛽𝐵2) =  {1 −
1
2
[𝑌(0) + 𝑌(1)]} [𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2] − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵2
2     (4.9)         
 
 
                                                          
67
 This section emphasises a range of 𝜃 that the pure-bundling strategy is credible. In this 
analysis of the pure-bundling case, 𝜃 should not be too extremely high in order to ensure that 
the benefit from tying the markets is not trivial. See the appendix (Section 4.5.4) for details. 
1 
1 0 
[A1B1] 
[A2,B2] [A1,B2] 
[A2,B1] 
𝑌(𝑥) 
𝑌(0) 
𝑌(1) 𝐼 
𝐼𝐼 
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Consumer surplus 
          𝐶𝑆 = ∫ ∫ [
𝑌(𝑥)
0
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − ?̃?] 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
1 
0
      
              +∫ ∫ [
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2
−(1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵2
]
1
𝑌(𝑥)
𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
1 
0
,                   (4.10) 
where ?̃? is price of pure bundle [A1B1]; 𝑃𝐴1𝐵1 = ?̃?. 
(3) The mixed-bundling strategy 
Firm 1 offers products separately at price 𝑃𝐴1 and 𝑃𝐵1. Additionally, firm 1 also 
offers discount 𝛿 on a bundle [A1B1]. Consumers still have all four choices, (I) - (IV). 
In Figure 4.5, at a given set of individual prices and quality enhancement levels, ?̂? and 
?̂? are the locations of the marginal consumers in market A and market B respectively 
if bundle discount is zero. When firm 1 offers the bundle discount, its market shares 
in both markets expands according to 𝛿.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Market shares with the mixed-bundling strategy 
                                                          
68
 This model is set up in the two-market framework, similar to those of Gans and King 
(2006) and Matutes and Regibeau (1992). 
1 
1 0 
[A1,B2] 
[A1B1] [A2,B1] 
[A2,B2] 
?̂? 
?̂? 
?̂?  
𝑥
⬚
  
 
𝐼 
𝐼𝐼 𝐼V 
𝐼𝐼𝐼 
 
 
165 
 
?̂? =
1
2
+ 
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)                                (4.11) 
?̂? =
1
2
+ 
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑃𝐵1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)                                 (4.12) 
?̂? = ?̂? +
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
                                                            (4.13) 
?̂? = ?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
                                                              (4.14) 
Consumers in area 𝐼 choose a bundle of [A1B1] from firm 1 at discounted price. 
Consumers in area 𝐼𝐼 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼  and 𝐼𝑉  purchase product [A1,B2], [A2,B1] and [A2,B2] 
from separate firms respectively.  
Profit functions 
 Profit function includes revenue, less investment cost of quality improvement. 
 Firm 1 
 𝜋1(𝑃𝐴1, 𝑃𝐵1, 𝛿, 𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐵1) = 𝐷𝐴1[𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1] + 𝐷𝐵1[𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1]                      
   −𝐷𝐴1𝐵1𝛿  − 𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴1
2 − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵1
2                      (4.15) 
Firm A2 
                        𝜋𝐴2(𝑃𝐴2, 𝛽𝐴2)  =  𝐷𝐴2[𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2] − 𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴2
2                                (4.16)                                 
 Firm B2 
     𝜋𝐵2(𝑃𝐵2, 𝛽𝐵2) =  𝐷𝐵2[𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2] − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵2
2                               (4.17)                                
𝐷𝐴1 is demand for product A1 from consumers who buy bundle [A1B1] or combination 
[A1,B2]. Thus, 𝐷𝐴1 is equal to the total of area 𝐼 and area 𝐼𝐼. 
𝐷𝐴1 = ?̂? +
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
) 
𝐷𝐵1 is demand for product B1 from consumers who buy bundle [A1B1] or combination 
[A2,B1]. Thus, 𝐷𝐵1 is equal to the total of area 𝐼 and area 𝐼𝐼𝐼. 
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𝐷𝐵1 = ?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
) 
𝐷𝐴1𝐵1 is demand for bundle [A1B1] equal to area 𝐼. These consumers get a special 
discount (𝛿) deducted from the original price of bundle [A1B1], (𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑃𝐵1). Firm 1 
sacrifices some of its revenue to attract this consumer group. 
𝐷𝐴1𝐵1 = ?̂??̂? + ?̂? (
𝛿
2𝑡
) + ?̂? (
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
)  
𝐷𝐴2  is demand for product A2 from consumers who buy combination [A2,B1] or 
[A2,B2]. Thus, 𝐷𝐴2 is equal to the total of area 𝐼𝐼𝐼 and area 𝐼𝑉.  
𝐷𝐴2 =  1 − {?̂? +
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
)} 
𝐷𝐵2  is demand for product B2 from consumers who buy combination [A1,B2] or 
[A2,B2]. Thus, 𝐷𝐵2 is equal to the total of area 𝐼𝐼 and area 𝐼𝑉.  
𝐷𝐵2 =  1 − {?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
)} 
Consumer surplus  
 Consumer surplus after mixed bundling is the sum of consumer surplus from 
the four areas. Ζ(𝑥) denotes a function of 𝑥 as represented by the thick solid linear 
line in Figure 4.5, 𝑥 ∈  [?̂?, ?̂? ], Ζ(𝑥)  ∈  [?̂?, ?̂? ].  Ζ(𝑥) = ?̂? + 𝜃?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
− 𝜃𝑥 
𝐶𝑆 = ∫ ∫ [
?̂? 
0
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑃𝐵1 − 𝛿] 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
?̂? 
0
   
        +∫ ∫ [
Ζ(𝑥)
0
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑃𝐵1 − 𝛿] 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
?̂?  
?̂?
  
        +∫ ∫ [
1
?̂? 
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2 − 𝑥𝜃𝑡 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑃𝐵2] 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
?̂? 
0
  
       +∫ ∫ [
?̂?
0
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − (1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵1] 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
1 
?̂?  
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       +∫ ∫ [
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2
−(1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵2
]
1
Ζ(𝑥)
 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
?̂?  
?̂?
 
       +∫ ∫ [
 𝑉𝐴 +  𝑉𝐵 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2
−(1 − 𝑥)𝜃𝑡 − (1 − 𝑦)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐵2
]
1
?̂?
 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑥
1 
?̂? 
                                     (4.18) 
Timing of the game 
This model boils down to a three-stage game solved by backward induction.  
Stage 1 Firm 1 decides whether to implement the bundling strategies (pure 
bundling and mixed bundling) instead of selling products A1 and product B1 separately  
(no bundling).
69
  
Stage 2 Firms simultaneously choose their quality enhancement levels  
Stage 3 Firms choose their prices simultaneously.  
4.3 Analysis 
 The outcome with the no-bundling strategy is considered a benchmark to be 
compared with the pure-bundling and the mixed-bundling outcomes.  
4.3.1 No bundling 
 In the absence of bundling, firm 1 competes with firm A2 and firm B2 in 
market A and market B separately. The equilibrium outcomes are as follows. 
 Equilibrium market outcomes 
 When firm 1 is not allowed to bundle, the markets are independent of each 
other. Consumers give consideration to choices in each market independently.  
Stage 3  Firm 1 solves the following profit-maximisation problem. 
max
𝑃𝐴1,𝑃𝐵1
𝜋1 
                                                          
69
 All firms have already entered the market. The issue of market entry is omitted. 
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Differentiating profit function (4.3) with respect to associated prices yields the 
following. 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
= {
1
2
+ (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2]} −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1) = 0    (4.19) 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
= {
1
2
+ (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑃𝐵1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]} −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1) = 0      (4.20) 
Analogously, the single-product firms’ problems are shown below. 
max
𝑃𝑘2
𝜋𝑘2 
𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. Differentiating profit functions (4.4) and (4.5) with respect to associated 
prices gives 
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
= {
1
2
− (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2]} −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2) = 0   (4.21) 
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
= {
1
2
− (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑃𝐵1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]} −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2) = 0.    (4.22) 
 Solving (4.19) - (4.22) reveals the price functions in stage 3 at a given set of 
quality enhancement levels.  
𝑃𝐴1
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2) = 𝜃𝑡 +
2
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
3
(𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)               (4.23) 
𝑃𝐴2
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2) = 𝜃𝑡 +
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
2
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 −
1
3
(𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)               (4.24) 
𝑃𝐵1
∗ (𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) = 𝑡 +
2
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 +
1
3
(𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)               (4.25) 
𝑃𝐵2
∗ (𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) = 𝑡 +
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
2
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 −
1
3
(𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)               (4.26) 
 After substituting (4.23) - (4.26) in (4.3) - (4.5), the firm profit functions in 
reduced form are shown below. 
 
 
 
169 
 
𝜋1(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) 
            = [
1
2
− 
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
6𝜃𝑡
+ 
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
6𝜃𝑡
+
𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2
6𝜃𝑡
] [
𝜃𝑡 −
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
+
1
3
(𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)
] 
               + [
1
2
− 
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
6𝑡
+ 
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
6𝑡
+
𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2
6𝑡
] [
𝑡 −
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
+
1
3
(𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
] 
 −𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴1
2 − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵1
2                                                                                              (4.27) 
 
𝜋𝐴2(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) 
            = [
1
2
+ 
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
6𝜃𝑡
− 
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
6𝜃𝑡
−
𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2
6𝜃𝑡
] [
𝜃𝑡 +
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
−
1
3
(𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)
] 
−𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴2
2                                                                                                                 (4.28) 
 
𝜋𝐵2(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) 
            = [
1
2
+ 
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
6𝑡
− 
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
6𝑡
−
𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2
6𝑡
] [
𝑡 +
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 −
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
−
1
3
(𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
] 
−𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵2
2                                                                                                                (4.29) 
 Stage 2 The multi-product firm and the single-product firms maximise their 
own profits as shown below. 
max
𝛽𝐴1,𝛽𝐵1
𝜋1 
max
𝛽𝑘2
𝜋𝑘2 
One may differentiate (4.27) - (4.29) with respect to associated quality enhancement 
levels (𝛽𝑘𝑖); 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. After solving the derivatives, the equilibrium quality 
enhancement levels are shown below. 
                                             𝛽𝐴1
∗ = 𝛽𝐴2
∗ =
𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
                                                    (4.30) 
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                                           𝛽𝐵1
∗ = 𝛽𝐵2
∗ =
𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
                                                    (4.31) 
 Substituting (4.30) and (4.31) in the price functions (4.23) - (4.26) yields the 
equilibrium prices below. 
                                      𝑃𝐴1
∗ = 𝑃𝐴2
∗ = 𝜃𝑡 +
𝑐𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
6𝑏𝐴
                                             (4.32) 
                                       𝑃𝐵1
∗ = 𝑃𝐵2
∗ = 𝑡 +
𝑐𝐵(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
6𝑏𝐵
.                                             (4.33) 
Proposition 4.1 
 When bundling is not allowed, firms choose symmetric prices and quality 
enhancement levels. Therefore, firms have equal market shares and profits in each 
market.  
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.1). 
 The result is consistent with the standard Hotelling model; firms choose 
symmetric prices and quality enhancement levels in each market because firm 1 
competes with its rivals in each market separately. The equilibrium prices are 
determined by taste cost, costs of quality enhancement and additional utility from the 
quality enhancement within the same market. As a result of the symmetric outcome in 
each separate market, the multi-product firm and the single-product rivals have equal 
market shares and profits in each market.  
Observation 4.1 
 Taste cost has positive effects on the equilibrium prices but no effect on the 
equilibrium levels of quality enhancement.  
Proof 
From (4.30) - (4.33),  
 
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜃 > 0;  
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝑡
= 1 > 0; 
                                   
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝑡
= 0; 
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
∗
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝑡
= 0.                                                 
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 In each market, firms choose their quality enhancement levels depending only 
on relevant costs and additional utility from quality enhancement, but independent of 
taste cost. In general, firms set prices to cover additional marginal costs of quality 
enhancement. In addition, they can raise prices according to an increase in taste cost 
because substitutability between rival products deceases. If cost structure and additional 
utility from quality enhancement in the two markets are identical, the price in the less 
competitive market is certainly higher. 
Consumer surplus with no bundling  
After substituting the equilibrium outcomes (4.30) - (4.33) in (4.6), consumer  
surplus in the no-bundling case is 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑉𝐴 + 𝑉𝐵 +
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
6𝑏𝐴
+
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
6𝑏𝐵
−
5𝜃𝑡
4
−
5
4
𝑡.                       (4.34) 
 Comparative statics analysis  
In the no-bundling case, the equilibrium quality enhancement level (𝛽𝑘𝑖)  and 
prices (𝑃𝑘𝑖)  are determined by associated costs and additional utility in the market 𝑘; 
𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.  
Quality enhancement 
According to (4.30) - (4.31), the equilibrium quality enhancement levels are 
affected by the costs and addition utility in the following way. 
1)  
𝜕𝛽𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑏𝑘
= −
(𝑎𝑘−𝑐𝑘)
6𝑏𝑘
2 < 0 
When the investment cost increases, firms find it less profitable to compete 
fiercely on quality enhancement. Thus, the equilibrium quality enhancement levels drop. 
 2) 
𝜕𝛽𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑐𝑘
=  −
1
6𝑏𝑘
< 0 
 Likewise, if the additional marginal cost increases, firms have less incentive to 
invest in quality enhancement.  
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3) 
𝜕𝛽𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑎𝑘
=  
1
6𝑏𝑘
> 0 
By contrast with the costs, if the additional utility from quality enhancement is 
perceived to be greater from consumers’ perspective, firms have a tendency to invest 
in higher quality enhancement level to attract consumers.  
Price 
Consider (4.32) - (4.33), the equilibrium prices are clearly affected by the 
costs and addition utility as follows. 
1) 
𝜕𝑃𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑏𝑘
= −
𝑐𝑘(𝑎𝑘−𝑐𝑘)
6𝑏𝑘
2 < 0 
Prices decrease with investment cost. When investment cost decreases, firms 
compete by increasing the equilibrium quality enhancement levels and then raise prices 
to cover the costs of quality enhancement. 
2) 
𝜕𝑃𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑐𝑘
=  
𝑎𝑘−2𝑐𝑘
6𝑏𝑘
 
The effect of additional marginal cost on prices is ambiguous. Prices may 
decrease with additional marginal cost if the cost is comparatively high (𝑐𝑘 >
𝑎𝑘
2
). 
Under this assumption, when the cost increases, the quality enhancement levels 
decrease and the marginal costs drop noticeably, and consequently the prices go 
down. On the other hand, when the cost is relatively low (𝑐𝑘 <
𝑎𝑘
2
) , prices may 
increase with the cost. For example, when the per-quality-unit cost of additional 
marginal cost (𝑐𝑘)  decreases, firms decide to increase their quality enhancement 
levels. However, the per-quality-unit cost is so low that the additional marginal cost 
(𝐶𝑘) decreases. Overall, the prices go down. 
3) 
𝜕𝑃𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑎𝑘
=  
𝑐𝑘
6𝑏𝑘
> 0 
Prices increase with additional utility from quality enhancement. This is 
because this factor precisely determines the equilibrium levels of quality enhancement 
which firms take into account in their price decision.  
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4.3.2 The pure-bundling strategy 
 When pure bundling is allowed, firm 1 implements the strategy which affects 
the market outcomes as follows. 
 Equilibrium market outcomes 
 Stage 3  Firm 1 only sells its products as a product bundle, so consumers have 
only two choices, bundle [A1B1] and combination [A2,B2]. In this stage, firm 1 
solves the following problem. 
max?̃? 𝜋1  
From (4.7), the first-order condition (FOC) is 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕?̃?
= −
1
2𝑡
(?̃? − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1) +
1
2
 
               + (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 + 𝑃𝐵2 − ?̃? + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2] = 0.         (4.35) 
 Analogously, the single-products firms’ problems are shown below. 
max
𝑃𝑘2
𝜋𝑘2 
where 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}.  From (4.8) and (4.9), the FOCs are as follows. 
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
= −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2) +
1
2
 
                 − (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 + 𝑃𝐵2 − ?̃? + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2] = 0        (4.36) 
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
= −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2) +
1
2
 
                  − (
1
2𝑡
) [𝑃𝐴2 + 𝑃𝐵2 − ?̃? + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2] = 0       (4.37) 
At any given set of quality enhancement levels, the equilibrium prices are  
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 ?̃?∗(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) =  
5
4
t +
3
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
3
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 
                                                +
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]                        (4.38) 
𝑃𝐴2
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) =  
3
4
t +
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
3
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 
                                                −
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]                        (4.39) 
𝑃𝐵2
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) =
3
4
t +
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
3
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 
                                                −
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2].                       (4.40) 
Substituting (4.38) - (4.40) in (4.7) - (4.9), one obtains the following.  
𝜋1(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2)  
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 
5
8
+
1
2𝑡
(
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]
)
 
 
]
 
 
 
 
× [ 
5
4
t −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
+
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]
]
  
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          −𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴1
2 − 𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵1
2                                                                                                   (4.41) 
 
𝜋𝐴2(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) 
 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 
3
8
−
1
2𝑡
(
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]
)
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
× [ 
3
4
t +
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
−
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]
 ]
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           −𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴2
2                                                                                                                     (4.42) 
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𝜋𝐵2(𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) 
 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
[ 
3
8
−
1
2𝑡
(
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]
) ]
 
× [ 
3
4
t +
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 −
1
4
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
−
1
4
[𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2]
]
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          −𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵2
2                                                                                                                      (4.43) 
 
Stage 2 The multi-product firm and the single-product firms’ problems are 
defined below. 
max
𝛽𝐴1,𝛽𝐵1
𝜋1 
max
𝛽𝑘2
𝜋𝑘2 
One may differentiate (4.41) - (4.43) with respect to associated quality enhancement 
levels (𝛽𝑘𝑖); 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. The following outcomes satisfy the FOCs. 
𝛽𝐴1
∗ =
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)[20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2]
8𝑏𝐴[16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2]
                  (4.44) 
𝛽𝐴2
∗ =
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)[12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2]
8𝑏𝐴[16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2]
                 (4.45) 
𝛽𝐵1
∗ =
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)[20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2]
8𝑏𝐵[16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2]
                 (4.46) 
𝛽𝐵2
∗ =
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)[12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2]
8𝑏𝐵[16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2]
                 (4.47) 
Substituting (4.44) - (4.47) in (4.38) - (4.40) gives the equilibrium prices of 
the game as follows. 
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 ?̃?∗ =
5
4
𝑡 
+(
1
16
)
[
 
 
 
        − (
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
𝑏𝐴
+
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
𝑏𝐵
)     
+ (
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)(
𝑎𝐴
2 − 𝑐𝐴
2
𝑏𝐴
+
𝑎𝐵
2 − 𝑐𝐵
2
𝑏𝐵
)
]
 
 
 
 
(4.48) 
𝑃𝐴2
∗ =
3
4
𝑡 
+(
1
16
)  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
3𝑐𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
𝑏𝐴
     −
𝑐𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
𝑏𝐴
(
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
     − 
4𝑎𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)𝑡𝑏𝐵 + 4(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2𝑡𝑏𝐴
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (4.49) 
𝑃𝐵2
∗ =
3
4
𝑡 
+(
1
16
)
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
3𝑐𝐵(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
𝑏𝐵
      −
𝑐𝐵(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
𝑏𝐵
(
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
− 
4𝑎𝐵(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)𝑡𝑏𝐴 + 4(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2𝑡𝑏𝐵
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (4.50) 
Proposition 4.2 
(i) When the multi-product firm employs the pure-bundling strategy, it chooses 
higher quality enhancement levels than the single-product firms, i.e. 𝛽𝐴1
∗ > 𝛽𝐴2
∗  and 
𝛽𝐵1
∗ > 𝛽𝐵2
∗ . 
(ii) The multi-product firm sets its bundle price lower than the total price of the 
single-product firms’ product combination when quality enhancement involves relatively 
high costs but yields comparatively low additional utility: 
?̃?∗ < (≥) 𝑃𝐴2
∗ + 𝑃𝐵2
∗    iff   [
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
+𝑏𝐵𝑐𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + 𝑏𝐴𝑐𝐵(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
] < (≥) 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.2). 
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After pure bundling, consumers have only two choices of products, bundle 
[A1B1] and combination [A2,B2]. The differentiation between these two choices 
becomes based on the taste cost of the less competitive market. Costs and additional 
utility from quality improvement in one market have some effect on the equilibrium 
prices and quality enhancement levels in the other market. The multi-product firm 
certainly chooses higher levels of quality enhancement than its single-product rivals. 
This is because it incorporates the spillover between the two markets into its profit-
maximisation problem, but the single-product firms still maximise their own profit 
separately (without cooperation). Choi (2004) and Krӓmer (2009) also reported 
similar results in their settings of pure bundling where the multi-product firm ties its 
monopoly product with its competitive product. Even though the multi-product firm 
faces duopolistic competition in both markets in the present study, it still employs 
pure bundling to achieve dominance through its superior quality.   
The price comparison is ambiguous. The multi-product firm’s bundle price is 
lower than the total price of the single-product firms’ product combination when the 
costs of quality enhancement, compared to the additional utility, are extremely high. 
In this case, the process of quality enhancement involves high investment costs and/or 
results in a substantial increase in marginal production costs, so the multi-product firm 
gives a stronger focus on price than quality enhancement because of the inefficiency 
in cost of quality enhancement. It offers slightly higher quality enhancement levels, 
and it aggressively sets lower price than its rivals in order to expand its consumer 
base. In this model, consumers evaluate the two product choices with regard to perfect 
information on quality and price. Consumers can perceive the lower price of bundle as 
an indirect discount. This is similar to the result of Nalebuff (2004), where firms are 
not allowed to vary quality of product in the setting of pure bundling. However, when 
the costs of quality enhancement, compared to the additional utility, are not too high, 
the multi-product firm concentrates on its investment in quality enhancement and 
accordingly sets its bundle price higher than the single-product firms.  
Observation 4.2 
 After pure bundling, the strong competition in the more competitive market 
(𝜃) no longer affects the equilibrium levels of quality enhancement and prices.  
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Proof  
According to (4.44) - (4.50), 
𝜕𝛽𝑘𝑖
∗
𝜕𝜃
= 0,
𝜕 ?̃?∗
𝜕𝜃
= 0,
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝜃
= 0,
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝜃
= 0;  𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}                   
 After pure bundling, only [A1B1] and [A2,B2] remain available to consumers. 
From consumers’ viewpoint, they have to choose either [A1B1] or [A2,B2], and the 
products in the more competitive market become more clearly differentiated after 
being tied with those in the less competitive market. Hence, consumers evaluate the 
two available product choices mainly based on the taste cost of the less competitive 
market (𝑡).   
Proposition 4.3  
 After pure bundling, the multi-product firm has higher profit with larger 
market share than the single-product firms, i.e. 𝜋1
∗ > 𝜋𝐴2
∗ + 𝜋𝐵2
∗  and  𝑀𝑆1 >
1
2
> 𝑀𝑆2. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.3).  
After internalising the spillover between the two tied markets, the multi-
product firm finds it profitable to offer higher quality enhancement levels to attract 
consumers and then becomes dominant with larger market share and higher profit 
than its single-product rivals.  
Consumer surplus with pure bundling 
Consumer surplus after pure bundling is  
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑉𝐴 + 𝑉𝐵 −
𝜃2𝑡
6
−
𝑡
2
+ 𝑡𝑌0(1 − 𝑌0) − 𝜃𝑡(1 − 𝑌0) + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2
∗ + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2
∗  
            −(𝑃𝐴2
∗ + 𝑃𝐵2
∗ ) + (
𝜃
2
− 𝑌0) [
 ?̃?∗ − (𝑃𝐴2
∗ + 𝑃𝐵2
∗ )
 
−𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1
∗ + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2
∗ − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1
∗ + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2
∗
],             (4.51) 
where 𝑌0 = 𝑌(0) = (
1+𝜃
2
) +
2𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)2
 . 
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 The pure-bundling strategy VS the no-bundling strategy 
In stage 1, to emphasise the effect of pure bundling, the pure-bundling market 
outcomes are compared with the no-bundling benchmark in this section.  
Denote Ω =  
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)2
 ,  𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 > 0,  𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 > 0.   
Proposition 4.4a 
 When the pure-bundling strategy is implemented instead of the no-bundling 
strategy, the outcomes of the multi-product firm change as follows. 
 (i) In both markets, the multi-product firm decreases its quality enhancement 
levels when quality enhancement involves relatively high costs but yields comparatively 
low additional utility:  
𝛽𝐴1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐵1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗   iff  𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 < 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵.  
Conversely, it increases the levels when the process of quality enhancement is 
efficient enough in terms of cost and additional utility: 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ > 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐵1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ > 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗   iff  4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 < 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵.  
(ii) The multi-product firm raises its bundle price when the two tied markets 
are significantly different in competition intensity: 
 ?̃? 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ > (≤)𝑃𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ + 𝑃𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  iff 𝜃 < (≥)
1
4
+
1
48𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
{
(3Ω − 3) [𝑏𝐵𝑎𝐴𝔸 + 𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐵𝔹]
 
+(3Ω − 5) [𝑏𝐵𝑐𝐴𝔸+ 𝑏𝐴𝑐𝐵𝔹]
}. 
(iii) The multi-product firm’s market shares increase in both markets, i.e. 
 𝑀𝑆1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 > 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑁𝑜 = 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑁𝑜.  
(iv) The multi-product firm’s profit increases, i.e. 𝜋1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ > 𝜋1 𝑁𝑜
∗ . The pure- 
bundling strategy dominates the no-bundling strategy for the multi-product firm in 
most situations.
70
  
                                                          
70
 In this section, it is assumed that 𝜃 is not too extremely high in order that the strategy is still 
credible in the analysis of pure bundling. See the appendix (Section 4.5.4) for details.  
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Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.4). 
Compared to the no-bundling benchmark, the pure-bundling strategy can 
increase the multi-product firm’s profit in most situations. Consequently, at stage 1 of 
the game, firm 1 will use the pure-bundling strategy instead of no bundling. When the 
two markets are tied, the product choices are limited. Firm 1 takes this opportunity to 
reconsider about quality enhancement and pricing by incorporating the spillover 
concern into its profit-maximisation problem. It will spend less on quality enhancement 
to save cost if the investment cost and additional marginal cost of quality enhancement 
are very high in associated with a comparatively negligible amount of additional 
utility.
71 
It may not be worthwhile to attract consumers by heavy investment in quality 
enhancement with this inefficient technology. This is because the markets seem less 
competitive when only two options of product combinations remain available after pure 
bundling. Otherwise, due to the significant effect of the spillover, the pure-bundling 
strategy may stimulate the multi-product firm’s investment if quality enhancement 
does not involve too huge investment cost and additional marginal cost but yields 
relatively substantial additional-utility. This study points out that the multi-product 
firm’s incentive to invest in quality depends on the efficiency of the quality 
enhancement approach in terms of cost and additional utility. This contrasts with the 
close paper by Choi (2004) that argued that the multi-product firm certainly increases 
its investment in cost reduction after pure bundling.   
The effects of the pure-bundling strategy on prices are ambiguous. Two effects 
of pure bundling occur. First, pure bundling reduces the number of product choices 
and obscures the strong competition in market A, thus firms may charge higher prices. 
Second, in response to pure bundling, firms may change their quality enhancement 
levels, which directly affect marginal costs and finally their pricing. When the two 
markets’ taste costs are significantly different (𝜃 is sufficiently low), the price of 
bundle [A1B1] is higher than the no-bundling benchmark. When the more competitive 
market is tied with the far less competitive market, the reduction in competition 
intensity after pure bundling benefits the multi-product firm so significantly that it can 
                                                          
71
 See more details in the appendix (Section 4.5.7). 
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raise its bundle price. Otherwise, it will lower its bundle price in the process of profit 
maximisation, which internalises the spillover after pure bundling. With more attractive 
quality and reasonable price, the multi-product firm can expand its market share. 
Proposition 4.4b 
When the multi-product firm implements the pure-bundling strategy instead of 
the no-bundling strategy, the single-product firms are affected as follows. 
(i) The single-product firms decrease their quality enhancement levels in both 
markets, i.e.  𝛽𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗   and  𝛽𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗  .  
(ii) The single-product firm in the less competitive market decreases price, i.e. 
𝑃𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . Ambiguously, the single-product firm in the more competitive 
market raises its price when the two tied markets are significantly different in 
competition intensity:  
𝑃𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ > (≤) 𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗   iff 
𝜃 < (≥)
3
4
−
(3Ω − 1)𝑐𝐴𝔸(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) + 12𝑎𝐴𝔸𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 12𝔹
2𝑡𝑏𝐴
2
48𝑡𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
. 
(iii) The market shares of the single-product firms shrink in both markets, i.e. 
𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 < 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑁𝑜  and  𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 < 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑁𝑜.   
(iv) In the more competitive market, the single-product firm’s profit increases 
when the two tied markets are significantly different in competition intensity:   
 𝜋𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ > (≤) 𝜋𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗   iff 
𝜃 < (≥)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
16
 + 
𝔸2
18𝑡𝑏𝐴
[
 
 
 
 
 1 −
1
2
[
 
 
 
 
(
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 
−𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)
(
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
 
]
 
 
 
2
 
]
 
 
 
 
 
−
6
16
[ 
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
(
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
 ] +
1
16
[ 
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
(
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
 ]
2
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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In the less competitive market, the single-product firm’s profit decreases, i.e.  
𝜋𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝜋𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ .   
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.5). 
When the multi-product firm implements pure bundling, the single-product 
firms decide to save cost and react by decreasing their quality enhancement levels, 
which are finally lower than those of firm 1. This is because they separately consider 
their own profit-maximisation problems without the spillover concern. This finding 
confirms the result of Choi (2004) and Krӓmer (2009) that pure bundling reduces the 
single-product rivals’ incentive to invest, even in the duopolistic environment with 
more intense competition. 
According to Proposition 4.2 and Proposition 4.4a (i), with pure bundling, 
firm 1 becomes stronger and acts aggressively in investing in quality enhancement. 
The single-product firm in the less competitive market is adversely affected by this 
aggressive bundling strategy. As a result, firm B2 responds by reducing price to 
maximise its profit in this difficult situation. Finally, it certainly loses its market share 
and profit. However, the outcomes of the single-product firm in the more competitive 
market ambiguously change. When the two markets’ taste costs are very different 
(𝜃 is very low), firm A2 indirectly benefits from pure bundling by firm 1. When the 
more competitive market is tied with the much less competitive market, the 
substitutability between product choices drastically diminishes according to a limited 
number of available product choices. For this reason, firm A2 may increase its price 
and its profit grows despite a reduction in market share. Otherwise, tying the markets 
leads to only a small drop in the degree of competition of market A, and consequently 
firm A2 has to reduce price according to a decrease in its quality enhancement level. 
In this case, firm A2, similar to firm B2, earns smaller market share and lower profit 
than the no-bundling benchmark. 
Proposition 4.4c 
Compared to the no-bundling case, the effect of the pure-bundling strategy on 
consumer surplus is ambiguous. Consumer surplus decreases when the two tied markets 
are significantly different in competition intensity:   
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𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 < (≥) 𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑜  iff 
θ(θ + 9) < (≥)9 − 9𝛺 + 3Ω2 −
1
𝑡
[ 
𝔸2
𝑏𝑎
+
𝔹2
𝑏𝐵
 ]
[
 
 
 
 
 
−2 +
15
8
Ω −
3
8
Ω2
 
+
(3Ω − 6)𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
 
]
 
 
 
 
 . 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.6). 
A change in consumer surplus is ambiguous. Pure bundling reduces consumer 
surplus when the taste costs of the two markets are significantly different (𝜃 is low). 
The limitation of product choices causes distortion of the allocation of consumers, 
which leads to the disutility from the unavailability of consumers’ ideal product 
combinations. In addition, due to a reduction in competition intensity after pure 
bundling, price distortion occurs, especially in the more competitive market. The 
distortions of price and the allocation of consumers adversely affect consumer 
welfare. This dominates the benefit from firm 1’s decision on quality enhancement 
levels and bundle price by virtue of firm 1’s spillover concern. On the other hand, 
consumer surplus may increase when the two markets’ taste costs are not significantly 
different (𝜃 is sufficiently high). Tying the two markets does not lead to severe 
distortion. Therefore, the benefit of the spillover concern outweighs the disutility and 
the negative effect of price distortion. 
4.3.3 The mixed-bundling strategy  
 In addition to a product bundle, firm 1 also offers its products separately  
in accordance with the mixed-bundling strategy, which has effects on the market 
outcomes as follows. 
 Equilibrium market outcomes 
Stage 3 The multi-product firm solves the following problem. 
max
𝑃𝐴1,𝑃𝐵1,𝛿
 𝜋1 
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Differentiating (4.15) with respect to associated prices and bundle discount 
(𝛿) yields the following FOCs. 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
= −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1) −
𝛿
4𝜃𝑡2
(𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1) + ?̂? +
𝛿?̂?
𝜃𝑡
+
3𝛿2
8𝜃𝑡2
 = 0       (4.52) 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
= −
𝛿
4𝜃𝑡2
(𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1) −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1) + ?̂? +
𝛿?̂?
𝑡
+
3𝛿2
8𝜃𝑡2
 = 0         (4.53) 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛿
=
{
 
 
 
 (
?̂?
2𝜃𝑡
+
𝛿
4𝜃𝑡2
) (𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1) + (
?̂?
2𝑡
+
𝛿
4𝜃𝑡2
) (𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1)
 
−?̂??̂? −
𝛿?̂?
𝑡
−
𝛿?̂?
𝜃𝑡
−
3𝛿2
8𝜃𝑡2 }
 
 
 
 
 = 0     (4.54) 
 
Analogously, the single-product firms’ problems are shown below. 
max
𝛽𝑘2
𝜋𝑘2 
𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. The FOCs obtained from differentiating (4.16), (4.17) with respect to 
associated prices are shown below.  
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
= −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2) + 1 − ?̂? −
𝛿?̂?
2𝜃𝑡
−
𝛿2
8𝜃𝑡2
 = 0                  (4.55) 
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
= −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2) + 1 − ?̂? −
𝛿?̂?
2𝑡
−
𝛿2
8𝜃𝑡2
 = 0                     (4.56) 
where  
?̂? =
1
2
+ 
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑃𝐴1 + 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2) 
?̂? =
1
2
+ 
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑃𝐵1 + 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1 − 𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2). 
The function of the equilibrium discount by firm 1 cannot be expressed 
explicitly as a closed-form expression. However, after considering (4.54)  in the 
neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0, it is found that 
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𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
= (
?̂?
2𝜃𝑡
) (𝑃𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1) + (
?̂?
2𝑡
) (𝑃𝐵1 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1) − ?̂??̂?. 
If 𝛿 = 0, the mixed-bundling competition becomes the no-bundling case in which 
firms choose symmetric quality enhancement levels and prices in equilibrium. 
Therefore,  
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
=
1
4
> 0.                                                        (4.57) 
 As a result, if mixed bundling is allowed, firm 1 has incentive to offer a 
bundle discount in order to increase its profit. Thus, in equilibrium, 𝛿∗ > 0. 
Due to the fact that equilibrium bundle discount cannot be expressed in closed 
form, one may write the equilibrium prices as functions of quality enhancement levels 
and equilibrium bundle discount (𝛿∗). After solving (4.52) - (4.56), the equilibrium 
prices at any given set of quality enhancement levels are as follows. 
𝑃𝐴1
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) = 
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
)
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 θ (θ𝑡3 −
𝛿∗2𝑡
3
) +
δ∗θ𝑡2
6
+
δ∗5
288θ𝑡2
−
2
9
δ∗3
+(
96𝜃2𝑡4 − 40𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
144𝜃𝑡2
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
+(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
−θ(
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+θ(
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
+ (
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) (𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1−𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)
+𝜃 (
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) (𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1−𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (4.58) 
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𝑃𝐵1
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) = 
     (
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
)
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (θ𝑡3 −
𝛿∗2𝑡
3
) +
δ∗θ𝑡2
6
+
δ∗5
288θ𝑡2
−
2
9
δ∗3
−(
2δ∗θ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
+(
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
+(
96𝜃2𝑡4 − 40𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
144𝜃𝑡2
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
+ (
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) (𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1−𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)
+(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) (𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1−𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (4.59) 
 
 
𝑃𝐴2
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) = 
    −
𝛿∗
6𝑡
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
)
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (θ𝑡3 −
𝛿∗2𝑡
3
) +
δ∗θ𝑡2
6
+
δ∗5
288θ𝑡2
−
2
9
δ∗3
−(
2δ∗θ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
+(
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
+(
96𝜃2𝑡4 − 40𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
144𝜃𝑡2
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
+ (
2δθ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) (𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1−𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)
+(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) (𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1−𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    + 𝜃𝑡 + 
𝛿∗2
12𝑡
+
1
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
2
3
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2 +
𝛿∗
6𝑡
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 −
1
3
(𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1−𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)                    (4.60) 
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𝑃𝐵2
∗ (𝛽𝐴1, 𝛽𝐴2, 𝛽𝐵1, 𝛽𝐵2) = 
    −
𝛿∗
6𝜃𝑡
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
)
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 θ (θ𝑡3 −
𝛿∗2𝑡
3
) +
δ∗θ𝑡2
6
+
δ∗5
288θ𝑡2
−
2
9
δ∗3
+(
96𝜃2𝑡4 − 40𝜃𝑡2𝛿∗2 + 𝛿∗4
144𝜃𝑡2
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
+(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
−θ(
2δ∗θ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
+θ(
2δ∗θ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
+ (
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3δ∗2
12
) (𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴1−𝑎𝐴𝛽𝐴2)
+𝜃 (
2δ∗θ𝑡2 + δ∗3
36θt
) (𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1−𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    + 𝑡 + 
𝛿∗2
12𝜃𝑡
+
𝛿∗
6𝜃𝑡
𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1 +
1
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1 +
2
3
𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2 −
1
3
(𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵1−𝑎𝐵𝛽𝐵2)                (4.61) 
 
Stage 2  Firms choose quality enhancement levels simultaneously. The multi-
product firm and the single-product firms’ problems are as follows. 
max
𝛽𝐴1,𝛽𝐵1
𝜋1 
max
𝛽𝑘2
 𝜋𝑘2 
One may differentiate the reduced-form profit functions with respect to associated 
quality enhancement levels (𝛽𝑘𝑖);  𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵},  𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.  Further, one can substitute 
(4.55) and (4.56) into the derivatives and then obtain the following.  
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
= [1 −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2)] (
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
+ 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) 
               + [1 −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2)]
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
 − 2𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴1                               = 0              (4.62) 
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𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
= [1 −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2)]
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
 
               + [1 −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2)] (
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
+ 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵) − 2𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵1       = 0             (4.63) 
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
=
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2) [
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
+ 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 −
𝛿
2𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
+
𝛿
2𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
− (?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
)
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
] 
               −2𝑏𝐴𝛽𝐴2            
        = 0                                                                                                                               (4.64) 
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
=
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2)
[
 
 
 
    
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
+ 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 −
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
+
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
    − (?̂? +
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
)
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝛽𝐵2 ]
 
 
 
 
 − 2𝑏𝐵𝛽𝐵2   
= 0                                                                                                                              (4.65) 
Proposition 4.5 
 (i) The multi-product firm offers a bundle discount (𝛿∗ > 0) with the mixed-
bundling strategy and sets higher individual prices than those of the single-product 
rivals, i.e. 𝑃𝐴1
∗ > 𝑃𝐴2
∗   and  𝑃𝐵1
∗ > 𝑃𝐵2
∗ . 
(ii) In the more competitive market, the multi-product firm’s quality enhancement 
level is higher than the single-product firm’s counterpart.  
The quality enhancement outcome in the less competitive market is ambiguous 
according to 𝜃 . However, if the two markets are identical in cost structure and 
additional utility of quality enhancement and taste costs are not too different (𝜃 is 
sufficiently high), the outcome is similar to that in the more competitive market. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.8). 
 The no-bundling case can be seen as the mixed-bundling case with 𝛿 = 0. The 
multi-product firm offers a bundle discount (𝛿∗ > 0). Even though the multi-product 
firm’s prices are higher than its rivals’ prices, its product are still attractive because it 
can offer a bundle discount as a price-discriminatory tool under the mixed-bundling 
strategy. It rewards the consumers who purchase its bundles at a discount. Moreover, 
in the more competitive market, it invests more heavily in quality enhancement and 
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then attracts consumers, especially those who do not buy its bundle but purchase 
either product A1 or product B1. The single-product firms cannot discriminate 
consumers by a bundle discount. In response to the multi-product firm’s discounted 
prices, the single-product firms (without cooperation) have to attract consumers by 
setting lower prices, which affect all consumers in the same way. This reaction is 
commonly found as strategic complements in a price game. Thus, in the more 
competitive market, the single-product firm certainly decreases its quality enhancement 
level to save cost. These quality enhancement outcomes is also found in the less 
competitive market if the taste costs of the two markets are not too different (𝜃 is 
sufficiently high). Even though the multi-product firm gives up some revenue due to 
the bundle discount, it can promote its profit after all. This is partly because of its 
higher individual prices than those of the single-product firms.  
Quality discrimination is not practical in this setting. The multi-product firm 
offers the same levels of quality enhancement to all consumers. Suppose the taste 
costs of the two markets are not too different (𝜃  is sufficiently high), the multi-
product firm decides to set higher levels of quality enhancement than the single-
product firms in order to attract the consumers who confront its higher individual 
prices. Similarly, with the pure-bundling strategy, as stated in Proposition 4.2, the 
multi-product firm also chooses to invest in quality enhancement more heavily than 
its single-product rivals.  
Proposition 4.6  
(i) After mixed bundling, the multi-product firm has higher profit than the 
single-product firms, i.e.  𝜋1
∗ > 𝜋𝐴2
∗ + 𝜋𝐵2
∗  .   
(ii) The equilibrium market shares are ambiguous.  
In the more competitive market, it is more likely that the multi-product firm has 
larger market share than the single-product firm. 
The outcome in the less competitive market is ambiguous according to 𝜃 . 
However, if the two markets are identical in cost structure and additional utility of 
quality enhancement and taste costs in the two markets are not too different (𝜃 is 
sufficiently high), the outcome is similar to that in the more competitive market. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.9). 
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The multi-product firm may persuade some consumers to switch to its product 
bundle by means of mixed bundling. Compared to the less competitive market, the 
multi-product firm is more likely to steal some market share from its single-product 
rival and become dominant in the more competitive market with lower taste cost. The 
outcome in the less competitive market is ambiguous. However, if the two markets 
are identical in cost structure and additional utility of quality enhancement and taste 
costs in the two markets are not too different (𝜃 is sufficiently high), this market share 
outcome is also found in the less competitive market. Additionally, it is certain that 
the sum of the single-product firms’ profits is less than the multi-product firm’s profit. 
The mixed-bundling strategy puts the single-product firms at a disadvantage.  
In addition to the pure-bundling strategy, the multi-product firm may earn 
larger market shares than its rivals after adopting the mixed-bundling strategy. Both 
pure bundling and mixed bundling can increase the multi-product firm’s profit, and it 
certainly has higher profit than its rivals.  
 The mixed-bundling strategy VS the no-bundling strategy 
The effects of the mixed-bundling strategy on market outcomes are discussed 
in form of a comparison between the mixed-bundling outcomes and the no-bundling 
benchmark.  
Proposition 4.7a 
 After the implementation of the mixed-bundling strategy instead of no 
bundling, the multi-product firm’s profit increases whereas the two single-product 
firms’ profits decrease in both markets, i.e. 𝜋1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝜋1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝜋𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝜋𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 
𝜋𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝜋𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . The mixed-bundling strategy dominates the no-bundling strategy 
for the multi-product firm. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.10). 
In stage 1 of the game, the multi-product firm has incentive to employ the 
mixed-bundling strategy instead of no bundling because it can increase profit after 
mixed bundling. The bundle discount can be seen as a tool for the multi-product firm 
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to persuade the consumers who originally buy other product combinations to choose 
its bundle [A1B1] instead. 
Proposition 4.7b 
When the multi-product firm employs the mixed-bundling strategy instead of 
the no-bundling strategy, the prices and quality enhancement change as follows. 
(i) The multi-product firm raises its individual prices, whereas the single-product 
firms reduce their prices in both markets, i.e. 𝑃𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝑃𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ ,  𝑃𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝑃𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 
𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗   and  𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . 
(ii) In the more competitive market, the multi-product firm increases its quality 
enhancement level, but the single-product firm decreases its quality enhancement level, 
i.e. 𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗   and  𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . 
A change in quality enhancement in the less competitive market is ambiguous. 
However, if the two markets are identical in cost structure and additional utility of 
quality enhancement and the taste costs of the two markets are not too different (𝜃 is 
sufficiently high), the multi-product firm increases its quality enhancement level but 
the single-product firm decreases its quality enhancement level in the less competitive 
market. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.11). 
Similar to Gans and King (2006), Reisinger (2006) and Avenali, D’Annunzio 
and Reverberi (2013), this study finds that the multi-product firms strategically increase 
its individual prices, but its bundle is still attractive because of a bundle discount. The 
single-product firms’ reaction is to reduce their prices. The consumers who intend to 
buy other product combinations exclusive of bundle [A1B1] will perceive that the 
multi-product firm’s individual prices are higher than the single-product firms’ prices. 
Consequently, in the more competitive market, the multi-product firm finds it 
profitable to increase investment in quality enhancement from the no-bundling 
benchmark in order to attract some of these consumers. Meanwhile, the single-
product firm decreases its quality enhancement level in order to reduce associated cost 
and accordingly offers lower price. This key finding is also found by Avenali, 
D’Annunzio and Reverberi (2013). Even though the multi-product firm’s monopoly 
power is removed from the present study, mixed bundling still undermines the single-
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product firms’ incentive to invest in the setting of more intense competition. However, 
the result in the less competitive market is ambiguous. Provided that the two markets 
are identical in cost structure and additional utility of quality enhancement and the 
two markets are not too different in competition intensity (𝜃 is sufficiently high), the 
quality enhancement outcome is similar to the more competitive market’s counterpart. 
Proposition 4.7c 
After the implementation of the mixed-bundling strategy instead of the no-
bundling strategy, a change in the market share outcome is ambiguous. 
In the more competitive market, it is more likely that the multi-product firm 
can increase its market share, whereas the single-product firm’s market share decreases.  
The outcome in the less competitive market is also ambiguous. However, if 
the two markets are identical in cost structure and additional utility of quality 
enhancement and the taste costs of the two markets are not too different (𝜃  is 
sufficiently high), the outcome is similar to that in the more competitive market. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.12). 
A comparison of market shares is ambiguous. If the two markets are identical 
in cost structure and additional utility of quality enhancement and the two markets are 
not too different in terms of competition intensity, the mixed-bundling strategy does 
not only threaten the single-product firms’ profit, but also decreases their market shares.  
In summary, the multi-product firm takes advantage of a wider range of 
product lines by means of mixed bundling in order to reap more profit. It can offer a 
bundle discount as an extra price-discriminatory tool. Meanwhile, the single-product 
firms (without cooperation) cannot implement this discriminatory pricing and still 
carry out only one pricing scheme which applies to all consumers.  
Proposition 4.7d 
 After the implementation of the mixed-bundling strategy instead of the no-
bundling strategy, a change in consumer surplus is ambiguous.  
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However, if the two markets are identical in cost structure and additional 
utility of quality enhancement and the taste costs of the two markets are significantly 
different (𝜃 is sufficiently low), mixed bundling certainly decreases consumer surplus. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.13). 
In the extreme case analysed by Avenali, D’Annunzio and Reverberi (2013) 
where the multi-product firm ties its monopoly component with its competitive 
component, the mixed-bundling strategy jeopardises consumer surplus. However, the 
present study relaxes the assumption about competition intensity and finds that the 
effect of mixed bundling on consumer welfare is ambiguous. The mixed-bundling 
strategy, similar to the pure-bundling strategy, is more likely to undermine consumer 
welfare when the two tied markets are significantly different in competition intensity. 
This result is clearly illustrated in Corollary 4.1 as mentioned below.  
Corollary 4.1 
 Suppose both markets are identical in taste cost, cost structure and additional 
utility of quality enhancement, consumer surplus certainly decreases after mixed 
bundling. 
Proof  See the appendix (Section 4.5.14).  
According to Proposition 4.7d, suppose the two markets are significantly 
different in taste cost (𝜃 is sufficiently low), the markets are noticeably distorted after 
the less competitive market is tied with the more competitive market. Even though 
mixed bundling may stimulate the firms to offer higher quality enhancement levels of 
product A1 and B2 in this case, the changes in quality enhancement of the other 
products have a considerably negative impact on consumer surplus. As a result, 
consumer surplus decreases after all. In addition, suppose the two markets are not too 
different in taste cost ( 𝜃  is sufficiently high), the multi-product firm’s quality 
enhancement levels slightly increase while those of the single-product firms 
substantially decrease from the symmetric no-bundling benchmark. The effect of the 
mixed-bundling strategy on consumer surplus is ambiguous in this case. However, a 
substantial drop in the single-product firms’ quality enhancement levels is more 
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noticeable than a slight increase in those of the multi-product firm. Thus, it is likely 
that consumer surplus decreases after mixed bundling.
72
  
As stated in Corollary 4.1, if the two markets are identical in taste cost, cost 
structure and additional utility of quality enhancement, i.e. 𝜃 = 1, 𝑏𝐴 = 𝑏𝐵, 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵, 
𝑎𝐴 = 𝑎𝐵, the equilibrium outcome in market A is identical to that in market B. It is 
found that the deterioration of the single-product firms’ quality enhancement has 
more significant effects on consumer surplus than a boost in that of the multi-product 
firm. In this setting of identical parameters, the mixed-bundling strategy reduces 
consumer surplus.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 This study examines the effect of the pure-bundling and the mixed-bundling 
strategy on the market outcomes and consumer surplus. In this model, one multi-
product firm and two single-product rivals compete in two duopolistic markets, which 
have different degrees of competition (different taste costs). They choose quality 
enhancement levels and then prices to attract consumers. Without bundling, firms 
compete with each other in each market separately. This leads to the symmetric 
equilibrium in each market. However, both bundling strategies dominate the no-
bundling strategy because the multi-product firm can increase profit after bundling, 
while the single-product firms lose profits in most situations.  
With pure bundling, the multi-product firm considers the spillover between the 
two tied markets, whereas its single-product rivals (without cooperation) neglect it. 
As a result, the multi-product firm can offer higher quality enhancement levels than 
its rivals. The bundle price of the multi-product firm is lower (higher) than the total  
                                                          
72
 The effect of mixed bundling on consumer surplus is ambiguous according to 𝜃. The result 
is illustrated in the three cases of 𝜃 (𝜃 is low, 𝜃 is moderate, and 𝜃 is high). However, this 
study focuses its analysis of consumer welfare on the case of low 𝜃 . This attracts the 
regulators’ attention and relates closely to leverage theory in the context of bundling. See 
proof in the appendix (Section 4.5.13). 
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price of the product combination of the single-product firms if the process of quality 
enhancement is inefficient (efficient enough) in terms of cost and additional utility. 
However, compared to the no-bundling benchmark, pure bundling undermines 
the single-product firm’s incentive to invest in quality in both markets, but the multi-
product firm’s decision on quality enhancement is ambiguous. If the process of 
quality enhancement is inefficient (efficient enough) in terms of cost and additional 
utility, the multi-product firm decreases (increases) its quality enhancement levels. 
The comparison in prices is also ambiguous. The bundle price of the multi-product 
firm and the price of the single-product firm in the more competitive market are 
higher than the no-bundling benchmarks if the two markets’ degrees of competition 
are so different that these firms benefit from a reduction in competition intensity after 
pure bundling. Meanwhile, the single-product firm in the less competitive market 
reduces its price because its multi-product rival is more aggressive with the pure-
bundling strategy. The multi-product firm’s market share expands. The single-product 
firm in the less competitive market certainly loses profit. Despite a reduction in 
market share, the single-product firm in the more competitive market may enjoy an 
increase in profit if the benefit from tying the more competitive market with the much 
less competitive market prevails.  
Mixed bundling is a price-discriminatory strategy. Compared to the no-bundling 
benchmark, the multi-product firm increases its individual prices in both markets in 
spite of its bundle discount. Meanwhile, the single-product firms decrease their prices.  
In the more competitive market, the multi-product firm raises its quality enhancement 
level in order to attract the consumers who are charged high individual prices. The 
single-product firm decreases its quality enhancement level corresponding to its lower 
price. In the less competitive market, a change in quality enhancement is ambiguous. 
The outcome is similar to that in the more competitive market if the two markets are 
not too different in competition intensity. A change in market shares is also ambiguous. 
The multi-product firm’s market shares are likely to expand in both markets when the 
two markets are not too different in competition intensity. In addition to pure bundling, 
the multi-product firm can also implement the mix-bundling strategy to achieve 
dominance under these circumstances. 
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Compared to the no-bundling benchmark, the pure-bundling strategy reduces 
consumer surplus when the two markets are significantly different in competition 
intensity. In this case, the negative effect of the less intense competition with a limited 
number of product choices outweighs the benefit from the multi-product firm’s 
spillover concern. Similarly, the effect of the mixed-bundling strategy on consumer 
surplus is ambiguous. Consumer welfare is threatened if the two markets’ degrees of 
competition are significantly different. A decrease in quality enhancement levels of 
the single-product firms is likely to be more substantial than an increase in quality 
enhancement levels of the multi-product firm. In this case, the mixed-bundling 
strategy is likely to have a negative impact on consumer surplus. Similar to pure 
bundling, mixed bundling tends to be employed for the purpose of enlarging the 
product differentiation in the more competitive market rather than promoting strong 
competition in price and quality enhancement, especially when a more competitive 
market is tied with a much less competitive market. 
Bundling seems unacceptable when consumer welfare is main concern in some 
situations. However, the sectoral regulators should take into account some positive 
effects of bundling. For instance, pure bundling can promote the multi-product firm’s 
quality enhancement when the quality enhancement does not involve relatively huge 
costs. Therefore, in the remote areas with low demand and prohibitive investment cost 
in telecommunications, pure bundling is not an appropriate approach to stimulate 
quality enhancement. Pure bundling should not be allowed in this situation in order to 
prevent the predatory practice by the multi-product firm and protect consumer welfare. 
On the contrary, in the more competitive market, mixed bundling can at least 
stimulate quality enhancement by the multi-product firm, which is likely to serve the 
majority of consumers. The bundling strategy may pave the way for higher standard 
of product quality in the future. In addition, the effect of mixed bundling on consumer 
surplus is still ambiguous, so it is possible that consumer surplus may increase under 
some conditions. A ban on mixed bundling in this situation is a short-sighted intervention. 
The single-product rivals may submit a petition against bundling in an attempt to halt 
a decline in their own profits. However, it is not necessary for the regulators to 
intervene when all of the tied markets are highly competitive.  
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Further research may extend to a group of light consumers, who intend to 
consume either product A or product B. Additionally, the issues about vertical 
differentiation in quality and market segmentation are also interesting in the context 
of bundling.    
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4.5 Appendix  
4.5.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1 
Substituting the equilibrium outcomes (4.30) - (4.31) in the profit functions 
(4.27) - (4.29), the equilibrium profits are as follows. 
 𝜋1
∗ =
𝜃𝑡
2
+
𝑡
2
−
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
36𝑏𝐴
−
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
36𝑏𝐵
                                   (4. A1) 
    𝜋𝐴2
∗ =
𝜃𝑡
2
−
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
36𝑏𝐴
                                                  (4. A2) 
𝜋𝐵2
∗ =
𝑡
2
−
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
36𝑏𝐵
                                                   (4. A3) 
It is certain that 𝜋1
∗ = 𝜋𝐴2
∗ + 𝜋𝐵2
∗ . Substituting (4.30) - (4.33) in (4.1) and (4.2), the 
locations of marginal consumers show symmetric market shares in both markets. 
𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑁𝑜 = 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
 = 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑁𝑜 = 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑁𝑜 =
1
2
                            (4. A4) 
𝑀𝑆𝑘𝑖 𝑁𝑜 is market share of product 𝑘𝑖 in market 𝑘 in the no-bundling case; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, 
𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.                                                                                                
4.5.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2 
 Proof that 𝒃𝑩(𝒂𝑨 − 𝒄𝑨)
𝟐 + 𝒃𝑨(𝒂𝑩 − 𝒄𝑩)
𝟐 < 𝟏𝟐𝒕𝒃𝑨𝒃𝑩 to guarantee the 
existence of interior equilibrium  
 This study casts light on the telecommunications markets which are involved 
with extremely high cost structure, especially investment cost of infrastructure. It is 
assumed that all the quality enhancement levels are non-negative. In the business 
world, firms cannot or hardly decrease their quality from the standard level. From 
(4.44)  - (4.47) , 𝛽𝐴1
∗ , 𝛽𝐴2
∗ , 𝛽𝐵2
∗  and 𝛽𝐵2
∗  are non-negative when the condition that 
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 is satisfied. 
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(i) Quality enhancement 
From (4.44) - (4.47), 
𝛽𝐴1
∗ − 𝛽𝐴2
∗ = 
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)[8𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
8𝑏𝐴[16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2]
 > 0  
𝛽𝐵1
∗ − 𝛽𝐵2
∗ =
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)[8𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
8𝑏𝐵[16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2]
 > 0. 
This is because 16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 > 0 under the condition for 
an interior equilibrium mentioned above, 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 . 
Therefore, 𝛽𝐴1
∗ − 𝛽𝐴2
∗ > 0, 𝛽𝐵1
∗ − 𝛽𝐵2
∗ > 0. 
(ii) Prices 
From (4.48) - (4.50), 
𝑃𝐴2
∗ + 𝑃𝐵2
∗ =
3
2
𝑡 
+(
1
16
)
[
 
 
 
 
 −(
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)(
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
𝑏𝐴
+
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
𝑏𝐵
)
+(
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)(
𝑎𝐴
2 − 𝑐𝐴
2
𝑏𝐴
+
𝑎𝐵
2 − 𝑐𝐵
2
𝑏𝐵
)
]
 
 
 
 
 
. 
𝑃𝐴2
∗ + 𝑃𝐵2
∗ −?̃?∗ 
=
1
4
𝑡 +
1
16
{
 
 
 
 (
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
𝑏𝐴
+
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
𝑏𝐵
) [1 − (
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)]
−(
𝑎𝐴
2 − 𝑐𝐴
2
𝑏𝐴
+
𝑎𝐵
2 − 𝑐𝐵
2
𝑏𝐵
)(
8𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
}
 
 
 
 
  
= −
𝑡
(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
[𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 + 𝑏𝐵𝑐𝐴𝔸+ 𝑏𝐴𝑐𝐵𝔹− 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵], 
where 𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 > 0  and  𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 > 0. 
An interior equilibrium exists when 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵. 
Under this condition, 16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 > 0. Accordingly, 𝑃𝐴2
∗ + 𝑃𝐵2
∗ −?̃?∗ > 0 
when 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 + 𝑏𝐵𝑐𝐴(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + 𝑏𝐴𝑐𝐵(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵) < 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵. 
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4.5.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3 
Substituting the equilibrium quality enhancement levels (4.44) - (4.47) and the 
equilibrium prices (4.48)  - (4.50) in (4.7) - (4.9) yields the following equilibrium 
profits. 
𝜋1
∗ =
25𝑡
32
+
5𝑡
16
(
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
) 
          +
𝑡
32
(
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
2
 
 −
1
64
(
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
𝑏𝐴
+
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
𝑏𝐵
)
(
 
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2)
 
2
   (4. A5) 
 
𝜋𝐴2
∗ =
9𝑡
32
−
3𝑡
16
(
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
) 
            +
𝑡
32
(
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
2
 
            −
1
64
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2
𝑏𝐴
(
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
2
                (4. A6) 
 
𝜋𝐵2
∗ =
9𝑡
32
−
3𝑡
16
(
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
) 
            +
𝑡
32
(
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
2
 
            −
1
64
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
𝑏𝐵
(
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
)
2
               (4. A7) 
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 Due to the condition 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 , firm 1 has 
higher profit than the total of its rivals’ profits, i.e.  𝜋1
∗ > 𝜋𝐴2
∗ + 𝜋𝐵2
∗  . 
As seen in Figure 4.4, market share of firm 1 in the tied markets is as follows 
when 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 in the existence of interior equilibrium. 
      𝑀𝑆1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 = (
1
2
) [𝑌(0) + 𝑌(1)]                                                                             
  =
5
8
+ (
1
8
) (
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
) >
1
2
        (4. A8) 
      𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 
                        =
3
8
− (
1
8
) (
𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)2 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)2
) <
1
2
        (4. A9) 
4.5.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4a 
(i) 𝜷𝑨𝟏 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ ⋚ 𝜷𝑨𝟏 𝑵𝒐
∗ , 𝜷𝑩𝟏 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ ⋚ 𝜷𝑩𝟏 𝑵𝒐
∗   
One can compare (4.30)  with (4.44) , and (4.31)  with (4.46)  to show that 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ ⋚ 0 and 𝛽𝐵1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ ⋚ 0 respectively.  
The condition  𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 should be satisfied to 
guarantee the existence of interior equilibrium.  𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 > 0,  𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 > 0. 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ =
3𝔸(20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) − 4𝔸(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)
24𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ < 0 when 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 < 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵. 𝛽𝐴1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ > 0 
when 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 < 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵.   
𝛽𝐵1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ =
3𝔹(20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) − 4𝔹(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)
24𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
 
𝛽𝐵1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ < 0 when 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 < 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵. 𝛽𝐵1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ > 0 
when 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 < 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵.  
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 (ii) ?̃? 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ ⋛ 𝑷𝑨𝟏 𝑵𝒐
∗ + 𝑷𝑩𝟏 𝑵𝒐
∗  
From (4.32), (4.33), and (4.48),  ?̃?1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − (𝑃𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ + 𝑃𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) > 0 when  
𝜃 <  
1
4
+
1
48𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
{
(3Ω − 3) [𝑏𝐵𝑎𝐴𝔸 + 𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐵𝔹]
 
+(3Ω − 5) [𝑏𝐵𝑐𝐴𝔸+ 𝑏𝐴𝑐𝐵𝔹]
}, 
where 𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴, 𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵. 
Thus, ?̃? 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ ⋛ 𝑃𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ + 𝑃𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  if 𝜃 ⋚  
1
4
+
1
48𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
{
(3Ω − 3) [𝑏𝐵𝑎𝐴𝔸 + 𝑏𝐴𝑎𝐵𝔹] 
+(3Ω − 5) [𝑏𝐵𝑐𝐴𝔸+ 𝑏𝐴𝑐𝐵𝔹]
} 
respectively.  
(iii) 𝑴𝑺𝟏 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆 > 𝑴𝑺𝑨𝟏 𝑵𝒐 = 𝑴𝑺𝑩𝟏 𝑵𝒐 
From (4. A4) and (4. A8), firm 1’s market share increases. 
 (iv) 𝝅𝟏 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ > 𝝅𝟏 𝑵𝒐
∗  
Comparing (4. A1) with (4. A5), 𝜋1 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝜋1 𝑁𝑜
∗ > 0 in the range of 𝜃 where 
the pure-bundling strategy of firm 1 is still credible. 
Proof of the range of 𝜽 in the analysis of pure bundling 
If 𝜃 is too extremely high, the pure-bundling strategy of firm 1 will not be 
credible and then pure bundling is pointless to be analysed because firm 1 will not 
deviate from the no-bundling strategy to the pure-bundling strategy. Hence, in the 
pure-bundling section, 𝜃 is assumed to be within the range of 𝜃 that varies according 
to the costs and the addition utility from quality enhancement as in Figure 4.6 with regard 
to the condition for an interior equilibrium, 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵. 
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Figure 4.6 The maximum value of 𝜃 in the analysis of the pure-bundling strategy 
 The maximum value of 𝜃 decreases according to a considerable increase in 
costs and a substantial decrease in additional utility.  When the costs are not too high 
and the additional utility is not too low, the pure-bundling strategy of firm 1 is 
credible, regardless of value of 𝜃. 
4.5.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4b 
 (i) 𝜷𝑨𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ < 𝜷𝑨𝟐 𝑵𝒐
∗ , 𝜷𝑩𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ < 𝜷𝑩𝟐 𝑵𝒐
∗  
Comparing (4.30) with (4.45), and (4.31) with (4.47) gives the following.  
 𝛽𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  
              =  
3𝔸(12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) − 4𝔸(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)
24𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
< 0  
 𝛽𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗  
              =  
3𝔹(12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) − 4𝔹(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)
24𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
< 0  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Series1Maximum value of 𝜃 
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 = 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 
2𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 0 6𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 8𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 10𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 
(𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) 
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 
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In regard to the condition that 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵  for an 
interior equilibrium, 16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 > 0 and 12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2 > 0. 
(ii) 𝑷𝑨𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ ⋛ 𝑷𝑨𝟐 𝑵𝒐
∗ , 𝑷𝑩𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ < 𝑷𝑩𝟐 𝑵𝒐
∗  
 From (4.32) and (4.49), 𝑃𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  > 0 when 
𝜃 <
3
4
−
(3Ω − 1)𝑐𝐴𝔸(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2) + 12𝑎𝐴𝔸𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 12𝔹
2𝑡𝑏𝐴
2
48𝑡𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
, 
where 𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴, 𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵. 
𝑃𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ ⋛ 𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  when 𝜃 ⋚  
3
4
−
(3Ω−1)𝑐𝐴𝔸(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸
2−𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)+12𝑎𝐴𝔸𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵+12𝔹
2𝑡𝑏𝐴
2
48𝑡𝑏𝐴(16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸2−𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
 
respectively. 
 From (4.33) and (4.50), after rearranging the expression, 𝑃𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ > 0 
if Ω <  
1
3
−
4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵(𝑐𝐵𝔹+16𝑡𝑏𝐵)
𝑐𝐵𝔹 (16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸2−𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
; Ω = 
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)2
. However, 
Ω > 1 > 
1
3
−
4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵(𝑐𝐵𝔹+16𝑡𝑏𝐵)
𝑐𝐵𝔹 (16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸2−𝑏𝐴𝔹2)
  when 𝑎𝑘 , 𝑏𝑘 , 𝑐𝑘  are in the range yielding an 
interior equilibrium; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. Therefore, 𝑃𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ < 𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . 
(iii) 𝑴𝑺𝑨𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆 < 𝑴𝑺𝑨𝟐 𝑵𝒐,  𝑴𝑺𝑩𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆 < 𝑴𝑺𝑩𝟐 𝑵𝒐  
From (4. A4) and (4. A9), firm A2 and firm B2’s market shares decrease after 
pure bundling.  
(iv) 𝝅𝑨𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ ⋛ 𝝅𝑨𝟐 𝑵𝒐
∗ , 𝝅𝑩𝟐 𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆
∗ < 𝝅𝑩𝟐 𝑵𝒐
∗   
Comparing (4. A2) with (4. A6), and analogously (4. A3) with (4. A7) reveals 
that 𝜋𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝜋𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ⋛ 0 and 𝜋𝐵2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝜋𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ < 0. 
𝜋𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝜋𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗     
     =
𝑡
576
{
 
 
 
 162 − 288𝜃 +
16𝔸2
𝑡𝑏𝐴
− 108 (
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
+18(
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
2
−
9𝔸2
𝑡𝑏𝐴
(
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
2
}
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𝜋𝐴2 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ − 𝜋𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ > 0 when  
𝜃 <
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
16
+
𝔸2
18𝑡𝑏𝐴
[
 
 
 
 
1 −
1
2
(
 
(
12𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2)
(
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
)
 
2
]
 
 
 
 
−
6
16
(
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
(
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
) +
1
16
(
𝑏𝐵𝔸
2 + 𝑏𝐴𝔹
2
(
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
−𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2
)
)
2
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, 
where 𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 and 𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵. 
4.5.6 Proof of Proposition 4.4c 
From (4.34) and (4.51), one can rearrange 𝐶𝑆 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝐶𝑆 𝑁𝑜 < 0 as 
θ(θ + 9) < 9 − 9𝛺 + 3Ω2 −
1
𝑡
[
𝔸2
𝑏𝑎
+
𝔹2
𝑏𝐵
]
[
 
 
 
 −2 +
15
8
Ω −
3
8
Ω2
 
+
(3Ω − 6)𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝔸2 − 𝑏𝐴𝔹2]
 
 
 
 
, 
where Ω =  
20𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)2−𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)2
 , 𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 > 0, 𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 > 0.  
𝐶𝑆 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 ⋚ 𝐶𝑆 𝑁𝑜  if  θ(θ + 9) ⋚ 9 − 9𝛺 + 3Ω
2 −
1
𝑡
[
𝔸2
𝑏𝑎
+
𝔹2
𝑏𝐵
] [
−2 +
15
8
Ω −
3
8
Ω2
 
+
(3Ω−6)𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
16𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵−𝑏𝐵𝔸2−𝑏𝐴𝔹2
].  
4.5.7 Proof of the conditions for the multi-product firm’s 
equilibrium quality enhancement levels in the pure-bundling 
case 
It is more likely that 𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 − 4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 < 0  when 𝑏𝑘 
and 𝑐𝑘  are comparatively high and 𝑎𝑘  is relatively low in accordance with the 
following; 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. 
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𝜕[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2+𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2−4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
𝜕𝑏𝐴
= (𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 − 4𝑡𝑏𝐵 < 0 if (𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 4𝑡𝑏𝐵. 
𝜕[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2+𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2−4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
𝜕𝑏𝐵
= (𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 − 4𝑡𝑏𝐴 < 0 if (𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 < 4𝑡𝑏𝐴. 
𝜕[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2+𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2−4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
𝜕𝑐𝐴
= −2𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) < 0  
𝜕[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2+𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2−4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
𝜕𝑐𝐵
= −2𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵) < 0  
𝜕[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2+𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2−4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
𝜕𝑎𝐴
= 2𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) > 0  
𝜕[𝑏𝐵(𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴)
2+𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵)
2−4𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵]
𝜕𝑎𝐵
= 2𝑏𝐴(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵) > 0  
It is assumed that 𝑎𝑘 > 𝑐𝑘 and 𝑏𝑘 is relatively high according to the nature of 
telecommunications cost structure and the assumption of the second-order conditions 
for the existence of equilibrium.  
𝜕2𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
    2 < 0 and  
𝜕2𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
     2 < 0 when (𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
2 < 32𝑡𝑏𝐴. 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
    2 < 0  and  
𝜕2𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
     2 < 0  when  (𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
2 < 32𝑡𝑏𝐵;  𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. 
4.5.8 Proof of Proposition 4.5 
(i) Prices  
Proof that 𝜹∗ > 𝟎 
From (4.54), the equilibrium discount cannot be expressed explicitly. One 
may consider the derivative at 𝛿 = 0, which is similar to the no-bundling situation. At 
𝛿 = 0 , the equilibrium prices and quality enhancement levels are symmetric, i.e. 
𝑃𝐴1
∗ = 𝑃𝐴2
∗ , 𝑃𝐵1
∗ = 𝑃𝐵2
∗ , 𝛽𝐴1
∗ = 𝛽𝐴2
∗ , 𝛽𝐵1
∗ = 𝛽𝐵2
∗ . At 𝛿 = 0, firm 1 has incentive to 
increase 𝛿 (offer a bundle discount) in order to reap more profit.  
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𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
=
{
  
 
  
 (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) (
1
2
) [𝜃𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴(𝛽𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0) − 𝑐𝐴(𝛽𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0)]
 
+ (
1
2𝑡
) (
1
2
) [𝑡 + 𝑐𝐵(𝛽𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0) − 𝑐𝐵(𝛽𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0)]
 
− (
1
2
) (
1
2
) }
  
 
  
 
=  
1
4
> 0      (4. A10) 
 
Proof that 𝑷𝑨𝟏
∗ > 𝑷𝑨𝟐
∗   and 𝑷𝑩𝟏
∗ > 𝑷𝑩𝟐
∗  in the mixed-bundling case 
 Considering the case of no bundling (𝛿 = 0), firms choose the symmetric 
equilibrium outcomes of prices and quality enhancement levels in both markets. 
However, when firm 1 is allowed to vary 𝛿 in the mixed-bundling case, it definitely 
chooses 𝛿∗ > 0 to maximise profit. Starting from the point 𝛿 = 0, the derivatives of 
prices in market A (4.58) and (4.60) are shown below. 
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
= 
1
6
+
1
18𝑡
(𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)(𝛽𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0 − 𝛽𝐵2
∗ |𝛿=0) =
1
6
> 0            (4. A11) 
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
= 
1
6𝑡
(−𝑃𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0 + 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0) =
1
6𝑡
(−𝑡 − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0 + 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵1
∗ |𝛿=0) 
                       = −
1
6
< 0                                                                                                 (4. A12) 
As a result of  𝛿∗ > 0 , 𝑃𝐴1
∗  increases but 𝑃𝐴2
∗  decreases from the symmetric no-
bundling benchmark. Therefore, after mixed bundling, 𝑃𝐴1
∗ > 𝑃𝐴2
∗ .  
Similarly, at 𝛿 = 0, the derivatives of prices in market B (4.59) and (4.61) 
are shown below. 
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
= 
1
6
+
1
18𝜃𝑡
(𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)(𝛽𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0 − 𝛽𝐴2
∗ |𝛿=0) =
1
6
> 0            (4. A13) 
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
=
1
6𝜃𝑡
(−𝑃𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0 + 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0) =
1
6𝜃𝑡
(−𝜃𝑡 − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0 + 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴1
∗ |𝛿=0) 
            = −
1
6
< 0                                                                                                   (4. A14) 
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When firm 1 chooses  𝛿∗ > 0, 𝑃𝐵1
∗  increases but 𝑃𝐵2
∗  decreases from the symmetric no-
bundling benchmark. Thus, in the mixed-bundling equilibrium, 𝑃𝐵1
∗ > 𝑃𝐵2
∗ . 
(ii) Quality enhancement  
Proof of the comparison of 𝜷𝑨𝟏
∗ , 𝜷𝑨𝟐
∗ , 𝜷𝑩𝟏
∗ , 𝜷𝑩𝟐
∗  in the mixed-bundling case 
According to (4. A10), firm 1 will offer a bundle discount (𝛿∗ > 0) but the 
equilibrium discount function cannot be expressed explicitly. Instead, one may 
consider at a fixed positive value of discount 𝛿∗ to compare the equilibrium quality 
enhancement levels with the no-bundling case in which the discount value is fixed at 
zero. However, it is found that the equilibrium levels of quality enhancement are 
ambiguous according to 𝜃. To illustrate the equilibrium outcomes, it is assumed that 
the two markets are identical in cost structure and additional utility of quality 
enhancement, but different in taste cost, i.e. 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).  
Table 4.1 Parameter assumptions 
Parameter value 
𝑡 1 
𝜃 (0,1) 
𝑎𝐴 2 
𝑐𝐴 1 
𝑏𝐴 100 
𝑎𝐵 2 
𝑐𝐵 1 
𝑏𝐵 100 
𝑉𝐴 20 
𝑉𝐵 20 
  
Consider the derivatives of profits with respect to quality enhancement levels 
at a fixed discount in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0. First, when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, 
the multi-product firm has incentive to increase quality enhancement levels and the 
single-product firms decrease quality enhancement levels from the symmetric no-
bundling benchmark in both markets. Thus, 𝛽𝐴1
∗ > 𝛽𝐴2
∗   and  𝛽𝐵1
∗ > 𝛽𝐵2
∗ .  
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Second, when θ is moderate, the multi-product firm has incentive to increase 
the quality enhancement level in the more competitive market but decrease the level 
in the less competitive market. Meanwhile, the single-product firms still decrease the 
quality enhancement levels in both markets. Therefore, it is certain that 𝛽𝐴1
∗ > 𝛽𝐴2
∗  but 
the comparison in the less competitive market is ambiguous.  
Third, when θ is sufficiently low, the multi-product firm still has incentive to 
increase the quality enhancement level in the more competitive market but decrease 
the level in the less competitive market. Meanwhile, the single-product firm in the 
more competitive market decreases the quality enhancement level but the single-
product firm in the less competitive market decides to increase the level. Therefore, 
𝛽𝐴1
∗ > 𝛽𝐴2
∗ , 𝛽𝐵1
∗ < 𝛽𝐵2
∗ . These results are shown in Figure 4.7a with 𝛿 = 0.1, Figure 
4.7b with 𝛿 = 0.2 and Figure 4.7c with 𝛿 = 0.3.   
 
Figure 4.7a The derivatives of profits with respect to quality enhancement levels at 
the symmetric no-bundling benchmark (𝛽𝐴1 = 𝛽𝐴2 =
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
, 𝛽𝐵1 = 𝛽𝐵2 =
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
) 
when 𝛿 is fixed at 0.1. 
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Figure 4.7b The derivatives of profits with respect to quality enhancement levels at  
the symmetric no-bundling benchmark (𝛽𝐴1 = 𝛽𝐴2 =
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
, 𝛽𝐵1 = 𝛽𝐵2 =
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
) 
when 𝛿 is fixed at 0.2. 
 
Figure 4.7c The derivatives of profits with respect to quality enhancement levels at 
the symmetric no-bundling benchmark (𝛽𝐴1 = 𝛽𝐴2 =
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
, 𝛽𝐵1 = 𝛽𝐵2 =
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
)  
when 𝛿 is fixed at 0.3. 
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When 𝛿 is fixed at a given positive value around zero, the levels of quality 
enhancement in (4.30) - (4.31), which are in equilibrium in the no-bundling case, 
can no longer maximise the corresponding profit in the mixed-bundling case. In the 
more competitive market, regardless of 𝜃, the multi-product firm increases the quality 
enhancement level (𝛽𝐴1
∗ >
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
)  and the single-product firm decreases the level 
(𝛽𝐴2
∗ <
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
) certainly.  
However, it is ambiguous in the less competitive market according to 𝜃. First, 
when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, the multi-product firm increases the level (𝛽𝐵1
∗ >
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
) 
but the single-product firm decreases the level (𝛽𝐵2
∗ <
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
) . Second, when 𝜃  is 
moderate, the multi-product firm and the single-product firm decrease the levels 
(𝛽𝐵1
∗ , 𝛽𝐵2
∗ <
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
). Lastly, when 𝜃 is sufficiently low, the multi-product firm decreases 
the level (𝛽𝐵1
∗ <
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
)  but the single-product firm increases the level instead 
(𝛽𝐵2
∗ >
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵
).  
4.5.9 Proof of Proposition 4.6 
(i) Proof that 𝝅𝟏
∗ > 𝝅𝑨𝟐
∗ + 𝝅𝑩𝟐
∗   in the mixed-bundling case 
According to (4.16), (4.17) and the equilibrium outcomes in (4.58) - (4.61), 
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝛿
= (𝑃𝐴2
∗ − 𝑐𝐴𝛽𝐴2
∗ ) (−
?̂?
2𝜃𝑡
−
2𝛿
8𝜃𝑡2
) < 0                             (4. A15) 
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝛿
= (𝑃𝐵2
∗ − 𝑐𝐵𝛽𝐵2
∗ ) (−
?̂?
2𝑡
−
2𝛿
8𝜃𝑡2
) < 0                              (4. A16) 
After mixed bundling, firm 1 offers a bundle discount so 𝛿  increases from 
zero. Profits of firm A2 and firm B2 decrease whereas firm 1’s profit increases from 
the symmetric outcomes of the no-bundling case. Therefore, 𝜋1
∗ > 𝜋𝐴2
∗ + 𝜋𝐵2
∗  in the 
mixed-bundling case. 
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(ii) Proof of the equilibrium market shares in the mixed-bundling case 
 As seen in Figure 4.5 with the unit demand assumption, demand for product A1 
is clearly interpreted as market share of product A1, 
𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 = ?̂? +
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
).                               (4. A17) 
Demand for product A2 indicates market share of product A2, 
𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 = 1 −𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 = 1 − {?̂? +
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
)}.          (4. A18) 
Likewise, market shares in market B are the following. 
𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 = ?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
).                                   (4. A19) 
𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 = 1 −𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 =  1 − {?̂? +
𝛿
2𝑡
?̂? +
1
2
(
𝛿
2𝜃𝑡
) (
𝛿
2𝑡
)}.           (4. A20) 
 Henceforth, one may employ the total differential of market share as an 
approximation of the sensitivity of market shares in response to a change of 
equilibrium quality enhancement levels from the no-bundling benchmark.  
𝑑𝑀𝑆𝐴1 =  
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
𝑑𝛽𝐴1 +
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
𝑑𝛽𝐵1 +
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
𝑑𝛽𝐴2 +
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
𝑑𝛽𝐵2 
𝑑𝑀𝑆𝐵1 =  
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
𝑑𝛽𝐴1 +
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
𝑑𝛽𝐵1 +
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
𝑑𝛽𝐴2 +
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
𝑑𝛽𝐵2 
The derivatives of (4. A17)  and (4. A19)  with respect to each quality 
enhancement level in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0 are shown in Figure 4.8a and 
Figure 4.8b according to a range of 𝜃. The parameter values are assumed in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.8a The derivatives of market share of product A1 with respect to  
quality enhancement levels in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0 
 
 
Figure 4.8b The derivatives of market share of product B1 with respect to  
quality enhancement levels in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0 
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To illustrate the effect of mixed bundling on market share, one may follow 
(4.62) - (4.65) and manipulate the derivatives to obtain the differentials of equilibrium 
quality enhancement levels below. The parameters are assumed in Table 4.1 and bundle 
discount (𝛿) is considered as a fixed positive value in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0.  
𝑑𝛽𝐴1 = 𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗  
Substituting 𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗  and 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗  in (4.62) and rearranging the equations 
gives (4. A21) and (4. A22) respectively. 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
)
{
 
 
 
 𝛧1𝔸 [1 −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
+ 𝛧2 [1 −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
}
 
 
 
 
            (4. A21) 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗  = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛧1𝔸[1 −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )]
 
+ 𝛧2 [1 −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )]
 
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   (4. A22) 
Therefore,  
𝑑𝛽𝐴1      
  = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛧1𝔸[
1
2𝜃𝑡
[(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) − (𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]]
  
+𝛧2 [
1
2𝑡
[(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) − (𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]]
 
+
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  (4. A23) 
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𝑑𝛽𝐵1 = 𝛽𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  
Substituting 𝛽𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗  and 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  in (4.63) yields the following. 
𝛽𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ =  (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 𝛧3 [1 −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
 + 𝛧1𝔹 [1 −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
}
 
 
 
 
         (4. A24) 
𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗ = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛧3 [1 −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )]
 
 + 𝛧1𝔹 [1 −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )]
 
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  (4. A25) 
Therefore,  
𝑑𝛽𝐵1 = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛧3
[
 
 
 
 
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
 
−
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
 
 
 
 
  
+𝛧1𝔹
[
 
 
 
 
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
 
−
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
 
 
 
 
  
+
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.               (4. A26) 
 
𝑑𝛽𝐴2 = 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  
Substituting 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗  and 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗   in (4.64) gives the following. 
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𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
) {𝛧4𝔸 [
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
}                (4. A27) 
𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
)
{
 
 
 
 
𝛧4𝔸 [
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )]  −
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 }
 
 
 
 
  (4. A28) 
Thus,  
𝑑𝛽𝐴2 = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−𝛧4𝔸
[
 
 
 
 
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
 
−
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
 
 
 
 
  
+
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.               (4. A29) 
𝑑𝛽𝐵2 = 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗  
Substituting 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗  and 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗  in (4.65) yields the following. 
𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
) {𝛧4𝔹 [
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]}                   (4. A30) 
𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 𝛧4𝔹 [
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )]
 
−
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 }
 
 
 
 
                        (4. A31) 
Therefore,  
𝑑𝛽𝐵2 = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−𝛧4𝔹
[
 
 
 
 
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
 
−
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )]
 
 
 
 
 
 
+
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
,                (4. A32) 
 
 
 
217 
 
where 
𝛽𝑘𝑖 𝑁𝑜
∗  is the equilibrium level of quality enhancement of product 𝑘𝑖 in the no-bundling 
case. 
𝛽𝑘𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗  is the equilibrium level of quality enhancement of product 𝑘𝑖 in the mixed- 
bundling case. 
𝔸 = 𝑎𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴 > 0 
𝔹 = 𝑎𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵 > 0 
𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}  
𝑖 ∈ {1,2}  
𝛧1 = −
𝛿
6𝑡
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
)(
2𝛿𝜃𝑡2 + 𝛿3
36𝜃𝑡
) +
2
3
  
𝛧2 = −
𝛿
6𝜃𝑡
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
)
[
 
 
 
 𝑐𝐴 (
96𝜃2𝑡4 − 40𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
144𝜃𝑡2
)
 
+𝑎𝐴 (
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3𝛿2
12
)
]
 
 
 
 
  
              + 
𝛿
6𝜃𝑡
𝑐𝐴 
𝛧3 = −
𝛿
6𝑡
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
)
[
 
 
 
 𝑐𝐵 (
96𝜃2𝑡4 − 40𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
144𝜃𝑡2
)
 
+𝑎𝐵 (
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3𝛿2
12
)
]
 
 
 
 
   +  
𝛿
6𝑡
𝑐𝐵 
 
𝛧4 = 1 − (
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
)(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3𝛿2
12
) 
 
              −
𝛿2
12𝜃𝑡2
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
)(
4𝜃𝑡2 − 3𝛿2
12
) 
 
              −
𝛿
2𝑡
(
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2 + 𝛿4
)(
2𝛿𝜃𝑡2 + 𝛿3
36𝜃𝑡
). 
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At a fixed value of 𝛿 ≥ 0, 𝛧1 > 0, 𝛧2 ≤ 0, 𝛧3 ≤ 0, 𝛧4 > 0 and 𝛧4 > 𝛧1.  
𝑑𝛽𝐴2 > 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐴1 < 0 for all values of 𝜃. Comparing (4. A23) with (4. A29) 
reveals the following.  
|𝑑𝛽𝐴2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐴1|   
    = (
1
2𝑏𝐴
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(𝛧4 − 𝛧1)𝔸 (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
] 
−𝛧2 (
1
2𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              (4. A33) 
 
However, the signs of 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 and 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 depend on value of 𝜃. Compare (4. A26) 
with (4. A32) yields the three following cases of 𝜃.   
First, when 𝜃 is high, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 > 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 < 0.  
|𝑑𝛽𝐵2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐵1|  
   = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(𝛧4 − 𝛧1)𝔹(
1
2𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
−𝛧3 (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  > 0   (4. A34) 
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Second, when 𝜃 is moderate, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 < 0.  
|𝑑𝛽𝐵2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐵1|            
    = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(𝛧1 + 𝛧4)𝔹(
1
2𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
+𝛧3 (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
−
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             (4. A35) 
Third, when 𝜃 is low, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 < 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 > 0. 
|𝑑𝛽𝐵2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐵1|          
    = (
1
2𝑏𝐵
)
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(𝛧1 − 𝛧4)𝔹(
1
2𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
+𝛧3 (
1
2𝜃𝑡
) [
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
+
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             (4. A36) 
 
It is also found that  
𝜕(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
=
𝛿
6𝑡
𝔸 [
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2
+𝛿4
] (
2𝛿𝜃𝑡2 + 𝛿3
36𝜃𝑡
) +
𝔸
3
 > 0 
𝜕(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
=
𝛿
6𝑡
𝔹 [
144𝜃𝑡2
144𝜃2𝑡4 − 76𝜃𝑡2𝛿2
+𝛿4
] (
2𝛿𝜃𝑡2 + 𝛿3
36𝜃𝑡
) +
𝔹
3
> 0. 
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In conclusion, when 𝜃  is high, 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . 
One can conclude that [
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )] > 0, 
and analogously, [
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )] > 0.  From 
(4. A33) and (4. A34), |𝑑𝛽𝐴2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐴1| > 0 and |𝑑𝛽𝐵2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐵1| > 0. 
When 𝜃 is moderate, 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . According to 
(4. A33)  and (4. A35) , it is concluded that |𝑑𝛽𝐴2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐴1| > 0 but the sign of 
|𝑑𝛽𝐵2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐵1| is still ambiguous.  
When 𝜃  is low,  𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ and 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . Therefore, one 
may conclude that [
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) −
1
2𝜃𝑡
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )] > 0 and 
[
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) −
1
2𝑡
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )] < 0.  According to (4. A33) 
and (4. A36), the signs of |𝑑𝛽𝐴2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐴1| and |𝑑𝛽𝐵2| − |𝑑𝛽𝐵1|  are ambiguous.  
As shown in Figure 4.8a and 4.8b, 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
  and  
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
  are positive, but 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
 and 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
  are negative for all values of 𝜃. 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
= −
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
 
and 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
= −
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
. Likewise, 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
  and 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
  are positive, but 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
  and 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
  are negative for all values of 𝜃.  
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
= −
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
 
and analogously 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
= −
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
. Moreover, 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
>
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
> 0 
and  
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
>
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
> 0. 
In accordance with proof of Proposition 4.5, first, when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, 
𝑑𝛽𝐴1, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 > 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐴2, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 < 0. It is certain that 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  and 
𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 in this case.  
Second, when 𝜃 is moderate, 𝑑𝛽𝐴1 > 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐴2, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 < 0. Thus, if 
𝑑𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑑𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 −  𝑑𝛽𝐵2 > 0 , firm 1’s market shares strongly increase after 
mixed bundling. Assuming parameter values in Table 4.1, firm 1 can expand  
its market shares certainly. Therefore, it is likely that firm 1’s market shares 
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increase from the symmetric benchmark after all, i.e. 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 and 
𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑.  
Third, when 𝜃  is sufficiently low, 𝑑𝛽𝐴1, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 > 0  and 𝑑𝛽𝐴2, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 < 0 . 
Additionally, in the more competitive market, 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
>
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
> 0 . The 
positive effect of 𝑑𝛽𝐴1 and 𝑑𝛽𝐴2  is likely to outweigh the negative effect of 𝑑𝛽𝐵1  
and 𝑑𝛽𝐵2  on firm 1’s market share. Mixed bundling is likely to expand firm 1’s 
market share in the more competitive market. However, in the less competitive 
market, 
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
>
𝜕𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
> 0 . The negative effect of 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 and 𝑑𝛽𝐵2  has  
a tendency to outweigh the positive effect of 𝑑𝛽𝐴1 and 𝑑𝛽𝐴2 on firm 1’s market share. 
Consequently, it is likely that firm 1’s market share in the less competitive market 
shrinks.   
In addition, as clearly shown in Figure 4.8a in the more competitive market, 
the effects of quality enhancement levels on their own markets are softened by taste 
cost. When 𝜃  increases (taste cost increases whereas the degree of competition 
decreases), the market is less competitive. In other words, firms are more powerful to 
maintain their market shares, and it is more difficult for firms to approach their rivals’ 
customers by offering attractive quality enhancement.  
4.5.10 Proof of Proposition 4.7a 
 𝜋1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝜋1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝜋𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝜋𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 𝜋𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ <  𝜋𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗  
At 𝛿 = 0, (4. A10), (4. A15) and (4. A16) show that 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
> 0, 
𝜕𝜋𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝛿
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜋𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝛿
< 0 respectively. Thus, compared to the no-bundling case, firm 1 chooses 𝛿∗ > 0 
and accordingly reaps more profit, while firm A2 and firm B2 lose profits. 
4.5.11 Proof of Proposition 4.7b 
(i) Prices 
 𝑃𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝑃𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗  and  𝑃𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝑃𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  
𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗  and  𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗  
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From (4. A11) - (4. A14), at 𝛿 = 0, 
𝜕𝑃𝐴1
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
> 0, 
𝜕𝑃𝐴2
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
< 0,  
𝜕𝑃𝐵1
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
> 0 
and  
𝜕𝑃𝐵2
∗
𝜕𝛿
|
𝛿=0
< 0. The bundle discount (𝛿) will deviate from zero and finally 𝛿∗ > 0. 
Therefore, firm 1’s prices increase but the prices of firm A2 and firm B2 decrease from 
the symmetric price benchmark in the no-bundling case in which 𝛿 is fixed at zero. 
(ii) Quality enhancement  
In the more competitive market, 𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . 
However, in the less competitive market, a change in quality enhancement levels  
is ambiguous. According to the proof of Proposition 4.5 (ii) under the parameter 
assumptions in Table 4.1, there are different results in the three cases of 𝜃.  
First, when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, firm 1 increases its quality enhancement levels 
while firm A2 and firm B2 decrease their quality enhancement levels in market A  
and market B respectively. Therefore, 𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 
𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜 
∗ . 
 Second, when 𝜃 is moderate, firm 1 increases the quality enhancement level 
in market A but it decreases the level in market B. Meanwhile, firm A2 and B2  
decrease the levels. 𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ ,  𝛽𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 
𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ .  
Third, when 𝜃 is sufficiently low, firm 1 increases the quality enhancement 
level in market A but it decreases the level in market B. Meanwhile, firm A2 
decreases the level in market A but firm B2 increases the level in market B. 
𝛽𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐴1 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐵1 𝑁𝑜
∗  and 𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ < 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ > 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ . 
4.5.12 Proof of Proposition 4.7c 
A change in equilibrium market shares is ambiguous. Under the assumptions 
in Table 4.1, the results depend on 𝜃 as stated in proof of Proposition 4.6 (ii).  
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Firstly, when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, it is certain that 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑁𝑜, 
𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 < 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑁𝑜 and 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑁𝑜, 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 < 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑁𝑜.  
Secondly, when 𝜃  is moderate, the market share outcomes are ambiguous.  
If 𝑑𝛽𝐴1 − 𝑑𝛽𝐴2 + 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 −  𝑑𝛽𝐵2 > 0 , 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑁𝑜 , 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 < 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑁𝑜 
and similarly 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑁𝑜, 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 < 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑁𝑜.  
Thirdly, when 𝜃 is sufficiently low, the outcomes are ambiguous. In the more 
competitive market, it is likely that 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐴1 𝑁𝑜 ,  𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 < 𝑀𝑆𝐴2 𝑁𝑜 . 
Conversely, in the less competitive market, it is likely that 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 < 𝑀𝑆𝐵1 𝑁𝑜, 
 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 > 𝑀𝑆𝐵2 𝑁𝑜. 
4.5.13 Proof of Proposition 4.7d 
A change in consumer surplus is ambiguous. According to (4.30) and (4.31), 
the equilibrium outcomes in the no-bundling case (𝛿 = 0) are symmetric and also 
contribute to consumer surplus in (4.34). After mixed bundling, 𝛿 increases from zero 
to a certain amount of positive value. The levels of equilibrium quality enhancement 
cannot be expressed explicitly. Instead, the total differential of consumer surplus can 
be used as an approximation of a change in consumer surplus to compare consumer 
surplus in the mixed-bundling case with that in the no-bundling case.  
𝑑𝐶𝑆 =  
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
𝑑𝛽𝐴1 +
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
𝑑𝛽𝐵1 +
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
𝑑𝛽𝐴2 +
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
𝑑𝛽𝐵2 
In the neighbourhood of  𝛿 = 0 , the derivatives of consumer surplus with 
respect to quality enhancement levels when 𝜃 varies in a range of (0,1) are shown in 
Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9 The derivatives of consumer surplus with respect to  
quality enhancement levels in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0 
 Substituting (4. A23), (4. A26), (4. A29), and (4. A32) in the above differential 
(𝑑𝐶𝑆) yields the following.  
𝑑𝐶𝑆 =  
1
2𝜃𝑡
[
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) 
−(𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
{
  
 
  
 
Ζ1𝔸
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
− Ζ4𝔸
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
)
2𝑏𝐴
+Ζ3
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵 }
  
 
  
 
 
 
       +
1
2𝑡
[
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ )
−(𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ )
]
{
  
 
  
 
Ζ2
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
+ Ζ1𝔹
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
−Ζ4𝔹
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
)
2𝑏𝐵 }
  
 
  
 
 
 
       +
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
 
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
 
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
 
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
 
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
 
𝜃 
0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1  
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      +
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
)
2𝑏𝐴
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
)
2𝑏𝐵
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
  
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
(4. A37) 
According to proofs of Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.6, the result is 
divided into three cases of 𝜃. First, when 𝜃 is sufficiently high, 𝑑𝛽𝐴1, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 > 0 and 
𝑑𝛽𝐴2, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 < 0. One may consider (4. A37) in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0 by rewriting  
(4. A37) with regard to the derivatives and the parameters assumed in Table 4.1. The 
sign of 𝑑𝐶𝑆 is ambiguous.  
Second, when 𝜃 is moderate, 𝑑𝛽𝐴1 > 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐵1, 𝑑𝛽𝐴2, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 < 0. From (4. A37) 
in the neighbourhood of  𝛿 = 0, the sign of  𝑑𝐶𝑆 is still ambiguous.  
Third, when 𝜃 is sufficiently low, 𝑑𝛽𝐴1, 𝑑𝛽𝐵2 > 0 and 𝑑𝛽𝐴2, 𝑑𝛽𝐵1 < 0.  
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) − (𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ ) > 0 
(𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) − (𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐵𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ ) < 0.  
In addition to the expressions, it is also found that 
1
2𝜃𝑡
{Ζ1𝔸
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
− Ζ4𝔸
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
)
2𝑏𝐴
+ Ζ3
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
} < 0, 
and  
1
2𝑡
{Ζ2
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
+ Ζ1𝔹
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
− Ζ4𝔹
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
)
2𝑏𝐵
} > 0 
Furthermore,  
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[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
)
2𝑏𝐴
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
)
2𝑏𝐵
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
  
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
< 0. 
Therefore, one can conclude that 𝑑𝐶𝑆 < 0 certainly in this case. 
4.5.14 Proof of Corollary 4.1 
To consider the sign of 𝑑𝐶𝑆, one may start with the assumptions of the markets 
with the identical degrees of competition and the parameter values in Table 4.1, i.e.  
𝜃 = 1, 𝑏𝐴 = 𝑏𝐵, 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵, 𝑎𝐴 = 𝑎𝐵 . Firm 1 will set product A1’s price equal to 
product B1’s price and choose product A1’s quality enhancement level equal to 
product B1’s level. Likewise, firm A2 will choose the same price and level of quality 
enhancement as firm B2. This can be seen in both the no-bundling case and the 
mixed-bundling case, i.e. 𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ = 𝑃𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ = 𝛽𝐵2 𝑁𝑜
∗ , 𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ = 𝑃𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ , 
𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ = 𝛽𝐵2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ . One may rearrange (4. A37)  with these assumptions and 
obtain the following. 
𝑑𝐶𝑆 < 0 if  
(𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) − (𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ ) > −
𝑇3
𝑇1 + 𝑇2
             (4. A38) 
where 
𝑇1 = 
1
2𝜃𝑡
{Ζ1𝔸
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
− Ζ4𝔸
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
)
2𝑏𝐴
+ Ζ3
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
}, 
𝑇2 =
1
2𝑡
{Ζ2
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
+ Ζ1𝔹
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
− Ζ4𝔹
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
)
2𝑏𝐵
}, 
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𝑇3 =
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
)
2𝑏𝐴
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐴1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
)
2𝑏𝐵
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝛽𝐵1
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
 
 
            +
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
)
2𝑏𝐴
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐴2
𝜕𝛽𝐴2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
 
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
+
(
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
)
2𝑏𝐵
∙
(
 
 𝜕𝜋𝐵2
𝜕𝛽𝐵2
|
𝛽𝐴1=𝛽𝐴2=
𝑎𝐴−𝑐𝐴
6𝑏𝐴
  
𝛽𝐵1=𝛽𝐵2=
𝑎𝐵−𝑐𝐵
6𝑏𝐵 )
 
. 
 
(4. A38) is true because (𝑃𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑁𝑜
∗ ) − (𝑃𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ − 𝐶𝐴𝛽𝐴2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑
∗ ) > 0 
and −
𝑇3
𝑇1+𝑇2
 < 0 in the neighbourhood of 𝛿 = 0. Therefore, in this setting of identical 
parameters, the mixed-bundling strategy decreases consumer surplus from the no-
bundling benchmark.  
Table 4.2 The value of −
𝑻𝟑
𝑻𝟏+𝑻𝟐
 when 𝜹 is fixed around zero73 
𝜹 −
𝑻𝟑
𝑻𝟏 + 𝑻𝟐
 
0.1 -0.03752 
0.2 -0.05548 
0.3 -0.06758 
0.4 -0.07617 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73
 This table shows the value of −
𝑇3
𝑇1+𝑇2
 when 𝛿 is fixed around zero under the assumptions of the 
markets with identical taste cost (𝜃 = 1) and the parameter values in Table 4.1. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
 
The telecommunications sector has been growing rapidly as a result of the 
revolution in telecommunications technology and consumer trends. However, entry 
into this industry is naturally suppressed by a requirement of enormous amounts of 
investment in infrastructure and operation, in addition to the spectrum allocation 
managed by the telecommunications regulator. Theoretically speaking, in the absence 
of collusion, symmetric firms are expected to compete strongly. It would be easier for 
the regulator to monitor the competition among symmetric firms. However, it can be 
seen in the real business world that firms are more likely to be different in terms of 
cost structure, reputation, consumer bases, the advantages of incumbency, and the 
scope of services. All of these aspects in the environment of asymmetry greatly 
influence the equilibrium market outcomes. A firm in a dominant position has a great 
tendency to impose an aggressive strategy to extract rent and to corner its underdog 
rivals by predatory practices.  
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the competition in the 
telecommunications sector in the context of asymmetric firms in order to point out the 
effects of firm asymmetry on the market outcomes and social welfare under various 
critical situations. Chapter 2 has studied the competition between two facility-based 
mobile network operators under different access charge regulations in the presence of 
firm asymmetry in cost and reputation. Further studying cooperation in the investment 
stage, Chapter 3 has examined the quality-enhancing effects of various approaches of 
infrastructure sharing, ranging from co-investment amongst competing firms to 
service-based entry, in a duopoly setting based on Cournot competition. In addition to 
competition in a single product market, Chapter 4 has developed the bigger picture to 
capture the competition between a multi-product firm and its single-product rivals in 
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two duopolistic product markets with different degrees of competition intensity or 
product differentiation. The effects of the multi-product firm’s bundling strategies on 
quality enhancement incentives and consumer welfare were explored in this chapter. 
5.1 Significant findings and policy implications 
As seen in the aforementioned theoretical studies and empirical evidence, 
interconnection among mobile network operators is deemed to be a critical aspect in 
market inefficiency, especially if firms are asymmetric. To suggest an appropriate 
regulatory regime in the setting of asymmetry in cost and reputation, Chapter 2 has 
drawn comparisons of three different pragmatic regulations on interconnection;  
(1) no regulation on access charge, (2) the symmetric cost-based access charge 
regulation and (3) the asymmetric cost-based access charge regulation. In the 
unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to secure a dominant position and 
serve the majority of subscribers, despite earning an inferior reputation to the high-
cost firm, only if its reputation is not significantly worse. This is because the low-cost 
firm can offer a lower on-net price to attract consumers in accordance with marginal 
cost pricing. Additionally, similar to the main findings reported by Hoernig (2007), 
Lopez and Rey (2009), in the wholesale market, the dominant low-cost firm can set  
a higher mark-up on access charge to widen a gap of firm asymmetry and finally reap 
higher profit than its high-cost rival. Therefore, intervention by the regulator is 
necessary to protect consumer welfare and promote competition in this environment 
of asymmetry.  
The symmetric regulation has an immediate effect on off-net prices, which are 
pushed down to actual marginal costs. After both firms’ access mark-ups are eliminated, 
the low-cost firm can no longer undermine its high-cost rival by means of access 
charge pricing, but it still takes advantage of its low cost and/or its reputation to hold 
the dominant position in the market. Similarly, the asymmetric regulation is a highly 
effective way of facilitating entry, especially for a small entrant with high cost. In 
other words, there is an increased probability that the high-cost entrant can take over 
the dominant position from the low-cost established firm if it has a sufficiently better 
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reputation than the established firm. However, the optimal regulation is ambiguous. 
The asymmetric regulation can generate higher social welfare if the difference in cost 
and the discrepancy in reputation are not too substantial and the two networks are 
differentiated enough. Otherwise, it damages social welfare because the new firm 
lacks efficiency and the established firm loses its profit more significantly. Thus, the 
implementation of the asymmetric regulation should be assessed carefully. It may be 
needed for the launch of a new mobile service to stimulate entry of the new network 
that may have higher cost and/or a worse reputation (unknown service) than the 
established firm. Under the asymmetric regulation, the high-cost firm should be a 
potential competitor in terms of cost, reputation and service differentiation to ensure a 
boost in social welfare. When the new network is gradually adopted by consumers 
and/or improves efficiency in cost, the regulator may reconsider imposing the symmetric 
regulation instead because the asymmetry between the two firms becomes subtle.  
In addition to the complex relationship amongst competing firms in the pricing 
stage, Chapter 3 has shed light on the earlier stage, where firms make their decisions on 
investment. Infrastructure sharing in telecommunications was investigated under the 
key assumption that firms have different cost structures. This chapter has compared  
the impacts of various infrastructure-sharing approaches on incentives for quality 
enhancement in next generation network, including (1) stand-alone investment without 
infrastructure sharing, (2) co-investment, and (3) the fully-distributed-cost regulatory 
regime. Under stand-alone investment, the low-cost firm can offer higher levels of 
quality upgrade, firm output and retail price and earn higher profit than the high-cost 
firm due to its cost saving. However, the high-cost firm can employ other approaches 
of infrastructure sharing to enter the market instead of network duplication. Co-
investment can boost the profits of both firms, even though the high-cost firm with 
lower bargaining power agrees to invest in a larger proportion of total investment, 
earning lower profit than the low-cost firm. Compared to stand-alone investment, co-
investment may be considered to be collusive in quality upgrade and potentially 
results in a shrinkage of consumer bases and a decline in consumer welfare, when 
infrastructure sharing does not yield a sufficient amount of cost saving.  
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Access to infrastructure under the fully-distributed-cost regulation may be an 
alternative solution to the problem of little incentive to upgrade quality. However, 
compared to co-investment, this approach causes firms to shrink their consumer bases 
and raise corresponding prices instead. Overall, the fully-distributed-cost approach 
threatens consumer surplus despite the quality upgrade incentive.  
Among these approaches in accordance with infrastructure sharing, the optimal 
approach depends on what is the highest priority from the regulator’s perspective. Co-
investment causes lower incentive to upgrade quality, but it can expand the size of the 
aggregate subscriber group and yield higher aggregate consumer surplus than the fully-
distributed-cost regulation. In this chapter, the comparison between quality upgrade 
and consumer surplus under co-investment and those under stand-alone investment  
is still ambiguous according to the degree of benefit from cost saving through 
infrastructure sharing. If the cost-saving benefit is substantial, service quality will be 
significantly enhanced with the efficient cost structure and consumer welfare will 
finally be improved. Therefore, it is suggested that the regulator should support 
negotiation on co-investment, only if infrastructure sharing can yield the substantial 
benefit of cost reduction. Otherwise, collusion in quality upgrade is likely to occur 
and stand-alone investment seems more appropriate in terms of consumer welfare. 
In contrast to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, where firm asymmetry was introduced 
in only one product market, Chapter 4 has extended to the competition in the broader 
context of asymmetry, involved with multiple product markets with different degrees 
of competition intensity. When bundling is not allowed, the multi-product firm is 
forced to compete with its single-product rivals in the two separate markets, resulting 
in the symmetric equilibrium outcomes of quality enhancement, price, market share 
and profit in each market. 
 However, the multi-product firm has strong incentives to employ some 
bundling strategies in order to reap higher profit. These strategies threaten its single-
product rivals in almost all situations. With the pure-bundling strategy, the multi-
product firm offers more attractive quality enhancement, has larger market share, and 
accordingly earns greater profit than its rivals because it takes into consideration the 
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spillover between the two tied markets, which its single-product rivals omit. 
Compared to the no-bundling case, the pure-bundling strategy dampens the single-
product firms’ incentives for quality enhancement in both markets. Meanwhile, due to 
the spillover, pure bundling can stimulate the multi-product firm’s investment in 
quality enhancement, if the associated costs are comparatively low and the additional 
utility from quality enhancement is relatively high. When the two markets are 
significantly different in competition intensity, the outcome is surprising in that, in 
addition to the multi-product firm, the single-product firm in the more competitive 
market can also raise its price and increase profit as a result of a sharp decrease in 
competition intensity after pure bundling. Nevertheless, the single-product firm in the 
less competitive market undoubtedly decreases its price in response and loses profit 
because of the aggressive strategy.  
 With the mixed-bundling strategy, similar to the findings reported by 
Armstrong (2011) and Reisinger (2006), the multi-product firm can discriminate 
consumers by offering a bundle discount and charging higher individual prices than 
its single-product rivals, and it subsequently earns greater profit. Clearly, this strategy 
greatly influences the outcome in the more competitive market. The multi-product 
firm can expand market share by attracting the consumers who encounter its high 
individual prices by its superior product quality to its single-product rival. These 
findings have also been observed in the less competitive market under the condition 
that the two markets are not too different in competition intensity. Compared to the 
no-bundling case, in the more competitive market, this strategy certainly encourages 
the multi-product firm to improve quality and to expand its market share, but it 
undermines the single-product rival’s incentive for quality enhancement. This outcome 
also unfolds in the less competitive market when the two markets are not too different 
in degree of competition.  
The pure-bundling strategy is likely to threaten consumer welfare when the 
two tied markets are significantly different in terms of competition intensity. The 
regulators should not allow pure bundling if a tying market and a tied market are 
significantly different in competition intensity. However, the regulators may take into 
consideration a boost in quality enhancement through the pure-bundling strategy in 
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the situation where the quality enhancement is cost efficient and the two markets are 
not too different in competition intensity. Additionally, the regulators should carefully 
consider the mixed-bundling strategy because its effect on consumer surplus is also 
ambiguous. Mixed bundling may harm consumer welfare if there is a sharp distinction 
in degrees of competition in the two markets. In this situation, mixed bundling distorts 
the more competitive market so significantly that consumer surplus is destroyed by 
the increasing disutility as a consequence of deviating from the originally preferred 
products. Otherwise, in addition to an increase in consumer welfare, it is interesting to 
note that mixed bundling may stimulate quality enhancement by the multi-product 
firm, especially in the more competitive market. 
In conclusion, as observed in the three different frameworks of firm asymmetry, 
a dominant firm may employ a predatory strategy that puts its rivals at a disadvantage. 
The dominance usually results from lower cost structure, better reputation and/or 
wider scope of services. In addition to market foreclosure, incentive for quality 
enhancement is one of the major concerns. Most predatory strategies adopted by a 
dominant firm are more likely to damage consumer welfare. The regulator should 
carefully monitor the dominant firm’s behaviour under certain circumstances, which 
inevitably involves making trade-offs between static efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency. From a dynamic viewpoint, this includes a boost in competition intensity 
and quality enhancement. 
In the context of interconnection in mobile telecommunications, regulations on 
access charge are still necessary to eliminate the aforementioned price distortions. 
Compared to the symmetric cost-based access charge regulation, the asymmetric 
regulation is more effective in encouraging facility-based entry, but it may not be 
optimal in the situation in which the high-cost entrant is too inefficient in terms of 
cost, reputation and service differentiation. Moreover, with concern over infrastructure 
sharing, this thesis has strongly supported that co-investment yields higher consumer 
surplus than the other infrastructure-sharing approaches, including the fully-distributed-
cost regulation and the unregulated access price approach. However, it is argued that 
compared to stand-alone investment, co-investment is likely to provoke collusion to 
suppress quality enhancement, consequently dampening consumer welfare, when cost 
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saving from infrastructure sharing is negligible. Finally, in the setting of multiple 
product markets, the pure-bundling strategy and the mixed-bundling strategy probably 
reduce consumer surplus when the less competitive market is very distinct from the 
more competitive market in terms of competition intensity or product differentiation. 
Thus, the regulator should keep a close eye on these strategies in various competitive 
situations because their far-reaching effects on welfare vary depending on firm 
asymmetry in cost structure, reputation and the competitive natures of the markets.  
5.2 Limitations and further research 
To systematically analyse the asymmetric firms’ behaviour, it is necessary to 
model the competition based on some reasonable assumptions and limitations. These 
assumptions are made to highlight the far-reaching effects of firm asymmetry in 
critical situations.  
Firstly, on the demand side, this thesis assumes specific functional forms of 
demand. In order to simplify the models, it is acceptable to set up a specific demand 
function and a utility function to capture how consumers perceive products or services 
in a particular way. Further research may attain a higher level of generality by 
assuming general functions. In addition, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the assumption 
of unit demand simplifies the models for telecommunications services in that a 
consumer normally subscribes to only one service provider. This assumption may be 
reconsidered in further research when it plays a pivotal part in adapting models for 
other product markets with different consumption patterns.  
Secondly, on the supply side, this study investigates the market outcomes in 
the setting of firm asymmetry based on perfect information on the types of the firms. 
For example, it is assumed that the firms’ cost structures are not private information. 
The regulator can distinguish the low-cost firm from the high-cost firm. Likewise, the 
competitors and consumers can correctly perceive cost structures and reputation. In 
the telecommunications markets, the assumption about complete information is 
reasonable. Service providers in several countries are legally obliged to report their 
cost structures or reveal some relevant information in order that the regulator, the 
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public and other service providers can deduce information about cost. However, it is 
interesting to conduct research on the assumption that information on cost structure is 
private and incomplete.  
Thirdly, the timing of the games in this thesis is mainly based on multi-stage 
games where firms choose their strategies of prices and/or quality enhancement 
simultaneously in each stage. It is difficult to ensure that the competition in the real 
world follows a one-shot game. Firms may adjust their prices or levels of quality 
enhancement frequently. Additionally, firms may cooperate in price setting. From a 
dynamic perspective, entry into the market may occur in the form of a repeated game. 
Nevertheless, these advanced versions of extensive-form games are too complex for 
the purpose of this study. To clearly interpret the main findings, these assumptions are 
still necessary for this thesis.  
Lastly, the models are designed on the basis of duopolistic competition. There 
are only two asymmetric firms in each market. Future research may extend to the 
competition among multiple firms. However, the duopolistic models are reasonable in 
the telecommunications markets because it can be seen in the real business world that 
only a few service providers operate as a result of a fundamental requirement of large-
scale investment. 
Despite these simplistic assumptions and other limitations, this study is useful 
in that it can point out the results and the suggestions for the second-best solutions 
when the first-best practice is impossible. It is still necessary to base these studies on 
some assumptions in order to focus on the key variables and their impacts on the 
equilibrium market outcomes. The regulators should monitor the competition in the 
telecommunications sector with regard to the concerns mentioned in this thesis. The 
regulators can derive the optimal policies and the appropriate regulations in certain 
circumstances from the suggestions in this thesis. 
Further research may investigate the competition among asymmetric firms 
regarding other interesting issues. For instance, telecommunications spectrum allocation 
and licensing is one of the major concerns in telecommunications. Underdog firms are 
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likely to be unsuccessful in auction. Incumbents or big firms are more likely to win 
the auction than other bidders. In other words, they can transfer their dominance to  
the next generation telecommunications markets. The auction may be a process of 
allocating spectrum to the most efficient players. Nevertheless, there are some concerns 
about collusion and auction design. Future research should support the regulators in 
designing appropriate mechanisms and imposing optimal regulations/deregulations  
in the telecommunications industry, which has changed in line with the advancement 
of technology and consumer trends.  
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